

Notes and References

Chapter 1

1. A synthesis of research on the decision is Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). Insider accounts include Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York: Bantam edition, 1966); Roger Hillman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).
2. David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972).
3. An extended account of the invasion is K. E. Meyer and T. Szulc, *The Cuban Invasion* (New York: Praeger, 1962).
4. See Karl W. Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas, "The Steps to War: A Survey of System Levels, Decision Stages, and Research Results" in Patrick J. McGowan (ed.) *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, vol. 1 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 275-329, p. 300.
5. Janis (see n. 1); Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (Sept., 1972), pp. 751-785. See also the comment by I. M. Destler and the rejoinder by George, *ibid.*, pp. 786-795.
6. For example, Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1930); James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) and *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972); Glendon Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959); Arnold Rogow, *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1963); Alexander and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: Dover paperback, 1964); Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia" in David Finlay et al., *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 25-96; and "The Operational Code Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Phil-osophical and Instrumental Beliefs," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, III: 1 (March, 1970), pp. 123-157; Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966); Margaret Hermann, "How Leaders Process Information and the Effect on Foreign Policy, An Exploratory Study", in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Finding, and Methods* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974); John Toland, *Adolph Hitler* (New York: Doubleday, 1976); Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York: Norton, 1958) and *Gandhi's Truth* (New York: Norton, 1969); Bruce Mazlish, *In Search of Nixon* (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Bruce Mazlish, *The Revolutionary Ascetic: Evolution of a Political Type* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Bruce Mazlish, *Kissinger: The Euro-pean Mind in American Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Lucian Pye, *Mao Tse Tung: The Man in the Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976); Nancy Clinch, *The Kennedy Neurosis* (New York: Grossset and Dunlop, 1973); Robert

Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary 1879-1929* (New York: Norton, 1974); Robert Tucker, "The Georges' Wilson Reexamined: An Essay on Psychobiography." *American Political Science Review*, 71:2 (June, 1977), pp. 606-618; Irving Lefberg, *Analyzing Judicial Change: the Uses of Systematic Biography* (unpublished doctoral thesis in progress, M.I.T.); Walter C. Langer, *The Mind of Adolph Hitler* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

7. Schlesinger (n. 1); Janis (n. 1).

8. Guerilla warfare was a preoccupation of Kennedy even when he was in the Senate. See Schlesinger (n. 1), pp. 340-342.

9. Schlesinger (n. 1).

Chapter 2

1. See Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), abridged edition, pp. 319-322. Related studies of the way wars are justified are Kjell Goldmann, *International Norms and War Between States* (Stockholm: Laromedelsforlagen, 1971) and F. M. Kail, *What Washington Said: Administration Rhetoric and the Vietnam War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

2. A classic article in the debate is Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 93-117. The most recent review of the issues is Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively" in Robert M. Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 18-54. See also Morton Kaplan, *On Historical and Political Knowing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 109-121.

3. General reviews of psychological approaches to international relations include Herbert Kelman and Alfred Bloom, "Assumptive Frameworks in International Politics" in Jeanne Knutson (ed.), *Handbook of Political Psychology* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), pp. 261-295; Amitai Etzioni, "Social Psychological Aspects of International Relations" in G. Lindzey and G. Aronson (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology* second edition (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), vol. 5, pp. 538-601; James C. Davies, "Aggression, Violence, Revolution, and War" in Jeanne Knutson (ed.), *Handbook of Political Psychology* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), pp. 234-260. Broad overviews of international relations theory are James E. Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1971) and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Theory of International Relations," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 8, pp. 1-85.

On the role of the individual decision maker see Holsti (n. 2); Herbert Kelman, "The Role of the Individual in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Considerations," *Journal of International Affairs*, 24:1 (1970), pp. 1-17; Lloyd Jensen, "Foreign Policy Calculation" in Michael Haas (ed.), *International Sys-*

- tems: *A Behavioral Approach* (New York: Chandler, 1974), pp. 77-97; Samuel A. Kirpatrick, "psychological views of decision-making" in Cornelius P. Cotter (ed.), *Political Science Annual: Individual Decision Making* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975); Anthony A. D'Amato, "Psychological Constructs in Foreign Policy Prediction," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11 (1967), pp. 294-311; John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), ch. 4; Margaret Hermann, "Effect of Personal Characteristics of Leaders on Foreign Policy" in M. A. East et al. (eds.), *Why Nations Act* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977).
- Of special methodological importance are Fred I. Greenstein's *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), and (treating personality experimentally) Donald T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments" in James Caporaso and Leslie Roos, Jr. (eds.), *Quasi-Experimental Approaches* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
4. For a more elaborate schema see M. Brewster Smith, "A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," reprinted in Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner (eds.), *A Source Book for the Analysis of Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1971), pp. 34-44. A related approach is Lloyd Etheredge, *The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays* (Washington: American Political Science Association, 1976).
5. Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1972), ch. 1 et passim.
6. A remarkably thorough study based on over a decade's research is Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). See also Axelrod (n. 2), and Steinbruner (n. 3), ch. 4.
7. For a review see Holsti (n. 2); the key original article in the operational code approach is Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, 13 (1969), pp. 109-222.
- If I understand the George-Holsti position correctly it is that emotional dynamics usually become operative through, and can be captured by a study of, cognitive processes embodied in the structure of an operational code.
8. See Ole Holsti and Alexander L. George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers" in C. P. Cotter (ed.), *Political Science Annual: Individual Decision-Making* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975); Alexander L. George, "Adaptation to Stress in Political Decision Making: the Individual, Small Group, and Organizational Contexts" in G. V. Coelho et al. (eds.), *Coping and Adaptation* (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Irving Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977).
- Work on aggressive drives is ably reviewed by Stephen Nelson, "Nature/Nurture Revisited: A Review of the Biological Bases of Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 18 (1974), pp. 285-335, and in Davies (n. 3).
- Crisis decision making is addressed in Charles F. Hermann (ed.), *International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Science* (New York: Free Press, 1972).

Work related to "national character" determinants of national war-likeness include Quincy Wright (n. 1); Philip Slater, *Footholds* (New York: Dutton, 1977) chs. 9, 10 and apps. A, B; Philip Slater, *The Glory of Hera* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); David Levinson, "What Have We Learned from Cross-Cultural Surveys?" *American Behavioral Scientist*, 20:5 (May-June, 1977), pp. 757-792; David McClelland, *Power: the Inner Experience* (New York: Irvington, 1975).

9. Among the most wide-ranging studies are Margaret Hermann, "How Leaders Process Information and the Effect in Foreign Policy: An Exploratory Study" in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies, Theories, Findings, and Methods* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974); see the works cited in note 6 of chapter 1 of the present book; Holsti (n. 2), overlaps with emotional dynamic categories.

A useful additional reference is John Raser, "Personal Characteristics of Political Decision-Makers: A Literature Review," *Papers of the Peace Research Society (International)*, 5 (1966), pp. 161-181. Comparative data on American presidents' motivational patterns and wars in David Winter, *The Power Motive* (New York: Free Press, 1973), have also been a useful contribution.

10. Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Janis and Mann (n. 8); Joseph DeRivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus: Merrill, 1968) is an important contribution to this topic of group processes as well as more generally.

11. Chris Argyris, *Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State*, Occasional Paper No. 2 of the Center for International Systems Research (Washington: Department of State, 1967).

12. A review is Holsti (n. 2). Basic references are Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974).

13. I am here following Gergen in being skeptical of the possibility of deriving cross-contextual fixed coefficients. See Kenneth Gergen, "Social Psychology as History," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 26:2 (1973), pp. 309-320.

14. Bjorn Christiansen, *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality* (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1959). General reviews of the personality-foreign policy literature may be found in Christiansen, Tom Atkinson, *A Propositional Inventory of Empirical Work Involving Foreign Affairs and National Security Attitudes, 1960-1966* (Oak Ridge: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1967); Kenneth W. Terhune, "The Effects of Personality in Cooperation and Conflict" in Paul Swingle (ed.), *The Structure of Conflict* (New York: Academic Press, 1970), pp. 193-204; William Eckhardt and Theo. Lentz, "Factors of War/Peace Attitudes" *Peace Research Reviews*, 1:5 (October, 1967), entire; Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation" in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 51-109; Paul Sniderman and Jack Cit-

- rin, "Psychological Sources of Political Belief: Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes," *American Political Science Review*, LXV:2 (June, 1971), pp. 401-417; Williams Eckhardt, "Ideology and Personality in Social Attitudes," *Peace Research Reviews*, III:2 (April, 1969), entire; William Eckhardt and N. Alcock, "Ideology and Personality in War/Peace Attitudes," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 81 (1970), pp. 105-116; William Eckhardt, "The Military-Industrial Personality," *Journal of Contemporary Revolutions*, 3:4 (1971), pp. 74-87; Slater (n. 8).
15. Christiansen (n. 14).
16. Eckhardt, "Ideology and Personality in Social Attitudes" (n. 14).
17. These could be construed as values, although I think such fantasies are less cerebral and more visceral than the term "values" implies. For evidence of generalization of values see William Scott, "International Ideology and Interpersonal Ideology," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), pp. 419-435.
18. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (New York: Ginn, 1906).
19. Cited in Robert A. Levine and Donald T. Campbell, *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior* (New York: Wiley 1972), p. 213.
20. Levine and Campbell, *ibid.*, provide a systematic review of evidence and alternative formulations.
21. See Fitzgerald (n. 5).
22. See Eckhardt and Lentz (n. 14); McClosky (n. 14); Sniderman and Citrin (n. 14).
23. McClosky (n. 14), pp. 106-107.
24. David C. Garnham, "Attitude and Personality Patterns of United States Foreign Service Officers," *American Journal of Political Science* 18:3 (1974), pp. 31-39; Bernard Mennis, *American Foreign Policy Officials: Who They Are and What They Believe Regarding International Politics* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971). For additional data on FSO attitude correlates see Andrew Semmel, "Some Correlates of Foreign Policy Attitudes among Foreign Service Officers" (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1972).
25. Lloyd Etheredge, *Political Psychology and Qualitative Metaphysics* (unpublished manuscript); "Hardball Politics: A Model" (forthcoming); and "Hypnosis and Order" in John Sweeney (ed.), *Politics and Psychology* (tentative title, forthcoming).
26. Cited on frontispiece of Oscar Jaszsi, *The Dissolution of Hapsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929); paperback edition, 1961.
27. Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, XCV (Spring, 1966), pp. 503-529. It should be noted that Kissinger based his analysis at the group level and implied that mistrust would be a realistic lesson for these men to learn from past experiences; such mistrust could be qualitatively different (in origin, intensity, and psychological consequences) from that which might arise between individuals in the United States.

28. Argyris (n. 11).

29. Verba (n. 2).

30. James D. Barber, *Power in Committees: An Experiment in the Governmental Process* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 75-82.

31. Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology; Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962), p. 468. Lane expands this thesis in his study of personality and belief systems among underclassmen at Adams College: "The aggressive man sees the government as aggressive . . . Here we have men . . . generalizing their need to be liked so that government officials are seen to be in the grip of this same need . . ." Robert E. Lane, *Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), p. 141.

32. Cited in Mennis (n. 24), p. 173.

33. See LeVine and Campbell (n. 19) for a general review. This is a plausible albeit a rather crude operationalization since what is repressed may not be the direct opposite of what is manifest in interpersonal relations. It is conceivable that projection of unconscious elements of personality are represented in the intercept term of the equation for the dependent variable in chapter 5 of the present work with variations in manifest personal dynamics affecting only variations from this intercept.

Chapter 3

1. Full documentation and extensive statistical appendices for these items and others not discussed in this manuscript are available in the thesis version: Lloyd S. Etheredge, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Yale University, 1974) available through University Microfilms. Appendix A of the present book discusses the possible sensitivity of conclusions to sampling bias and other issues.

2. These numbers reflect a 78% response from 50 people contacted at OMB and 49% of the 100 military officers in the resident class at NWC.

3. I will refer to "men" throughout since 98% of FSOs, 87% of OMB respondents, and all military officers were male. The number of women was too small to permit separate statistical analysis.

4. Separate analysis by length of total service abroad, length of service in underdeveloped countries, and length of service in Communist bloc countries failed to identify any consistent effects from these experiences on the variables in the study.

5. This represents, according to informants, a typical pattern at OMB, where young men and women work at the agency for 3-7 years and then move out to a substantive job in another government agency. Some respondents at OMB were there as a career and were in their 50s. The foreign service and military are career services.

6. Reprinted in John Robinson and Philip Shaver, *Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes* (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, 1969), pp. 135-139. On convergent

- and discriminant validity see David L. Hamilton, "The Comparative Study of Five Methods of Assessing Self-Esteem, Dominance, and Dogmatism," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 31 (Summer, 1971), pp. 441-452. On the ICL weighting system see Roife LaForge et al., "The Interpersonal Dimension of Personality: II. An Objective Study of Repression," *Journal of Personality*, 23:1 (September, 1954), pp. 129-153.
7. For example over two thirds of men in all groups checked "independent," "likes responsibility," "makes a good impression," and "friendly" while less than 10% checked "easily led," "meek," or "cold and unfeeling." These are of course self-ratings, and the ICL scoring system controls for social desirability response set (i.e., the tendency to give good-sounding but untrue responses).
8. Independence has also been reported for FSO's by Walther in his study for the Herter Commission. Walther compared FSOs with other occupational groups and found that "... the Foreign Service Officer tends to score high on the Self-confidence, Academic Data, Problem Analysis, Resourceful Accomplishment... Persuasive Leadership, and Autonomous scales. These results suggest that he likes work that combines interpreting data and influencing other people... his preferred style for working with a formal organization is to do the work himself rather than to work through a hierarchy. They greatly value personal intellectual achievement..."
- Regis Walther, *Orientations and Behavioral Styles of Foreign Service Officers* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), p. 16.
9. "Forceful" was checked by 58.9% of FSOs, 21.6% at OMB, and 67.3% of military officers; $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) \text{ ns}$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) > .001$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) > 7 \times 10^{-5}$, "Stern but fair" percentages were 25.4% (FSO), 29.7% (OMB), 51.0% (NWC); $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) > .002$, others ns, "Very respectful to authority" percentages were 31.0% (FSO), 35.1% (OMB), 65.3% (NWC); $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) \text{ ns}$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) > 7 \times 10^{-5}$, $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .01$. Significance levels determined by χ^2 with Yates correction.
- The Leary scoring system "nets" dominance and submission to obtain an overall score, a methodological shortcoming with a military group. Decomposed dominance and submission scores are suspect because the "net score" weighting procedure controls for social desirability response set. All groups were slightly more dominant and affectionate than the theoretical mean without significant group mean differences in net scores.
10. $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) \text{ ns}$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) > 3 \times 10^{-4}$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .04$.
11. 8.92 (FSO), 8.61 (OMB), 8.97 (NWC); $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .03$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) \text{ ns}$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) > .05$. Here, and for all other interval scales, statistical significance of differences was assessed by t -test based on an F -test with a $p < .05$ threshold for rejection of the null hypothesis of similar group variances. Significance levels of differences are not simply a product of absolute differences in means but depend as well on variances and number of respondents. For additional detail on the semantic differential adjective scales used here see appendix A, also Charles Osgood et al., *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957), and J. Snider and C. Osgood (eds.), *Semantic Differential Technique: A Sourcebook*

Chicago: Aldine, 1969.) Connotative similarity was determined by factor analysis-*varimax* criteria and orthogonal rotation, as described in appendix A.

12. An indication of high sense of esteem was an answer to a question on the SRC Strongmindedness scale (not reported in detail). Asked "When you get into an argument do you usually get your own way or do you often give in?" sixty percent of American adults say they "often give in" while only 50% at OMB checked this, 37% at the State, and only 27% at NWC. See the FSOs love of persuading people found by Walther (n. 8) and the evidence for higher dominance of military officers cited earlier.

On the theoretical and methodological issues involved in the concept of self-esteem see Ruth C. Wylie, "The Present Status of Self Theory" in Edgar F. Borgatta and William W. Lambert (eds.), *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 728-787, and her *The Self Concept* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961).

13. 3.62 (FSO), 4.41 (OMB), 3.20 (NWC). Of the 1,600 subjects in the Eysenck study, 91% completed all items. For government groups combined, $t = 4.9$, $p(t) < 5 \times 10^{-7}$. Analyzed separately there are strongly significant FSO and NWC differences from British adults. The OMB group shows a likely difference ($t = 1.49$, $p(t) < .07$). See p. 58 of thesis version of the present work; H. J. Eysenck, "A Short Questionnaire for the Measurement of Two Dimensions of Personality," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 42:1 (1958), pp. 14-17.

14. See Bernard Mennis, *American Foreign Policy Officials: Who They Are and What They Believe Regarding International Politics* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971); David Garnham, *Attitude and Personality Patterns of Foreign Service Officers and the Conduct of American Foreign Affairs* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971).

15. 6.77 (FSO), 6.36 (OMB), 7.61 (NWC); $p(\text{OMB-FSO})$ ns, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < 8 \times 10^{-5}$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < 4 \times 10^{-6}$.

16. 7.74 (FSO), 7.45 (OMB), 8.12 (NWC); $p(\text{OMB-FSO})$ ns, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .009$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .001$. For increases from self scores, OMB: $t = 4.39$, $p(t) < .001$; FSO: $t = 6.06$, $p(t) < .001$; NWC: $t = 2.49$, $p(t) < .01$.

17. "Many FSOs are ambitious to become an ambassador." John E. Harr, *The Professional Diplomat* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 207.

It may be important that Harr finds a substantial number of these ambitious diplomats overestimate the probability of career advancement to ambassadorships: many more think they have a good chance than will ever be able to fit in the available slots. Perhaps ambitious men overestimate the probability of success (a trait which may affect their greater willingness to use force), although an alternative interpretation is that the State Department promotes unrealistically high expectations of career success to retain able and ambitious men. Six hundred men felt they had a "good" chance or better when there were only 85 slots (*ibid.* p. 207). The discrepancy is slightly exaggerated by Harr, however, since there will be turnover in these 85 slots and not all 600 will compete simultaneously.

18. However, the question of trust within American elites is probably more complex than I have been able to paint it. Argyris conducted an intensive encounter group of the State Department and concluded, on the basis of extensive encounter sessions with diplomats at all levels, that there were exceptionally low levels of interpersonal trust throughout the Department. I think Argryris's contrary results can be partially explained as follows: he found that the State Department has strong group norms favoring rationality in interpersonal relations and disdaining the intrusion of emotion. Further, there was an associated norm that one should avoid candor which might lead to direct conflict. The encounter groups he used called, however, for both the expression of feelings and for candor. Thus Argryris's results may indicate that it was the idea of violating group norms which generated considerable anxiety and fears of retaliation. By the criteria Argryris employed (the restriction of certain group norms and the imagined risk of punishment for violating norms) most bureaucratic organizations would probably be characterized by low interpersonal trust.

The difference between the results obtained with the present scale and Argryris's conclusion probably depends, then, on different conceptions of trust. My questions asked about the ordinary assumption of goodwill a man might make in the normal course of his everyday work. Argryris's criteria, that there should be no fear of retaliation for candor, are broader and more difficult to meet. Argryris, *Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State*, Occasional Paper No. 2 of the Center for International Systems Research (Washington: Department of State, 1967).

For the original scale and national sample results see John P. Robinson et al., *Measures of Political Attitudes* (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, 1968), pp. 651-652, 662.

19. Competition between political elites may make political leaders less trusting than these government professionals.

20. By *t*-test on original six-point interval scale $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .004$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) > .001$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) > .001$. Original items were (incrementalist): "Actually, I've taken life pretty much as it's happened. I've just taken the course that looked most attractive when the time came to make a choice," and (Long Range Planning):

"Frankly, I've usually planned out my life pretty far ahead. I've known exactly where I wanted to go, figured out how to get there, and followed through."

21. These differences may reflect, in part, the different capacities of men in career-oriented hierarchical organizations to make long range plans. They have a clearer socially sanctioned definition of what "success" entails.

22. Political transcendence scores (on a scale of 0 to 10) show higher transcendence among civilians than among members of career services, greatest subordination among military officers: 5.89 (FSO), 6.33 (OMB), 5.56 (NWC); $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .004$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .004$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .001$.

23. Extraversion scores did not differ significantly across groups and showed the mean of these respondents to be slightly greater than that of British adults. See Eysenck (n. 13).

24. $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .05$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .001$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .001$.

25. 6.78 (FSO), 6.49 (OMB), 7.12 (NWC), differences not significant. On the related activity-power image of Soviet foreign policy (10 = high activity-power) scores were 7.23 (FSO), 6.92 (OMB), 7.29 (NWC), with intergroup differences again not significant.

26. $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .04$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC})$ ns, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .03$. A man could check as many major goals as he thought applied: the other options checked by more than 30% of diplomats were "they are seeking to gain control over oil resources vital to Western Europe and Japan" (48% FSO) and "they want to spread Communist ideology among the Arab peoples" (35.2% FSO). Military officers were much more likely to believe control of oil was a Russian motivation (71.4%, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .009$), and they were far less persuaded of ideological motives (12.2%, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .005$). Significance levels determined by χ^2 with Yates correction and N s of 125 (FSO), 37 (OMB), 49 (NWC).

27. $p < .001$.

28. Differences ns.

29. FSO-OMB difference (when weighted for intensity) is significant ($p < .04$); other differences are not.

30. Lester B. Pearson, *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development* (New York: Praeger, 1969). This result is important because it seems to establish there is no likelihood of substantial increases in assistance: even the sights of men who tend to be liberal in their domestic politics and internationalist in their foreign policies seem well below the 1% level.

31. The data partially confirm a hypothesis by Bruce Russett that those who favor larger amounts of foreign aid place greater importance on the aid. The hypothesis is confirmed for military aid (the correlation between importance and amount is .387, $p < .01$). There is no support in the case of economic development assistance ($r = .083$, ns), possibly because of the special nature of the sample (i.e., almost all men in these groups desire more aid rather than less). See Bruce Russett, "Demography, Salience, and Internationalist Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), pp. 658-664.

32. Differences ns.

33. Differences ns.

34. All OMB-NWC differences statistically significant at least at $p < .001$. The OMB dissent on neutral or pro-American foreign policy is statistically significant at $p < .001$; there is no essential difference on this item between FSO and NWC respondents.

35. All differences $p < .01$.

36. FSO-OMB difference weighted for intensity $p < .04$; other differences ns.

37. $p(\text{FSO-OMB}) < 7 \times 10^{-5}$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC})$ ns, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .002$.

38. $p(\text{FSO-OMB})$ ns, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .02$; $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .003$.

39. $p(\text{FSO-OMB}) < .006$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .003$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC})$ ns.

40. $7.28(\text{FSO})$, $6.98(\text{OMB})$, $7.82(\text{NWC})$. $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) = ns$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .002$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .001$. For hypothesis of desired increase probability of error of rejecting null hypothesis $< .001$ (OMB $t = 5.22$, FSO $t = 6.90$, NWC $t = 8.41$). The hypothesis that the military desired increase is greater than the civilian is also confirmed with $t = 2.54$, $p < .05$.

41. See the further discussion of these items in appendix A.

42. Military officer intensity was significantly ($p < .01$) higher, 2.4, probably what one would want of the men who actually do the fighting.

43. $p(\text{FSO-OMB})$ ns, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < 4 \times 10^{-8}$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < 4 \times 10^{-7}$. Original question was "How would you describe your domestic political views?" with answers given on a 7-point Likert scale.

44. The relation between traditional views of the cold war and the image of current Soviet foreign policy message became statistically significant ($r = .200$, $N = 224$, $p < .01$). This expansion of the data base to include a broader range of variance—more "hawks" from the military, more "doves" from OMB—provides evidence for the conventional wisdom that a "liberal-conservative" dimension of both perception and policy also exists among elites.

45. This point, that we are dealing with both policy preferences and beliefs about reality *simultaneously*, is crucial to emphasize. Some accounts of hawk-dove or liberal-conservative disagreements contend that the differences are primarily over

values. This is wrong. The differences are deeper, lying in *internally coherent different experiences of reality*. See also references in note 25 of chapter 2.

Chapter 4

1. In this discussion I am following the convention of imagining the dependent (attitude) scores graphed vertically and the independent (personality trait) scores graphed horizontally. See appendix A for more discussion of methods.

2. Appendix A describes in detail the methods used in the State Department study and the issues they raise. A check for nonlinearity showed that linear equations efficiently captured the relationships.

3. Assuming the equation is correctly specified.

4. There is another number which is represented in the tables as a probability estimate for each of the b_j terms. This number, $p(t)$, is analogous to $p(F)$ and is the probability that the observed values of b_j would result from random processes when the true $b_j = 0$.

5. As the methodology appendix A discusses, there are problems with paper-and-pencil questionnaires (called "attenuation") with a result that the b and R^2 values reported here are probably too low and the $p(t)$ and $p(F)$ values too high (i.e., the derived results are even more nonrandom than calculated).

6. This was also true of two additional semantic differential scores for stability and pragmatism discussed in appendix A.

7. The original 7-point scales were converted to a range of 0 to 10 so that 1.5 units on the transformed scale correspond to .9 units on the original scale. With this transformation the American foreign policy evaluation score = $2.24 + .6$ (NWC intercept shift) -1.04 (OMB intercept shift) $+ .54$ (self-evaluation score). The $p(t)$ s, were $< .01$, $< 1 \times 10^{-7}$, $< 1 \times 10^{-4}$. $R^2 = .21$, $SE = 1.43$, $F(3,218) = 18.8$, $p(F) < 8 \times 10^{-11}$

The American foreign policy activity-power score = $5.07 - .8$ (NWC intercept shift) $- .5$ (OMB intercept shift) $+ .18$ (self-activity power score). The $p(t)$ s were $< .002$, $< .01$, $< .003$. $R^2 = .09$, $SE = 1.2$, $F(3,218) = 8.03$, $p(F) < 5 \times 10^{-5}$.

See additional discussion in the thesis version, Lloyd Etheredge, *A World of Men*, unpublished doctoral thesis, Yale University, 1974. (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms).

The closeness of mean rating is usually taken as a better measure of identification than b coefficients or R^2 since, among a group of identifiers, there is likely to be small true score variance relative to measurement error variance, thus depressing b and R^2 .

See the discussion of attenuation in appendix A.

8. $p(t)$ of the FSO slope coefficient $< .20$. This observed figure needs to be evaluated in the light of the likely attenuation problem discussed in the appendix A; subtracting random measurement variations, the $p(t)$ may be much smaller.

9. G. K. Chesterton, "The Mistake of the Machine," in his *The Wisdom of Father Brown* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1970), pp. 76-91, esp. p. 77.

10. W. R. Kite, *Attributions of Causality as a Function of the Use of Reward and Punishment*. (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1964); Barry Schlenker and James Tedeschi, "Interpersonal Attraction and the Exercise of Coercive and Reward Power," *Human Relations*, 25:5 (1973), pp. 427-439.

11. C. L. Wheeler and E. F. Carnes, "Relations among Self-Concepts, Ideal Self-Concepts, and Stereotypes of Probable and Ideal Vocational Choices," *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 15 (1968), pp. 530-535.

The gap between how powerful and active a man feels and his ideal self dreams was a poorer predictor than the ideal self dreams themselves. Apparently, then, the dynamic is the content of the dreams themselves and not the relative deprivation or frustration (in the simple sense measured here) a man feels.

12. This variable, interpersonal trust, could also be considered an indicator of ingroup solidarity. If so, then the results go directly counter to the prediction of ethnocentrism theory and are additional evidence that these men are not ethnocentric in ways that are illuminated by examining intra-elite personality differences.

- I do not mean that being highly trusting is necessarily an ideal for an individual; it would be a more widely accepted ideal that he make differentiated, realistic assessments of who he could trust, to what extent, and under what conditions. (That everyone be trustworthy so everyone can be realistically trusting is more properly a desirable attribute of a *system*.) The correlations are unidirectional; mistrust does not predict, as did the neurotic symptoms, either to above or below average advocacy of force or desired capability levels.
13. $p(t)$ of the FSO and NWC slope coefficient $< .20$, for the OMB slope shift coefficient, $p(t) > .08$. See appendix A on corrections for attenuation.
14. The correlations are unidirectional: low self-esteem does not predict, as did neurotic symptoms, either to above or below average advocacy of force or desired capability levels.
15. I do not find this explanation as to why high self-esteem military officers want lower capability levels completely satisfactory. It might be that the NWC intercept term, which has multicollinearity with the group membership interaction term, makes the NWC X self-esteem interaction term b coefficient unstable, but in reality the correlation in the NWC sample is $-.282 (N = 40, p > .08)$, so the sign of the slope of the regression line is not an artifact, although its magnitude may be poorly estimated.
16. I should emphasize that this is not, to my mind, a test of *authoritarianism* as a personality syndrome (the research of Menzis and Garnham cited in chapter 3 of the present work suggests authoritarianism is quite low among these men). Rather it is a test of transcendence of *routine* political socialization, a test of the self having "grown up" politically.
- It is important to note, however, that almost all of these men have high self-evaluations. Since the spatial location of American foreign policy was assessed indirectly by its evaluative score the major component of the variance of the political transcendence score is simply the evaluative score for American foreign policy. The observed results can be read either as "political transcendence produces . . ." or as "those who have objections to American foreign policy tend to believe . . ." and the data do not permit ruling out the second interpretation.
17. This is true provided the equations are correctly specified. An argument for considering b s more important than R^2 s in analyzing data is Eric A. Hanushek and John E. Jackson, *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), p. 21.
18. This is a rough measure since, with only 5 items, the use of force scale moves in 20% jumps. Here, however, it is treated as a continuous variable.
19. This is a rough measure since, with only 5 steps, the desired war capability scale moves in 1/2 war jumps. Here, however, it is treated as a continuous variable.
20. In addition we have already seen two other instances of group-based effects: high dominance domestic policy specialists at OMB want to cut defense spending,

