

To explore the psychology of foreign policy thinking among people engaged seriously in that enterprise, a random sample of 300 American foreign service officers stationed in Washington were invited to complete an extensive questionnaire assessing their personality traits, their foreign policy positions, and their perceptions. Forty-two percent of the people contacted agreed to provide data. The answers were provided in December, 1971, and January, 1972, just after an India-Pakistan war and before President Nixon's previously announced trip to Peking.¹

In addition, to test theories that personality traits affect foreign policy thinking through interaction with organizational setting (a5, b5, chapter 2), data from two comparison groups were obtained: 49 mid-career military officers attending an advanced course at the National War College (now National Defense University) at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, and 39 domestic policy specialists at the Office of Management and Budget.²

The main purpose of this chapter is to outline key elements of the personality traits, images of reality, and foreign policy predispositions held by these men.³ The questions and scales will be described, and part of the evidence reviewed for their relations with one another. Of special importance for later chapters will be the finding that high dominance, ambitious, competitive, and self-assertive people also tend to be mistrustful in their interpersonal relations and that people who advocate use of force in international relations also feel especially threatened by the Soviet Union. In other words, we shall see that *behavioral predispositions and images of reality vary together in consistent ways*, both in the interpersonal arena and in the international arena.

Background and Personality

Respondents came from all levels of the State Department (although there was a drop to 30% participation at the highest FSO-1 and 2 levels). The typical foreign service officer was well educated (M.A. degree), had served two to three tours of duty abroad, was in his early 40s.⁴ The domestic affairs specialists were usually younger (late 20s and early 30s) with slightly more graduate education.⁵ The military officers represented all services and were usually in their early 40s with 20 years of service, a B.A. degree,

and some additional education since entering the military. Given their assignment to the National War College, they could be expected to move later into policy work involving political issues rather than to a field command.

A self-description of these men was provided by the Leary Interpersonal Checklist, an instrument developed by Dr. Timothy Leary before he left academic life for other pursuits. This consists of a series of 128 adjectives and adjectival phrases: the subject checks those he believes apply to himself. A scoring scheme allows one to arrive at measures of dominance-submission and affection-hostility.⁶

The subjects reported upon here accepted and rejected adjectives on the checklist that coalesce around four themes in their self-image. First, they are *independent*, especially in forming their attitudes and in thinking critically. Second, they *like responsibility*. Third, they *believe they are worthy men* (and further, they believe that they are so viewed by others). Finally, they think of themselves as *cordial* in their independence rather than as cool, aloof, or hostile.^{7,8}

There are, of course, differences in the response patterns of the three groups. The military officers tend to be more dominant (checking forceful description like "stern but fair") than the civilians.⁹ But one common characteristic, which will later help to explain the advocacy of military force, occurred in the percentage of men who checked "likes to compete." A majority of men in each group (53% at the State Department, 62% of domestic policy specialists, and 84% of military officers) said this was true about themselves.¹⁰

High self-regard and good mental health is indicated by two additional measures. The first is a measure of self-esteem. A man was asked to describe himself on a set of 7-interval adjective scales with evaluative connotations: good-bad, kind-cruel, skillful-bungling, honest-dishonest, friendly-menacing, and trusting-fearful. He was also asked to rate on these same scales the kind of person he would like to be, his ideal self. The gap between these two scores was taken as a measure of self-esteem—the greater the gap, the lower the self-esteem. The results show that these men believe themselves to live up very well to their own ideals: on the self-esteem scale (reverse scored and standardized from 0 to 10), the average in each group was between 8.6 and 9.0.^{11,12}

A second indication of good mental health derived from a neuroticism scale in the Maudsley Personality Inventory. These six questions assess symptoms of internal conflict—difficulties in concentration (e.g., "My mind tends to wander even when I am trying to concentrate"), frequency of depression, and tendencies to pronounced mood swings. Men in all three groups scored very low (3.6 for diplomats on a scale of 0 to 10) and, compared with an average score of 5.1 obtained in a stratified random sample of 1,450 British adults, this suggests they are freer of ordinary internal conflict than an average citizen.¹³

These results also corroborate the research of Mennis and Garnham (described on p.13), who studied mental health in the State Department. Both men found remarkably low scores for psychological rigidity and dogmatism among foreign service officers, scores among the lowest on record.¹⁴

An important aspect of the psychology of these men is provided by ratings of how strong, active, and powerful they feel and would like to feel. Respondents described themselves and their ideal selves using adjective scales representing activity and power: active-passive, fast-slow, moving-still, strong-weak, hard-soft, tenacious-yielding, aggressive-defensive, leading-following, dominating-submitting, and resolute-irresolute. On a scale of 0 to 10 the average of these ratings for the self-image was 6.3 for domestic affairs specialists, 6.8 for diplomats and 7.6 for military officers. Thus, these men feel somewhat active and powerful now. *But almost all wish to feel stronger, more active, and more powerful:* the average desired level was 7.7 in the State Department with military officers being slightly higher, domestic affairs specialists slightly lower.¹⁶ (This is an important result since, as we shall see, such personal dreams for strength, power, and activity shape both policy choices and inferences about the motivations of Russian leaders.) These results, which suggest that the typical diplomat is personally ambitious, corroborate the conclusion of Harr, who studied a 20% random sample of foreign service officers several years ago.¹⁷

Finally there are two additional personal characteristics of these men that have consequences for their foreign policy views. The first is interpersonal trust. Large majorities (from 68% to 88%) of men in each group said

generally that "most people can be trusted," that people "would try to be fair," that they would "try to be helpful."^{18,19} (These percentages average about 25% higher than answers given to these items by a random sample of American adults, who apparently have much less trust in human nature.)

A final trait (but one on which the subjects differ markedly) is how these men plan their own lives. Some men said they were simply "incrementalists," responding only to specific career opportunities as these arose. Other men were "long range planners" who set very definite long range goals for themselves and whose immediate choices were always subordinate to these long-term career goals. The State Department split about 50-50 between incrementalists and long range planners. But the comparison groups split in opposite ways; most domestic policy specialists were incrementalists (81%), most military officers (70%) were committed long range planners.^{20,21} It will turn out (chapter 5), that these personal differences are significant in determining whether a man believes long range ambition motivates Soviet foreign policy behavior.

In summary, one can say that although there are differences between groups, the evidence from both self-descriptions and standard psychological tests converges to a consistent picture of these men. They are well educated and see themselves as intellectually independent. They have high self-esteem and are probably more mentally healthy than average. They describe themselves as friendly and assume the trustworthiness of other people (and are more inclined to do so than the average American adult). They feel active and personally powerful. Many like to compete with others. And they are ambitious: they want to feel stronger, more active, and more powerful than they do at present.²²

Table 3.1 summarizes the correlations among selected personality scales for the FSO random sample. Included with other test results are dominance-submission, hostility-affection, and introvert-extravert scales on which the groups did not differ substantially and where the scores tended to be near the theoretical midpoint.²³ The table confirms Eckhardt's summary of studies of the general public (see note 16 to chapter 2), that there is a tendency for different facets of the willful assertion of the self to go together: dominant people tend to be slightly more hostile,

Table 3.1
Inter-Scale Correlations of Selected Personality Traits, FSO Sample

	1	2	3
1 Dominance	1.00		
2 Hostility	.325***	1.00	
3 Likes to Compete	.450***	.350***	1.00
4 Extraversion	.403***	.200*	.261**
5 Trust	.013	-.343***	-.157
6 Long Range Life Planning	.254***	.076	.183*
7 Self-Esteem	.182*	-.019	.004
8 Self: Activity/Power	.606***	.471***	.456***
9 Ideal Self: Activity/Power	.334***	.385***	.454***

* = $p < .05$ ** = $p < .01$ *** = $p < .001$

Neurotic conflict does not correlate significantly with any of the traits.

For entries in this table, N is between 112 and 126.

The p -value is the likelihood that the correlation could result from random processes.

Correlations (r 's) in the table can range from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to 0 (no correlation) to $+1$ (perfect positive correlation).

4	5	6	7	8
1.00				
.005	1.00			
.052	.010	1.00		
.041	.099	.010	1.00	
.440***	-.127	.232**	.308***	1.00
.337***	-.206*	.086	.076	.668***

like to compete, are more extraverted, feel more powerful, are more ambitious, and are more oriented to long range career planning. Men who are ambitious and hostile are also significantly more mistrustful of others. This same pattern of correlations appeared when all groups were considered together.

Views of the World

In this section I will sketch main themes in the perceptions of the world held by those elites. In the following section I will summarize common themes in the foreign policy decision-making area.

What beliefs and perceptions do these FSOs hold? Let us begin with views of the Soviet Union. FSOs tend to hold, either moderately or strongly, a traditional view of the origins of the Cold War. They believe that in the late 1940s the USSR had substantial expansionist ambitions and would have "sought to extend itself into every nook and cranny in Western Europe were it not checked." Almost all reject, on balance, the idea that the Soviet Union was only *reacting* in those years, i.e., that "Soviet conflict with the West arose from dangers to Soviet national security emanating from the Western powers. Soviet foreign policy was neither hostile nor expansionist but was misperceived by the West in this way." On a scale of 0 to 10 (10 being strongly traditional) diplomats scored a mean of 8.1. Military officers were almost all strongly traditional (9.1); domestic policy specialists were on the traditional side too (7.1), although less exclusively.²⁴

Soviet foreign policy was rated by these men on the same series of adjective scales listed on p. 19. On the scale of "friendly-menacing," men in all three groups agreed that Soviet foreign policy at the time of the study was, on average, slightly to moderately menacing (between 6.5 and 7.1 on a scale of 0 to 10).²⁵ They were concerned and vigilant, but far from being terrified of Soviet nuclear capabilities and intentions.

Beliefs about Soviet foreign policy were also assessed concretely by presenting a series of eight options to describe major Soviet foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. These options ranged from "they really don't know what they want" (5.6% of FSOs believed this) to a belief in major Soviet expansionist ambitions: "Their involvement is part of a long range

plan to establish influence across North Africa, to turn the Mediterranean into a Soviet lake, and thereby to intimidate our European allies in NATO." Fifty-nine percent of FSOs believed this was true. (Sixty-three percent of the military officers agreed, but only 38% at OMB.)²⁶

A final element in diplomats' beliefs about the Soviet Union was that Soviet-American relations have improved in the long run and that the United States was more secure in 1972 than in the early days of the cold war. Asked to compare American national security today with its national security in 1954, diplomats (and domestic policy specialists), by a ratio of 3:2, said our national security had increased. However, in the sharpest disagreement recorded in this study, military officers strongly believed the reverse: by a ratio of almost 5:1 they saw a decline.²⁷

The surface reason for different national security judgements was straightforward. Those who saw a national security increase cited psychological factors: the increased experience of US and USSR leaders in dealing with each other, the better international climate, greater trust and mutual understanding. Those who saw a national security decrease cited military factors: the great increase, since 1954, in Soviet strategic nuclear capability relative to that of the United States, as well as weakening domestic support for a strong American foreign policy, and (for some) the "naively liberal" views of international relations taught in colleges and universities.

Finally, each man was asked to locate his view of "the course of world politics in the years to come" along a scale between two scenarios. One scenario sketched a future that was "hopeful, even reassuring;" the other scenario sketched a future which was "grim, even frightening":

A. The prospects for the course of world politics in the years to come are hopeful, even reassuring. Developing agreements for the control of nuclear weapons and a growing awareness of the destructiveness of even limited war suggest a new sobriety and maturity. Rising educational levels among elites of both developed and underdeveloped states, a growing awareness of shared destiny, and negotiations among important powers on their major substantive disagreements suggest that negotiation and cooperation rather than military conflict will characterize future trends. Long range programs to deal with emerging problems of population and resource constraints can be expected to move into high gear in the light of growing consensus of their necessity.

B. The prospects for the course of world politics in the years to come are grim, even frightening. The expansion of nuclear arsenals by the super-powers and by China, and the growing size and far-flung deployment of Soviet naval power heighten the chances of military conflict and the potential destructiveness of that conflict if it should get out of hand. The growing military capabilities of underdeveloped states, together with heightened national consciousness, suggest that war between some of them is not to be unexpected—the pressures from the population explosion and natural resource constraints make such conflict even more likely.

On a 10-point scale (10 being “grim, even frightening”) diplomats scored at a mean of 3.9, military officers at 4.0, and domestic policy specialists at 3.3. Splitting the scale at the midpoint shows the consensus explicitly: 65% of American diplomats predict fair weather in the years ahead: 61% of military officers and 73% of domestic affairs specialists also agree.²⁸

In summary, then, American diplomats tend to believe that the traditional cold war perceptions of Soviet conduct were accurate; they see our national security as having increased over the years; they see the Soviet Union as slightly to moderately menacing, with marked expansionist desires in the Middle East. But on balance they are optimistic and believe that American foreign policy will cope well with Soviet foreign policy challenges and other problems in the years ahead. In all, they see a “hopeful, even reassuring” future before us.

Attitudes and Policy Judgments

What of the attitudes and policy thinking of these men? Key elements clustered in seven themes.

1. America should become more internationalist.

The questionnaire asked; “Some people believe that America should seek in the long run to negotiate mutually acceptable international agreements whereby all nations will begin to turn over at least some elements of national sovereignty to an internationally elected body. Other people oppose this idea. Do you believe America should try to develop international political institutions of this kind or should we retain our national sovereignty?”

Seventy-three percent of the diplomats checked “Move toward stronger

international political institutions.” Slight majorities of the two other groups (56% of domestic policy specialists and 54% of military officers) also selected this option.²⁹ (Judging by the lack of administration initiative in this area it is probably true that most diplomats were—and would be still—ahead of current foreign policy in their desire to create stronger world institutions.)

A desire for greater involvement with other nations was also evidenced in answers to questions about economic assistance. Diplomats favored a significant increase in economic foreign aid—to about \$4.8–5.0 billion annually. This figure is less than the 1% of the GNP optimistically called for by the Pearson Commission.³⁰ Still, diplomats desired to provide more aid than at present; and they placed moderately strong importance on it (7.1 on a scale of 0 to 10). However, they opposed the high level of foreign arms sale and military aid characteristic of the Nixon administration. Most wanted a cap of about \$1 billion and many would have liked to shift exclusively to sales and away from grants. (Military officers, as might be expected, were much more favorable to military aid and attached stronger importance to it.)³¹

It is notable, as well, that diplomats and men in other groups also believed that the greater part of American economic aid should be channeled primarily through international institutions: 60% of diplomats wanted more routing through international institutions; 62% of domestic policy specialists and 58% of military officers agreed.³²

2. America should place high priority on preventing unprovoked international aggression.

Each man was asked to rank his relative priority for eight American foreign policy objectives in underdeveloped countries. These goals and their average ranking (on a scale of 0 to 10) are listed in table 3.2.

A notable consensus was the high priority for “a government which will not engage in unprovoked aggression against other nations.” This high ranking (higher even than given “A government which is neutral or pro-American in its foreign policy” (no. 5 of the table)) may be simply a manifestation of the prevalent ideology in a status quo power, but I suspect it also represents an achievement in civilization. Its high priority probably

Table 3.2

Desired American Policy Priorities in Underdeveloped Countries, FSO Sample

1. A government that will not engage in unprovoked aggression against other nations	7.26
2. A government with broad popular support	7.22
3. A stable government capable of preserving internal order	6.10
4. A government which maintains civil liberties	5.42
5. A government which is neutral or pro-American in its foreign policy	5.17
6. Rapid economic development	5.12
7. A government which allows broad opportunities for American business investment	2.01
8. A government which retains the free enterprise system	1.31

Theoretical range 0 to 10 with 10 being the highest relative priority. $N = 124$.
 SD (SE): 1. 3.63 (.33); 2. 2.73 (.25); 3. 2.64 (.24); 4. 2.51 (.23); 5. 2.75 (.25);
 6. 2.84 (.26); 7. 3.49 (.31); 8. 2.09 (.19).

reflects a strong, civilized, superego injunction against aggression in general.

In history there has not always been this principled opposition to aggression. What is important to note is that a moral (and/or political) injunction against "aggression" may now be offered as one explanation of the use of force in current American foreign policy, a use of force which is seen as a *response* to disruptive events, an effort to preserve and protect the stability, security, and peace of the world by establishing and maintaining the principle that changes initiated by military aggression will not succeed.

The comparison groups agreed in giving a high rank to preventing aggression (7.4 at OMB, 6.4 at NWC), but they split strongly in other ways that seem to reflect a conservative-liberal dimension.³³ Military officers give their highest priority to maintaining order in underdeveloped countries (8.01) and care about this more than about broad popular support (6.10) or about civil liberties (5.09). Domestic policy specialists, however, give much higher priority to broad popular support (7.98) and to civil liberties (7.37); they do not place high value on stable governments (5.6), and they are relatively indifferent (compared to both FSOs and military officers) to whether an underdeveloped country's foreign policy favors Communist interests (3.3).³⁴

In section 7 of this chapter evidence will be presented regarding the tendency of these men to advocate the use of military force in different scenarios. There it will become clear that perceived Communist *aggression* is a major stimulus to which many of these men would respond with the use of force. But there is evidence that communism *itself* is not the key objection of these men. The questionnaire asked:

Some people say that Communist governments which are nationalist and nonexpansionist should be acceptable to the United States and that we should not try to oppose the emergence of such governments in underdeveloped countries. Other people say that communism is objectionable in itself and argue that the United States should work against the emergence of such governments in underdeveloped countries, even if they pose no military threat to us or our allies. How do you believe the United

States should respond to the possible development of nationalist, non-expansionist Communist governments in underdeveloped countries?

Subjects were to check one of two options: "Accept it if it happens; do not try to oppose it" or "Oppose it." Eighty percent of American diplomats checked the "Accept it if it happens" box. Ninety-seven percent of domestic policy specialists and 69% of the military officers felt the same way.³⁵

In other words, an ideologically crusading anticommunism apparently had waned among the professional mid-elites of American government by 1972. There was openness to détente. If the Communist world was willing to be pragmatic and "live and let live," then so were almost all of these men.

3. The export and promotion of capitalism and "free enterprise" should receive low priority in foreign policy.

This view, counter to what a Marxist would maintain is true of American elite beliefs, is shown by very low rankings accorded to objectives 7 and 8 (table 3.2): "A government which allows broad opportunities for American business investment" and "A government which retains the free enterprise system." These priorities were at the bottom of the list.

A similar belief that business interests should be subordinate to political control was shown by the answer to the question:

Suppose you were asked by the Secretary of State whether the United States should take the initiative, now, in developing international political institutions to govern the functioning of multinational business corporations. What would be your attitude toward such initiatives?

All groups favored such initiatives: 72% of diplomats, 53% of domestic policy specialists, and 61% of military officers would recommend that international business be subordinate to stronger multinational political controls.³⁶ These men tended to be ahead (if that is the correct word) of recent American administrations in their low deference to business interests. (It seems plausible that such interests carry more weight at political levels than among career professionals.)

4. American foreign policy is a friendly, moral force for good in the world.
This finding is based on adjective ratings for both American foreign policy

and ideal American foreign policy along the evaluative dimensions listed on p. 19. American foreign policy was rated quite positively. The gap between the actual and ideal images was used as a measure of the idealization of current American foreign policy (the greater the gap the lower the idealization): reverse-scored on a scale of 0 to 10, FSOs score at an average of 8.2 (military officers, 8.1; domestic policy specialists, 7.2). There was a virtuous image of the nation, and substantial approval of what was perceived as the benevolence and friendliness of American foreign policy.³⁷

5. Its present 1½-war military capability is adequate for the challenges America faces in the world.

At the time of the study official American policy was a "1½ war" capability level—"1" being the capability necessary for one major war, "½" being the capability necessary for one small war. Diplomats scored exactly at 1.5 as their desired capability level; military officers wanted some increase (1.7), domestic affairs specialists wanted a slight further decrease (1.3).³⁸

6. American foreign policy should become more activist and powerful in shaping the world.

Each man rated his image of the activity and power of American foreign policy using adjective scales upon which he rated himself and his ideal self (p. 20). American foreign policy was ranked as somewhat active and powerful by diplomats (6.3 on a 0 to 10 scale). Domestic policy specialists and military officers agreed with this view although their perceptions were slightly lower (5.7 and 5.6).³⁹ Yet *all groups agreed they wanted America to be more activist and powerful* with group means for this image between 7.0 and 7.9.⁴⁰ We have already seen other evidence of these activist desires in the earlier discussion of international political institutions, negotiated controls on multinational business, more economic aid (and, for the military officers, more military aid).

7. The use of American military force is necessary or desirable in certain situations.

Each man gave policy recommendations in five scenarios close to actual situations in American foreign policy. These scenarios and the percentage of men who advocated the use of force are listed in table 3.3.⁴¹

Table 3.3

Use-of-Force Scenarios, by Group

	Percent Advocating Force		
	OMB	FSO	NWC
1 Bay of Pigs ^a	36.1	49.6	79.6
2 Vietnam ^b	36.1	64.8	83.3
3 Soviet Union-Caribbean Buildup ^c	58.3	71.0	79.6
4 Indonesia ^d	11.1	16.8	24.5
5 Dominican Republic ^e	27.8	13.6	51.0
Mean Percent of Cases ^f	33	42.9	63.3

Actual questions were:

1. *Bay of Pigs*: "Suppose that you had known of the plans for the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion shortly before it occurred and you believed it could succeed in replacing the Castro regime. What would have been your view of the invasion at that time?"
2. *Vietnam*: "Suppose that during the middle 1960s you believed that the American military involvement in Vietnam would succeed in all of its announced objectives by the end of 1968. What would have been your attitude toward this involvement at that time?"
3. *Soviet Union-Caribbean*: "Suppose that the Soviet Union in the next few years begins a large scale naval buildup in the Caribbean. It becomes clear that only the threat or use of force can reverse the buildup. What would be your attitude toward this alternative?"
4. *Indonesia*: "Suppose that in the early 1960s you believed that President Sukarno's move to the left would shortly result in a military alliance between Indonesia and Communist China. If you also believed that an American military intervention could replace the Sukarno government by a pro-American or neutralist government, what would have been your attitude toward such an intervention?"
5. *Dominican Republic*: "Suppose you were called upon to give advice just prior to President Johnson's dispatch of American troops to the Dominican Republic. Suppose you believed that dispatching the troops would help to prevent bloodshed and stabilize the domestic politics of the Dominican Republic—but you did not believe there was a threat of a Communist takeover. What would have been your attitude toward sending in American troops?"

Original responses were to 7-point Likert scales. Tabled percents are of those checking one of the three advocacy positions. *N*s were 36 or 37 (OMB), 125 or 126 (FSO), 48 or 49 (NWC).

^a $p(\text{OMB-FSO})$ ns, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .0006$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .0001$.

^b $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .004$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < .03$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < 3 \times 10^{-5}$.

^c $p(\text{OMB-FSO})$ and $p(\text{FSO-NWC})$ ns, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .06$.

^dAll intergroup differences ns.

^e $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .04$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < 7 \times 10^{-7}$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < .05$.

^fStandard deviations: 27.6 (OMB), 25.0 (FSO), 25.3 (NWC). $p(\text{OMB-FSO}) < .04$, $p(\text{FSO-NWC}) < 3 \times 10^{-6}$, $p(\text{OMB-NWC}) < 2 \times 10^{-6}$. Single case significance levels determined by χ^2 , $df = 1$, Yates correction where appropriate.

As discussed in chapter 2, the evidence shows that the specific situation is the major determinant of whether force will be used. The advocacy of force varied widely—from 71% of diplomats in the case of a Soviet naval buildup in the Caribbean, to 13.6% of diplomats in a modified version of President Johnson's Dominican Republic decision. The major situational determinant appears to be perceived *threat*, particularly the dramatic expansion of Communist influence involving military force. Still, there is often significant disagreement within groups and also between groups, with military officers being more likely advocates of the use of force than civilians, and FSOs more likely to employ force than domestic policy specialists.

I also collected data on how *strongly* a man would advocate the use of force in each of these cases. Diplomats often recommend the use of force even when they are not strongly committed emotionally (they show an average emotional intensity of only 1.8 on a 3-point scale). This reflects the fact, I think, that they are professionals, accustomed to making decisions with some degree of personal detachment. (Such professionalism was reflected by a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff who characterized President Johnson's dispatch of troops to the Dominican Republic to me as a "surgical intervention.") I think this also means they will advocate the use of force (and, implicitly, the possible death of American soldiers) without actually being willing to die, themselves, to see the objective achieved.⁴²

Does this element of professional detachment increase or decrease the likelihood of war? I think it cuts both ways. Shutting off emotions could produce the use of force at a lower threshold of emotional commitment. On the other hand such detachment could allow men to react more calmly and dispassionately to international situations, thereby reducing the likelihood of the use of force, and it could modify a man's involvement so he will be satisfied to achieve limited political ends rather than total victory. On balance, I tentatively believe that professional detachment in the State Department has the second effect: I base this guess on the evidence in the next two chapters which show the greater tendency of military officers to advocate force arises, in part, because they are more involved emotionally in their foreign policy views.

Let me add, as a footnote, that while at the State Department I was told of the work of another researcher who had asked diplomats favoring the Vietnam War when they "had first begun to believe war was a legitimate instrument of national policy." Men I talked with were offended at being asked such a question. Some supported the Vietnam War but they did *not* believe "war was a legitimate instrument of national policy." Instead they felt that "using force" was an unpleasant "necessity." To my ear this legalism sounded like a sophisticated mental operation designed to retain a moral self-image by splitting off inhibiting moral considerations from practical ones. If so, then it could mark a significant fact that many foreign service officers are not completely comfortable with the idea of using military force even when advocating it—a possibility that I will raise in more detail later in a discussion of FSO modal personality and ambivalence.

Relations Between Selected Policy Attitudes and Perceptions

Table 3.4 summarizes the correlations between selected policy attitudes and perceptions in the FSO random sample. I have included in the list results of an additional item assessing a man's domestic political views; on a self-report scale (rescaled here from 0 to 10 with 10 being highly conservative) diplomats were on the liberal side (3.45), OMB professionals were there more so (2.89), while military officers were on the conservative side (6.12).⁴³

The most striking relation in the table is the organizing role apparently played by the belief that strong Soviet expansionist ambitions lay behind and motivated Soviet conduct in the early years of the cold war: FSO traditionalists were more inclined to use force, to desire greater military capability, and to see current Soviet foreign policy as expansionist. There is a syndrome of fear, suspicion, and militaristic tendencies. (Or, to put it differently, an interconnection among relative trust of the Soviet Union, approval of lower levels of war capability, and a disinclination to use force.) There is, indeed, a tendency for men to be, psychologically, either "hawks" or "doves," and to adopt the postures, in any particular case, that express this internal psychological coherence. This same pattern of relationships

emerged even more strongly when all groups were considered together.⁴⁴

What is crucial to note about these patterns is that *perceptual differences and policy differences tend to go together* across disparate situations, reflecting (as we shall see in the next two chapters) systematic *personal predispositions* to be either mistrustful and tough or sanguine and opposed to military emphases. Claiming to be speaking objectively about reality and how to deal with it (and believing sincerely that this is what they are doing), hawks, doves, and those in between will be seen to be partly offering mere rationalizations of predispositions.

Summary

In sum, these men believe America is a beneficent force in the world; they wish it to become more activist in providing economic aid (but reducing military aid), more activist in seeking to develop stronger international political institutions generally, and specifically more active in controlling the multinational corporations; they believe America should use military force in certain selected situations, especially to establish the norm that unprovoked aggression and international disorder will not be tolerated; they are receptive to the idea of detente in principle, and they agree with America's present level of military capability. A crude comparison with recent American foreign policy suggests that the State Department is the home of more enthusiasm for building international political institutions, less deference to business, more support for economic assistance, and less support for military assistance than the top political elites in Washington. Such findings are also evidence for the candor of the men who agreed to participate.

(Yet it is possible that the actual rate of private disagreement in the State Department is somewhat understated by these data. One of the unpleasant lessons I learned while conducting research in Washington was that there are some grown men who live in such fear of retaliation, disapproval, and rejection by their superiors that they do not feel comfortable to express an independent judgment even in private. It is not just in foreign countries that people can feel so intimidated that they forgo the exercise of basic human rights.)

Besides reporting the responses and establishing their plausibility, this

Table 3.4

Intercorrelations of Selected Policy Items and Perceptions, FSO Sample

	1	2	3
1 Use of Force in General	1.00		
2 Force—Bay of Pigs	.660***	1.00	
3 Force—Vietnam	.619***	.369***	1.00
4 Domestic Conservatism	.395***	.303***	.258***
5 Soviet Foreign Policy "Menace"	.139	.026	.180
6 Traditional Cold War Origins	.337***	.299***	.321***
7 Soviet Expansionist Wishes, Middle East	.292***	.281***	.116
8 Force Capability Desired	.122	.204*	.232**
9 Acceptance of Nonexpansionist Communist Governments	-.191	-.279**	-.101

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

For entries in this table, *N* is between 122 and 126.

4	5	6	7	8
1.00				
-.011	1.00			
.262**	.155	1.00		
.101	.086	.302***	1.00	
.134	-.005	.327***	.155	1.00
-.157	-.236**	-.085	-.083	.003

chapter has introduced the correlations within (1) personality organization and (2) the organization of foreign policy action and perception, showing that there is a syndrome linking both power-seeking and power-assertion (or their opposites) with beliefs about the threatening (or reassuring) nature of other people or other nations.⁴⁵ In chapters 4 and 5, I turn to the task of testing the possible causal effects of the personal syndrome on foreign policy action and perception.