

APSR 72 (1978)

## Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968:

### A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory \*

LLOYD S. ETHEREDGE  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

*Whether personality characteristics of American leaders crucially determine major American foreign policy decisions has been a matter of considerable disagreement. A test of two hypotheses drawn from interpersonal generalization theory shows such influences have probably been crucial in a number of cases in American foreign policy between 1898 and 1968. In 49 cases of intraelite disagreement on force-related issues and 13 cases of intraelite disagreement on inclusionary issues the direction of disagreement could be predicted in over 75 percent of the cases by knowledge of individual differences in interpersonal relations. A four-fold speculative typology suggests fundamental personality-based differences in orientation towards America's preferred operating style and role in the international system (e.g., introverts are drawn toward impersonal principles and mechanisms like balance of power—or in an earlier period to international law).*

*The evidence implies that one source of war and hard-line foreign policy is the structure of self-selection and recruitment to high office in the American political system. As well, the systematic tendency to self-expressive personalization in major foreign policy decisions probably increases the rate of error of American elites.*

Have personality characteristics of American leaders been decisive in major foreign policy decisions during this century? Traditionally many scholars have maintained that the answer, in general, is "no."<sup>1</sup> However, this thesis has

never been subjected to careful test, and there appear to be reasons to believe such a test might be worthwhile: several hundred studies have shown significant correlations of personality traits with foreign policy preferences within mass publics,<sup>2</sup> several elite case studies and exploratory comparative analyses have made plausible arguments for the presence of significant personality influence on policy decisions in a variety of important areas,<sup>3</sup> and recent studies of American diplomats report signifi-

\*I would like to express my appreciation to Chris Achen, Hayward Alker, Bob Axelrod, Paul Berman, Alexander L. George, Norman Graebner, Charles Heck, Ole Holsti, Arnold Kanter, Robert E. Lane, John McConahay, Ken McVicar, the late Conrad Morrow, David Rothberg, Doug Sprague, and H. Bradford Westerfield for comments, support, and other assistance. I am grateful for the early encouragement of Harold D. Lasswell and J. D. Barber. Gail Lopata, Lisa Gregorie and Linda Woolford typed the manuscript.

<sup>1</sup>The traditional argument against exploring "non-rational" influence is Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System" in *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, ed. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 93-117. On the traditional preponderance of the Rational Actor model see, for example, Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 10. Kreuger remarks on the historiography of American foreign policy that "most American historians view diplomacy as the outcome of decisions made by rational men in pursuit of the national interest" (p. 93). Thomas A. Kreuger, "The Social Origins of Recent American Foreign Policy," *Journal of Social History*, 7 (Fall 1973), 93-101. The emerging historiographic challenge to this paradigm is discussed in Robert M. Crunden, "Freud, Erikson, and the Historian: A Bibliographic Survey," *Canadian Review of American Studies*, 4 (Spring 1973), 48-64.

<sup>2</sup>Useful reviews are W. Eckhardt and T. Lentz, "Factors of War/Peace Attitudes," *Peace Research Reviews*, 1 (October 1967), entire; W. Eckhardt, "Ideology and Personality in Social Attitudes," *Peace Research Reviews*, 3 (April 1969), entire; Herbert McClosky provides a discussion of both elite and mass data in his "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation" in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 51-109; Bjorn Christiansen, *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality* (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1959); Paul Sniderman and Jack Citrin, "Psychological Sources of Political Belief: Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June 1971), 401-17.

<sup>3</sup>See for example Alexander L. and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: Dover, 1964); James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Joseph De Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1968); Arnold Rogow, *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* (New York:

cant personality-policy preference correlations among career professionals.<sup>4</sup>

This study was designed to test two hypotheses of personality influence on American foreign policy between 1898 and 1968. These two hypotheses were derived from interpersonal generalization theory, a theory exemplified by Bjorn Christiansen in his classic study and review of early literature, *Attitudes Toward Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality* (1959).<sup>5</sup> Christiansen's theory was that behavioral differences in interpersonal situations produced similar behavioral differences in international situations. Using a paper and pencil

instrument with 40 everyday scenarios and 40 international scenarios and 167 cadets and recruits at the Military and Naval academies in Oslo, Christiansen found a moderate and statistically significant tendency for six alternative responses in interpersonal situations (e.g., asserting oneself to change the other party's behavior) to generalize in a straightforward fashion to preferred responses by Norway (e.g., that Norway should assert itself and demand that the other party change its behavior).

Christiansen's study was not definitive for understanding government behavior in international relations. It was exclusively a paper and pencil self-report measure. The completion of 80 scenarios with the same response format may have increased correlations by inducing repetitious answers. Moreover, the subjects were not national leaders with expertise, extensive knowledge, responsibility, and the necessity of accounting for their views. Unlike what happens in the real world, Christiansen's subjects did not engage in discussion or hear opposing views on issues they were asked about before selecting their responses. Most importantly, Christiansen recognized that a range of "viable" options is established by the context of the domestic and international situation. So, in no scenario were individuals asked if they wanted Norway to go to war. Thus the study did not establish that self-assertive tendencies in everyday behavior actually carry someone beyond the threshold of normal diplomacy to war.

Since Christiansen's study, several hundred other studies have tended to support his theory in mass public samples. In the terms of Eckhardt's (1967, 1969) review and factor analysis, the tendency to favor willful "compulsion" of others seems to generalize directly from interpersonal to international situations.<sup>6</sup> But a number of these studies also have expanded Christiansen's theory and show that the individual's tendency is to generalize acts by psychological analogy; it intersects available capabilities and, at least among Americans, this produces *magnification* of interpersonal tendencies. That is, an American who believes children should be subjected to strict discipline might be more likely to favor use of nuclear weapons internationally. In the same vein, a recent study of a random sample of 126 American diplomats found that diplomats who like to compete (behavior which might be demonstrated in daily

---

Macmillan, 1963); Bruce Mazlish, *In Search of Nixon* (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Betty Glad, *Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966); Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976). Somewhat overdrawn is Nancy Clinch, *The Kennedy Neurosis* (New York: Grossett, 1973). See also the studies based on Alexander George's "operational code" approach: Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and the Image of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia" in *Enemies in Politics*, ed. David Finley, Ole R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 25-96; Ole Holsti, "The Operational Code Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 3 (March 1970), 123-57; Alexander L. George and Ole R. Holsti, "Operational Code Belief Systems and Foreign Policy Decision-Making" (unpublished); see also the series of papers prepared for the annual meeting of the 1973 American Political Science Association: G. G. Gutierrez, "Dean Rusk and Southeast Asia: An Operational Code Analysis"; Kurt Tweraser, "Senator Fulbright's Operational Code as Warrant for His Foreign Policy Advocacy, 1943-1967: Towards Increasing the Explanatory Power of Decisional Premises"; Loch Johnson, "Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behavior: Senator Church at Mid-Career." See also Margaret G. Hermann, "How Leaders Process Information and the Effect on Foreign Policy: An Exploratory Study," in *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories Findings and Methods*, ed. James N. Rosenau (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1974).

<sup>4</sup>Major results are reported in Lloyd S. Etheredge, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, in press); see also Bernard Mennis, *American Foreign Policy Officials: Who They Are and What They Believe Regarding International Politics* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971). David C. Gamham, *Attitude and Personality Patterns of American Foreign Affairs* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971).

<sup>5</sup>Christiansen, *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality* (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1959).

<sup>6</sup>Eckhardt, "Ideology and Personality"; Eckhardt and Lentz, "Factors of War/Peace Attitudes."

life by liking competitive sports or vying for promotion) tended to favor the use of American military force in four scenarios involving underdeveloped countries.<sup>7</sup> Generalization, involving magnification of self-assertive tendencies, now does appear implicated in war.

However, with the exception of the diplomat study mentioned above, most of the studies inspired by Christiansen's work present an additional methodological difficulty if one wishes to extrapolate to the behavior of national leaders. Probably to prevent a large number of "don't know" responses, most mass public studies phrase simplistic alternatives—e.g., "a country faced with a bunch of really dangerous enemies would be better advised to shoot first and ask questions later." Such questions may tend to elicit more emotionally expressive responses than would actual complex policy questions and, if so, the results obtained would be biased in favor of substantiating the hypothesis that elite foreign policy decisions have an emotional base.

Interpersonal generalization theory seems potentially relevant but it needs to be tested directly before we may call it useful in identifying one of the factors contributing to the policy choices of elites. Interpersonal generalization theory has, of course, been used by some historians. A typical impressionistic method is to use an adjective that plausibly describes both the individual and his policies. Thus Theodore Roosevelt was "rambunctious," Wilson an "idealist," Kennedy an "activist." While such implicit use of generalization theory may be correct, the underlying method is open to criticism on three grounds. First, there is no independent assessment of the personality and policy choice variables nor are there explicit decision rules about what evidence counts for or against the interpretations. Second, it is *ad hoc*—usually only one individual is involved and the metaphor settled upon is not designed to test a larger comparative taxonomy that would aid the understanding of other cases. Third, and most-seriously, the method is *inconclusive*. By failing to control carefully for and to rule out major alternative explanations (e.g., costs and benefits of the domestic and international political situations) the investigator often needs to rely on literary skill to persuade the reader that personality (rather than some other combination of factors) was a crucial variable.

<sup>7</sup>Etheredge, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy*.

## I

It should be clear that the question posed for test is not whether "personality" influences policy. Broadly construed, "personality" refers to many characteristics of decision makers (e.g., at least normal intelligence, cultural values, identification with the welfare of the nation) that are probably always relevant. But such constant, *shared* characteristics can either be assumed or subsumed under higher levels of analysis. The theoretical question addressed here is whether intraelite *variations* in personality characteristics produce *variations* in policy preference so that some personality characteristics unique to a key decision maker need to be measured and taken into account to explain why some policies are adopted rather than others.

It should also be clear that what is being tested is not a general theory of international behavior—there is no claim that "personality traits produce wars" alone. Rather the question is whether certain personality traits, in certain situations (the nature of which are left unspecified here) actually have tipped the balance for or against a policy choice like war and are thus a crucial ingredient in producing the policy choices in such situations.

The research method I employed in this study was to work backward, to select cases of American intraelite policy disagreements and then to test the proposition that the direction of such disagreements could be consistently predicted from independently derived knowledge of personality differences between the participants.<sup>8</sup> If personality differences show only a random correlation with the direction of policy disagreement, then it cannot be said that such personality differences produced policy differences. But if the imaginary random control group of the null hypothesis is rejected, then the conclusion would be that, in the confirming cases, the observed personality difference was probably a crucial contributor to the actual policy outcome.

It should be noted that interpersonal generalization theory would also predict that *policy agreement* should tend to flow from *similar*

<sup>8</sup>I am here following Greenstein's methodological lead. However, I have altered his concept of "actor dispensability" to the slightly more constrained concept of "elite actor interchangeability," a modification which seems more useful for focusing upon different levels of analysis. See Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), Ch. 2.

personality traits. This is a second test which could be conducted. I did not, however, believe it would be as straightforward and direct a test. A president tends to favor as secretary of state and key advisors individuals who share the president's views and thus there is implicit pressure for them to agree to retain influence. I assumed that such situational pressures and other strains toward "groupthink" often confound or override personality similarity as a factor in producing agreement.<sup>9</sup> Agreement tends to be broken, I assumed, only by strongly felt (hence probably personality-based) differences. In other words, I expected less confounding of other factors in producing disagreement, and I selected the present design as a better (albeit more limited) way of giving personality factors a direct chance to register their presence.

Focusing on intraelite disagreements at the same time allowed me to hold constant major alternative hypotheses. The domestic and international situations are the same for all participants. (The major competing hypothesis not ruled out explicitly by this design is the possibility that intraelite role is a significant influence—i.e., that the secretary of state tends to oppose military options by virtue of the office. If personality differences and policy differences correlate with office, then a correlation between the first two may not be a causal relationship. I return to this problem later.)

Thirty-six men were selected for study—American presidents, secretaries of state, and selected advisors who served between 1898 and 1968. I assessed personality traits by searching scholarly works, insiders' accounts, biographies, and autobiographies for the men under consideration. I excerpted passages relevant to two personality dimensions—general *dominance over subordinates* and *extroversion*, omitting explicit clues that would identify the individual involved or the scholarly source, and included these passages in dossiers. These dossiers were coded in random order using the rating criteria reported in the notes of Tables 2 and 3 by two independent judges unaware of the identities of the men they rated. I, who knew the identities and the scholarly sources, also rated the men. Among the three judges correlations ranged, for dominance, from .83 to .91 ( $p < .001$ ) and between .84 and .93 for extroversion ( $p < .001$ ). There were no systematic differences among us, and I used the unweighted mean rating of the

three judges as a subject's rating on that personality dimension except in the case of William Jennings Bryan. Knowing the original sources of the ratings for Bryan, I felt that it was the less scholarly and more idealized accounts that gave him a high-dominance rating and I lowered his dominance score since I felt the lower score would be more accurate.

The task of second-hand personality assessment of historical figures presents troublesome methodological issues which should be examined. In the first instance, one's observed behavior can differ substantially depending upon one's role and one's relation with those with whom one interacts. A man like Secretary Dulles could be dominant over his subordinates yet deferential to a superior. This social context must be standardized explicitly. I chose to assess dominance by assessing dominance over nominal subordinates on the assumption that a person's inner desire to dominate would be less inhibited and show itself more clearly in this sector of life. In addition, since America's use of force has often been directed against smaller countries, I felt this was the most relevant tendency of interpersonal behavior that would generalize.<sup>10</sup> Special weight in the coding was given to the scope and level of activity through which these men sought to initiate, monitor, and give personal direction to the activities of their subordinates. Thus an individual was described as very high on dominance if he was "recorded as regularly intervening at lower levels or ignoring subordinates completely while setting policy himself. May berate subordinates, seeks to impose will forcefully. He runs the show. Complex variegated information-acquisition system." A very low-dominance individual was one who "seldom interferes, defers to others, almost welcomes initiatives of others as a relief. Doesn't as much share power as abdicate it."

Criteria to assess extroversion were specifically constructed to take into account situational differences between men in these offices and a representative sample of the population. Most of these men, by virtue of their public

<sup>10</sup>It is conceivable that, with more cases, a less simple and more differentiated approach would be useful. Thus the present personality dimension may predict best to use of force against smaller countries but relations with autonomously powerful opponents in domestic politics might predict better to relations with the Soviet Union since World War II. For all his bullying tendencies toward subordinates Lyndon Johnson was more restrained and empathetic in dealing with the Soviet Union.

<sup>9</sup>Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

offices, probably spent more time with more people than the average American. They probably had more friends and acquaintances. Accordingly, to differentiate among them, coding criteria gave special weight to how a man spent what little leisure time he had: did he spend it with large numbers of other people (as was true of President Lyndon Johnson) or did he prefer relative isolation (Secretary Dulles, for example, would go with his wife to an isolated island away from telephones and other people)? A very extroverted individual was one who was "emotionally outgoing, loves crowds. Enjoys contacts with many kinds of people. Leisure time spent with people." A very introverted subject was one described as "cold, icy or aloof or acutely shy. Few close friends. Leisure time spent away from people."

An ideal personality assessment would be made by trained observers using explicit criteria, working independently of one another, and without prior knowledge of policy attitudes. This ideal was only partially met in the available source material—in particular most writers had a prior knowledge of policy decisions, there was a tendency toward rating interdependence with later scholars partially relying on the work of earlier writers, and there was a tendency toward impressionism, a lack of rigorous detailing of specific instances which led to a generalization. Also, the high degree of consensus in this study might have resulted from bias in my own excerpting. For all of these reasons it is important to have an independent check.

Fortunately, a partial check is possible. Donley and Winter (1970) scored inaugural addresses (which were delivered, of course, prior to later policy decisions) of 11 presidents for achievement and power motivation.<sup>11</sup> On this subsample correlations with the present dominance ratings were .54 ( $p < .01$  for N-Power) and .77 ( $p < .01$ ) for N-Achievement. Such significant correlations are supportive evidence that present ratings are reasonably

valid. The high degree of consensus among coders and across related methods occurs, I think, because these were all public figures much talked about and observed (hence a consensus about them in the present ratings) and because the differences among them are quite marked.

I do not want to leave the impression, however, that the rating task was entirely straightforward. While generally successful, the effort to disguise identities was not wholly effective since both raters were political scientists (although not foreign policy experts) and had some knowledge of the people in question: Franklin Roosevelt and Theodore Roosevelt were each recognized by one rater.<sup>12</sup> In addition there was considerable difficulty in rating Harry Truman since he was generally egalitarian but fired General Douglas MacArthur for asserting too much independence. My own feeling was that this reflected a habitual low dominance on Truman's part, a tendency which produced such later problems that he was forced to assert himself. The judges seemed to feel the same way, although with some misgivings—and it is appropriate to note that Donley and Winter do give Truman a high relative score for power motivation. Another complex case was Eisenhower, who asserted himself strongly in establishing procedures under which his key subordinates made major decisions. He is scored low here because the rating scales assessed assertion over policy *content*, although clearly there is another, *procedural*, sense in which Eisenhower was very much in charge. Herbert Hoover also was complex: he tended to be very dominant over policy initiatives intellectually, although he was personally a tolerant and egalitarian man who kept in office a secretary of state (Stimson) with whom he often disagreed fundamentally and strongly. Hoover is scored moderately high on dominance here although it should be noted that a single rating scale collapses this distinction between intellectual and interpersonal dominance.

There is a final and important method-

<sup>11</sup>R. E. Donley and D. G. Winter, "Measuring the Motives of Public Officials at a Distance: An Exploratory Study of American Presidents," *Behavioral Science*, 15 (1970), 227-36. See also David G. Winter, *The Power Motive* (New York: Free Press, 1973), pp. 212-18. Methodological issues of attributing variations in such scores primarily to personality variations are, of course, present and are discussed in Donley and Winter. For evidence that changes in national mood may produce different American leaders, see David McClelland, *Power: The Inner Experience* (New York: Irvington, 1975).

<sup>12</sup>The use of trained political scientists can be challenged on the grounds they may bring bias to such tasks. My own feeling is that they bring a useful sensitivity to power. For example Franklin Roosevelt's chaotic administrative style might be interpreted as reflecting low dominance. The judges, however, saw this as a style consciously designed to heighten presidential dominance. I think they were correct in this view, but it is true that other judges could have different assessments. The same comment applies to the Truman coding problem discussed next in the text.

ological point. When I began this study I was not totally ignorant of American foreign policy, and I knew a substantial amount about personalities and policies since World War II. It was this knowledge which helped convince me that interpersonal generalization theory was a good candidate for testing, and I used this knowledge, as well as previous studies, to specify the hypotheses and devise the rating criteria to capture what I thought would be the operative personality traits. I did not know in detail what all the evidence would show (especially prior to World War II) but I have accordingly been cautious to avoid counting too many recent cases on related issues (e.g., of Dulles-Kennan or Dulles-Stevenson disagreements) which I knew in advance would support the hypotheses. But the very knowledge that led me to spend time on the study and which helped to design it also tends to undermine the characterization of the study as completely a scientific test. In truth, the study was designed with some prior knowledge of the data. This problem, of course, is not unique to this study but pervades studies of well-known events. Any retrospective study of events of which the researcher has prior knowledge is tainted; indeed the more one is an expert in his field the less scientifically definitive any explanatory study will be, and the more any ultimate theoretical verification must depend upon replication by another researcher using a different sample. The present study is no exception to this caveat.

Actual personality ratings employed 10-point scales, and hypotheses were tested using numerical scores. These are reported in the notes to Table 2. However, for ease of visual presentation the 36 subjects are placed in one of 16 cells in Table 1.

I derived two hypotheses from interpersonal generalization theory to test for a systematic link between personality differences and policy differences. The first hypothesis was readily suggested by previous research in the Christiansen tradition, the second was my own related guess of a possible interpersonal-international linkage:

1. In cases of disagreement on the following aspects of the use of force those scoring *higher* on dominance will be *advocating* the threat or use of military force, military intervention, ultimata, and the military occupation of other countries and *opposing* moves toward disarmament and arbitration agreements when compared with those scoring lower on dominance.
2. In cases involving disagreement about policy toward the Soviet Union or the Soviet Bloc, those scored as *more extroverted* will advocate cooperative, inclusive policies—recognition, more trade, summit conferences, negotiations to resolve differences—when compared with those scored as more introverted.

Table 1. Comparative Personality Assessments:  
Presidents, Secretaries of State, Selected Advisors, 1898-1968

	Introvert			Extrovert
High Dominance	Dulles Wilson			Johnson Roosevelt, F. Roosevelt, T.
	Hoover Hughes Stimson	Acheson House Hull Root	Byrnes Hopkins Kennedy	
	Herter Kennan Marshall	Colby Knox Lansing	Bacon McKinley Stettinius Stevenson Truman	Bryan Taft
Low Dominance	Coolidge Day Sherman	Kellogg Rusk	Eisenhower Hay	Harding

Note: Categories are for visual display only; boxes are not equal intervals. Hypotheses were tested with numerical scores.

## II

I scored policy disagreements from the same sources I consulted to obtain material for personality ratings. To eliminate some of the possible alternative explanations, I scored in-tralite personality disagreements usually only when the individuals involved actually held office in the administration in power. However, to give additional coverage I also included a small number of individuals who were not in office at the time but who appeared to express themselves consistently and sincerely rather than merely and solely as a tactic to gain advantage in domestic political contests. The main consequence of this extended coding was to lengthen the coverage for President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretaries Root and Acheson, and advisors Kennan and Stevenson. Such additional cases did not bias the results of the tests (see Table 2, n. 8, and Table 3, n. 4).

As an additional cautionary restriction in coding I limited cases to those in which it seemed clear that the individual involved had access to the relevant information. The chief exclusion was comparisons between Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary Hull (whom FDR had appointed for domestic political reasons and did not usually keep fully informed).

I chose to be conservative, as I noted earlier, in coding a series of disagreements on related issues rather than to risk reporting a test more heavily weighted by a few individuals of whom I had detailed prior knowledge. In all of these series of cases (with the possible exception of Secretary Stimson's disagreements with the slightly more dominant and pacific President Hoover) this coding decision worked to lower the number of cases consistent with the first hypothesis.

The recorded disagreements are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In all, there were 49 disagreements scored on issues related to force, 13 disagreements scored on issues involving initiatives to "build bridges" with the Soviet Union.

There are, of course, methodological issues underlying this listing of cases: first, comprehensiveness; second, potential bias. Is this a definitive listing of all disagreements among these participants between 1898 and 1968? If not, are there grounds for maintaining that the listing is unbiased, especially considering my prior knowledge of the hypotheses under investigation?

No one can maintain that this is a comprehensive listing. It is doubtful that all disagreements were recorded by participants or that they all found their way from private papers to

published accounts. As well, the historical literature is somewhat uneven and one has the suspicion that some administrations are more exhaustively reported than others. Nevertheless, intra-administration disagreement has been a prominent topic in the literature, and I would be surprised if marked disagreements at least on major uses of force are unrecorded.

Granted that the listing probably is not comprehensive, could it be *biased* unconsciously in favor of the hypotheses? Yes, it could. I sought to deal with this possibility in two ways: first, by circulating an earlier version of this manuscript to six political scientists and diplomatic historians, second, by using an independent coder ignorant of the hypotheses to recode the single most comprehensive source of personal views, Norman Graebner's edited collection, *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century*.<sup>13</sup>

None of the professionals felt able to certify the comprehensiveness of the listing. But their comments and the independent coding of the Graebner volume were useful and did identify three cases, totally 5 disagreements, to add to the original 44 coded for hypothesis one.

One cannot claim that these procedures are exhaustive, only that they are reasonably thorough, given available resources. The ideal alternative would be to enlist a team of diplomatic historians for several years of work in archives and private papers without telling them the hypotheses under investigation. But given these checks to eliminate coding bias unwittingly favorable to the hypotheses, and given the high percentages of cases supporting the hypotheses, it seems unlikely that massive bias in favor of the theory is undetected on such a scale as would alter the conclusions reported here, at least in the case of the large *N* for the first hypothesis.

However the professional reviewers, especially the diplomatic historians, did raise queries that deserve discussion. One diplomatic historian felt the entire theory was "obvious" and he was bemused by social scientists "hacking their way through open doors." Of more practical relevance, another objected to including President McKinley's initial opposition to the Spanish-American War, on the grounds that McKinley eventually acceded to it. (I believe McKinley's early opposition was a reasonable

<sup>13</sup>Norman A. Graebner, *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961).

Table 2. An Inventory of Policy Disagreements: Coercion and Threat (Hypothesis One)

Subjects	Description	References	No. Consistent	No. Not Consistent
1. T. Roosevelt vs. McKinley	Roosevelt was an earlier advocate of the Spanish-American War. <sup>1</sup>	Howard K. Beale, <i>Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power</i> (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), pp. 61-63 et passim.	1	0
2. T. Roosevelt vs. Hay	Roosevelt objected to the first <i>Hay-Pauncefote Treaty</i> because he wanted the Isthmian canal fortified.	William Thayer, <i>The Life and Letters of John Hay</i> , Vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton, 1915), pp. 339-41.	1	0
3. T. Roosevelt vs. Hay	Against Hay's objection Roosevelt used veiled threats in the Alaskan boundary arbitration with England.	Foster Rhea Dulles, "John Hay," in <i>An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century</i> , ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961), p. 36.	1	0
4. T. Roosevelt vs. Root, Bacon	Root and Bacon opposed sending American troops to Cuba in 1906.	Philip C. Jessup, <i>Elihu Root</i> , Vol. 2 (New York: Dodd, 1938), p. 156; James B. Scott, "Robert Bacon," in <i>The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy</i> , Vol. 9, ed. S. F. Bemis (New York: Cooper Square, 1963), p. 290.	2	0
5. T. Roosevelt vs. Root	Roosevelt was very reluctant to agree to 24 bilateral arbitration treaties negotiated by Root.	Charles Toth, "Elihu Root," in Graebner, p. 56.	1	0
6. T. Roosevelt vs. Root	Root opposed Roosevelt's desire to intervene militarily in Venezuela.	Toth, p. 48.	1	0
7. Knox vs. Root	While in private life Root dissented from a Knox ultimatum to Chile.	Jessup, p. 250.	0	1
8. Wilson vs. Root, Taft, Bryan, Bacon	Root, Taft, Bryan, and Bacon opposed Wilson's military intervention in Mexico. (Bryan acquiesced until the Vera Cruz landing.)	Jessup, pp. 259-61, 256; Richard Challener, "William Jennings Bryan" in Graebner, p. 92; Merle Curti, "Bryan and World Peace," <i>Smith College Studies in History</i> , 16 (April-July 1931), 180-81; James B. Scott, <i>Robert Bacon: Life and Letters</i> (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1923), p. 265.	4	0
9. T. Roosevelt vs. Wilson, Root, Taft, Bryan, Bacon	Roosevelt wanted Wilson's Mexican policy to be more forceful.	W. H. Harbough, <i>The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt</i> , rev. ed. (New York: Collier, 1963), p. 450. See references in 8 above.	4	1 (Roosevelt-Wilson, no difference)
10. T. Roosevelt, Lansing vs. Wilson	Roosevelt and Lansing wanted earlier American entry into World War I.	Jessup, pp. 321-23, et passim.	0	2



Table 2. (Continued)

Subjects	Description	References	No. Consistent	No. Not Consistent
11. T. Roosevelt, Wilson, Lansing vs. Root	Root opposed Wilson's "path to war" policies prior to the sinking of the Lusitania.	Jessup, pp. 321-33.	2	1
12. T. Roosevelt, Wilson, House, Root, Lansing vs. Bryan	Bryan resigned as Secretary of State in opposition to Wilson's movements toward entering World War I.	Challenger, p. 98.	5	0
13. Hughes vs. Harding	Harding dissented from a stiff stand against the Obregon government of Mexico urged by Hughes in a dispute over American property claims.	Robert K. Murray, <i>The Harding Era</i> (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 329-31.	1	0
14. Hughes vs. Harding	Hughes wanted to keep U.S. forces in Haiti in 1923; Harding wanted to withdraw them.	Murray, p. 334.	1	0
15. Hoover vs. Stimson	Hoover opposed Stimson's desire to "put teeth" into the Kellogg-Briand pact by invoking economic sanctions against Japanese aggression in Manchuria.	Elting Morison, <i>Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson</i> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 445, 382-83, 403-05.	0	1
16. Hoover vs. Stimson	Hoover was a stronger advocate of disarmament than Stimson.	Morison, p. 410.	0	1
17. Acheson, Dulles vs. Kennan	Kennan advocated halting the northern advance of Allied forces in Korea at the 38th parallel.	George F. Kennan, <i>Memoirs, 1925-1950</i> (New York: Bantam, 1969), p. 523.	2	0
18. Acheson, Dulles vs. Kennan	Kennan dissented strongly from the militarization of containment urged by both men. <sup>2</sup>	Kennan, pp. 497-528 et passim; <i>Memoirs, 1950-1963</i> (Boston: Little Brown, 1972), passim.	2	0
19. Dulles vs. Eisenhower	Eisenhower opposed the Dulles plan for the U.S. to intervene in Indochina to rescue and supplant the French. <sup>3</sup>	Hans J. Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles" in Graebner, p. 296.	1	0
20. Dulles vs. Acheson	Acheson opposed the Dulles policy of a strong military stand to retain Quemoy and Matsu.	<i>New York Times</i> , Sept. 7, 1958, p. 1.	1	0
21. Dulles vs. Acheson	In the 1958-59 Berlin deadline crisis Acheson felt the Dulles policy was too conciliatory.	<i>New York Times</i> , Nov. 19, 1959, pp. 1, 22.	0	1
22. Kennedy vs. Rusk, Stevenson	Rusk had misgivings about, and Stevenson wholly disapproved of, the Bay of Pigs invasion.	Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, <i>Facing the Brink</i> (New York: Scribner, 1967), p. 149; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., <i>A Thousand Days</i> (New York: Houghton, 1965), pp. 259, 271.	2	0

Table 2. (Continued)

Subjects	Description	References	No. Consistent	No. Not Consistent
23. Acheson vs. Kennedy, Stevenson	Acheson favored a more hard-line stance than Kennedy or Stevenson in the 1961 Berlin crisis.	Schlesinger, pp. 380-83.	1	1
24. Kennedy vs. Stevenson	During the same crisis Stevenson urged a more conciliatory stand than Kennedy selected.	Schlesinger, p. 346.	1	0
25. Acheson vs. Kennedy, Stevenson	Acheson consistently favored the air strike option during the Cuban missile crisis.	Graham T. Allison, <i>Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</i> (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), p. 208.	1	1
26. Kennedy vs. Stevenson	Stevenson favored negotiations during the missile crisis; Kennedy adopted a quarantine.	Schlesinger, pp. 807-08.	1	0
27. Kennedy, Johnson vs. Kennan	Kennan dissented from Kennedy and Johnson policies in Vietnam.	J. William Fulbright, <i>The Vietnam Hearings</i> (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 107-66.	2	0
28. Johnson vs. Kennan	During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia Kennan advocated sending 100,000 American troops to Europe; Johnson did not agree.	<i>New York Times</i> , September 22, 1968, p. 3.	0	1
Totals			38	11
Percentage			77.5%	22.5%
Probability <sup>4</sup>			P<.0001	

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>While I have followed the weight of scholarly opinion in scoring McKinley as opposed to the Spanish-American War and being pressured into it, this view is not universal. See, for example, Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).

<sup>2</sup>This case could include Kennan's dissent from the Truman Doctrine in the early Cold War period (he felt it too sweeping). See George F. Kennan, "American Involvement" in *The Viet-Nam Reader*, rev., ed. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 17-18. The origin of containment is not explained, on the American side, by personality traits revealed by the personality differences model. But the sweeping implementation, military emphasis, and structuring of the Cold War do seem to be shaped by personality traits.

<sup>3</sup>I have followed the weight of scholarly opinion concerning Dulles' thinking. For a different view consult Robert Randle, *Geneva, 1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 65, 97.

<sup>4</sup>Since some men appear more than once, and since their views at different times are probably not related randomly, a null hypothesis imaginary base rate of random distribution (50/50) is probably slightly too liberal, although by an unknown amount.

<sup>5</sup>I chose to consider disagreements arising between men who *advocated* different positions. Men who tended to "go along" with the policy initiatives of others were usually excluded. For example in item 2, I counted only the Roosevelt-Hay disagreement (rather than including the Roosevelt-McKinley comparison which would also have been supportive of interpersonal generalization theory) because McKinley tended to take a back seat in foreign policy formation. The Roosevelt-McKinley comparison is included, however, on the issues surrounding the Spanish-American War because McKinley did become actively involved at that time. The reader should be cautioned, however, that this early decision was a matter of some consequence since the men who tend to "go along" turn out to be lower on interpersonal dominance. In other words, the high percentages reported favorably for interpersonal generalization theory are somewhat sensitive to this decision.

<sup>6</sup>I have, after considerable uncertainty, excluded comparisons between Colonel House and Woodrow Wilson on American entry into World War I and between Harry Hopkins and Franklin Roosevelt on American entry into World War II. Both advisors appeared, at times, to be more inclined to advocate military involvement at an earlier point than the president. However, both Wilson and Roosevelt were sensitive to public opinion, and it is a reasonable interpretation of their behavior that they did not move until after a buildup of public opinion; thus, I am not sure that their "true" opinions (the attitudes they would urge on a president if they were his adviser)

## Notes (Continued)

actually differed from the views which House or Hopkins may have been freer to express. The matter need not be resolved here; but it should be noted that including these two cases would slightly increase the cases inconsistent with interpersonal generalization theory. It should also be noted that the cases listed here predominantly involve American use of force in small country arenas. Direct great power wars may involve such weighty and costly decisions as to overwhelm the personal motive differences discussed here for those who feel under attack.

<sup>7</sup>Were Bryan's dominance score the original 5.67 instead of the adjusted 3.67 there would be a change of 2 cases (the Root (5.33) and Lansing (4.00) comparisons in item 12) in the inconsistent column leaving 36 supportive cases and 13 opposed (73.4 percent supportive).

<sup>8</sup>The question has also arisen whether including men out of office biases these scores. Looking at the subset of only those holding formal offices drops 25 comparisons of which 17 are supportive (1 each for items 2, 17, 20, 23, 25; 2 from cases 8, 11, 12, and 27; 4 from case 9) and 8 inconsistent (1 each from items 7, 9, 10, 11, 21, 23, 25, 28). This leaves 24 cases of which 21 support, and 3 do not support, hypothesis one—an increase of confirmation, 87.5 percent of the 24 cases ( $P < .0001$ ).

<sup>9</sup>Mean dominance scores (extroversion scores in parentheses) used to test hypotheses were Johnson, 9.67 (9.00); Dulles, 9.33 (1.33); Franklin Roosevelt, 9.33 (9.67); Wilson, 8.67 (2.33); Roosevelt, 8.67 (8.33); Hoover, 8.33 (1.33); House, 8.33 (4.33); Hughes, 8.00 (2.00); Stimson, 7.67 (2.33); Kennedy, 6.67 (6.33); Hopkins, 6.00 (6.67); Byrnes, 6.00, (6.33); Hull, 5.33 (4.87); Acheson, 5.33 (4.00); Root, 5.33 (4.33); Lansing, 4.00 (4.13); Bryan, 3.67 (adjusted from 5.67) (7.67); Stevenson, 3.67 (6.33); Stettinius, 3.67 (6.33); Knox, 3.67 (4.00); Bacon, 3.67 (6.33); Truman, 3.67 (7.33); Colby, 3.67 (4.00); Marshall, 3.33 (2.33); Herter, 3.33 (2.67); Taft, 3.33 (7.67); Kennan, 3.00 (2.00); McKinley, 3.00 (2.00); Kellogg, 2.67 (3.00); Eisenhower, 2.33 (5.00); Rusk, 2.33 (3.00); Hay, 1.67 (6.00); Sherman, 1.67 (2.00); Day, 1.67 (2.00); Harding, 1.67 (8.67); Coolidge, 1.33 (1.67).

<sup>10</sup>Scoring criteria for dominance were (1 to 10): *Highest scoring*: Recorded as regularly intervening at lower levels or ignoring subordinates completely while setting policy himself. May berate subordinates, seeks to impose will forcefully. He runs the show. Complex, variegated information-acquisition system. *Mod High*: In command of situation, may by-pass channels. Some power sharing and flexibility; *Mod*: Sets guidelines and makes final decisions himself. Fair amount of autonomy to subordinates. Tends to work through channels; *Mod Low*: Often takes a stand, primarily to check excesses. Generally grants large amount of autonomy to subordinates. Appoints people and tends to stay out of their way; *Low*: Seldom interferes, defers to others, almost welcomes initiatives of others as a relief. Doesn't as much share power as abdicates it; *Introversion-Extroversion* (1-10); *High Ext.*: Emotionally outgoing, loves crowds. Enjoys contacts with many kinds of people. Leisure time spent with people; *Mod. High*: Warm, outgoing, affable, possibly not drawn to crowds. Likes to socialize in his leisure time; *Mod*: Mixed—usually warm and considerate, especially with a moderate number of friends, is sometimes seen as a bit withdrawn; *Mod Low*: Reticent, shy, self-controlled, unemotional, spends leisure time in relative isolation; *Low*: Cold, icy, or aloof, or actually shy. Few or no close friends, leisure time spent away from people.

case to include.) Pervasive and sometimes strong objections were both the direct assertion that factors other than personality differences (especially differences in cognitive beliefs) explained the observed disagreement and the "anomaly" that high-dominance individuals did not consistently favor force in all cases and those of low dominance sometimes joined those of high dominance in advocating force in some cases. These objections usefully clarify what is tested here. First, there is no claim that different cognitive beliefs are uncorrelated with different policies. It is obvious from the words of the actors themselves that different choices are justified in a rationalist way. The relevant question investigated in this study is only whether the different cognitive justifications that are typically engaged and reported by participants and diplomatic historians might also be considered manifestations of deeper and more pervasive differences in motivational psychodynamics.

Another way to put the question is to ask whether one needs first to study each individual

case and rule out all plausible alternative explanations before including that case and concluding that a novel general theory built on such cases is valid? I think not. Such ruling out of alternative explanations in the specific case is probably impossible since, as the existent historiography demonstrates, plausible cognitive alternatives (for example) are already possible. What the present large *N* study of a single theory does is to increase the confidence with which one can go back to these individual historical cases and make the interpretation of such cases less ambiguous by suggesting more weight be given to relevant psychodynamic considerations. But, of course, the fact that any one single case is consistent with the present theory does not prove that the case is truly explained by the theory, it only creates a presumption in favor of including an explanation at the personal psychodynamic level of analysis.

My own working image of policy decisions is a Lewinian field theory approach: behavior is multiply determined, and a variety of forces

Table 3. An Inventory of Policy Disagreements:  
Inclusionary Policies Toward Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc (Hypothesis Two)

Subjects	Description	References	No. Consistent	No. Not Consistent
1. Harding vs. Hughes, Hoover	Hughes and Hoover opposed Harding's desire to recognize and increase trade with the Soviet Union.	Robert K. Murray, <i>The Harding Era</i> (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 348-54.	2	0
2. Eisenhower vs. Dulles	Dulles was cool toward Eisenhower's Open Skies inspection plan.	Sherman Adams, <i>First-Hand Report</i> (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 87.	1	0
3. Eisenhower vs. Dulles	Dulles was reluctant about Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative.	Adams, p. 112.	1	0
4. Eisenhower vs. Dulles	Eisenhower was more drawn toward summit conference with Soviet leaders than was Dulles.	Adams, p. 88; E. J. Hughes, <i>The Ordeal of Power</i> (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 207.	1	0
5. Dulles vs. Stevenson	Stevenson was consistently more willing than Dulles to negotiate differences with the Soviet Union.	H. Muller, <i>Adlai Stevenson: A Study of Values</i> (New York: Harper, 1967), pp. 154-55.	1	0
6. Eisenhower vs. Herter	Herter had grave doubts about Eisenhower's desire for a September, 1959 summit meeting with Khrushchev. <sup>1</sup>	G. Bernard Noble, <i>Christian Herter</i> (New York: Cooper Square, 1970), p. 78.	1	0
7. Kennedy, Acheson vs. Stevenson	Stevenson favored early negotiating rather than confrontation in the 1961 Berlin crisis.	See references 23 and 24, Table 2.	1	1
8. Kennedy, Acheson vs. Stevenson	Stevenson favored early negotiations rather than confrontation during the Cuban missile crisis.	See references 25 and 26, Table 2.	1	1
9. Johnson, Kennedy vs. Rusk	LBJ and JFK were more inclined toward building bridges with Eastern Europe and negotiating with the Soviet Union (e.g., Test Ban treaty, disarmament initiation); Rusk was more cautious and dubious.	Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., <i>A Thousand Days</i> (New York: Houghton, 1965), p. 285; Geyelin, P., <i>Lyndon B. Johnson and the World</i> (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 83.	2	0
Totals			11	2
Percentages			84.6%	15.4%
Probability			P < .002	

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Later in his study Noble comments that Herter "approved" of a Khrushchev visit (p. 291).

<sup>2</sup> For mean extroversion scores see Table 2, n. 9.

<sup>3</sup> See Table 2, n. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Dropping men not holding formal offices drops 3 comparisons (1 each in cases 5, 7, and 8) leaving 8 supportive and 2 opposing cases or 80 percent agreement ( $p \approx .05$ ).

and considerations, both arising from the individual and from the specific situation, interact (reinforcing, adding to, modifying, opposing each other) to produce a decision. It is not a theoretical contradiction that, in response to one situation, a high dominance person would, *on balance*, decide *against* force while a different situation would give more obvious and freer expression to one of many personal motivations. To draw an analogy, I am seeking to explain a direction in interpersonal variation about a mean in *given* problematic situations (problematic by definition—i.e., those producing intractable disagreement) when this range of variation already encompasses observed advocacy and opposition to a specific policy; what is being tested is *not* a theory which accounts for the mean, for all the other factors (situational and otherwise) which produce a foreign policy. (And I am *not* advancing here a theory of which objective situations yield a crucial role for personality in the policy response.)

Of the questions raised by others, another of importance is the possibility that dominance ratings merely reflect role-appropriate behavior rather than personality traits. There is a possibility that presidents are scored as more dominant or extroverted than secretaries or that high dominance is an artifact of growing administrative responsibilities as these have increased since the turn of the century. If so, then the personality measures may not truly assess individual motives.

A test of these objections is possible. If we exclude advisors House, Hopkins, Kennan, and Stevenson, we have an *N* of 32 men. Of the most dominant 16, 6 are presidents (LBJ, FDR, Wilson, TR, Hoover, JFK) and 10 are secretaries. Of the remaining 16, the same number (6) are presidents (Truman, Taft, McKinley, Eisenhower, Harding, Coolidge) and 10 are secretaries. There is no general tendency for presidents to be more dominant over subordinates than secretaries. But it is true that among the 6 most dominant personalities, there are 5 presidents (LBJ, FDR, Wilson, TR, Hoover) and only one secretary (Dulles), an unlikely occurrence by chance. Thus it is apparently true that extremely dominant individuals tend to become presidents rather than secretaries, but there is no general confounding of the presidential role with dominance rating, and the hypothesis that these ratings are merely a function of role can be ruled out.

Of the 12 presidents, are the more recent ones more likely to be scored as highly dominant? Of the 4 presidents included since World War II, 2 are in the more dominant half (JFK

and LBJ), 2 are in the less dominant half (Truman and Eisenhower). Of the 8 presidents included prior to World War II, 4 are in the more dominant half (TR, Wilson, Hoover, FDR), 4 are in the less dominant half (McKinley, Coolidge, Harding, Taft). There is no tendency for post-World War II presidents to be more dominant over subordinates.

Of the 20 secretaries, are the more recent scored as more dominant? Of the 7 recent secretaries, 4 are in the top 10 on dominance (Dulles, Byrnes, Acheson, Stettinius). Of the 13 who held office prior to or during World War II, 6 (Hughes, Stimson, Hall, Root, Lansing, Bryan) are in the top 10 on dominance. The comparison of 4/7 with 6/13 shows only a slight (and not statistically significant) tendency for higher-dominance individuals to be secretaries since World War II. Thus there is no general correlation of time period with dominance rating for the secretaries, and the hypothesis that personality ratings are confounded by increasing role requirements for dominance can be ruled out in this case as well.

However, there is evidence that different role requirements may affect the measure of extroversion. Of 12 presidents, 9 are in the top half of the extroversion rankings and only 3 are in the bottom half. Of the 20 secretaries, only 7 are in the top half of the extroversion ranking and 13 are in the bottom half. So secretaries tend to be scored as more introverted, presidents as more extroverted. The question is whether this is because of true *personality* differences or because of *role* differences. My own inclination, based on the fact that occupants of both the presidential and secretarial roles have shown varying behaviors (e.g., Presidents Wilson, Coolidge, and Hoover were quite introverted) is to attribute such scores exclusively to personality variations, especially so because the rating scale (reproduced in the notes to Table 2) placed weight on use of leisure time and degree of warmth rather than on role-specific behavior like presidential campaign activities and handshaking.

### III

Results of the analysis of the data are presented at the conclusion of Tables 2 and 3. If one accepts the personality scoring as valid, and if one accepts the cases presented as an unbiased listing, they show strong and statistically significant support for both hypotheses. In 78 percent of the cases involving issues of the use of force the difference along a personality dimension—everyday dominance of subordinates—is consistent with (and, inter-

personal generalization theory would argue, explains) the observed direction of policy disagreement. In 84.6 percent of the cases involving issues of inclusionary initiative toward the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc the difference along a second personality dimension, extroversion, is consistent with (explains) the observed direction of policy disagreement.

These percentages are strikingly high, unusually so for a single variable in social science research, and it will be well to look at the cases again to see how sensitive the analysis is to various aspects of their makeup.

The most obvious fact about the force cases is the strong support given the first hypothesis by Theodore Roosevelt. In 10 instances amounting to 15 disagreements Roosevelt's high dominance score and policy views give support to the theory in 13 of them. Removing Roosevelt leaves  $38-13 = 25$  cases in support and  $11-2 = 9$  opposed: 74 percent support, only a slight change.

A second and more subtle characteristic was discussed in a footnote to Table 2. Since I assumed there were multiple intra-administration forces making for policy agreement, I believed it was plausible, when indicated by historians, to think of some individuals as architects and others as "going along." Hence, I scored disagreements only between an outside critic and a principal policy architect, not between a dissenter or outside critic and those members of an administration who tended usually to defer in most areas of foreign policy to a principal architect. This means, for example (in the post-World War II period), that dissents by Kennan are scored against Acheson but not Truman, that dissents by Kennan and Acheson are scored against Dulles rather than Eisenhower, against Johnson or Kennedy rather than Rusk. But Kennan, Acheson, and Stevenson are scored as more dominant than Eisenhower or Rusk; if the "going along" category were to be disallowed, the picture becomes less supportive of hypothesis 1: in case 1 the Roosevelt-Day disagreement would be confirming; but in case 7 the Root-Taft disagreement would be disconfirming; in case 17 there would be a disconfirming instance where a Rusk (Assistant Secretary of State)-Kennan disagreement is counter to the theory. In case 18 a Truman-Kennan disagreement would be confirming but a Kennan-Eisenhower disagreement would be disconfirming. In case 20 the Acheson-Eisenhower disagreement would be disconfirming, but in case 21 it would be confirming. In case 23 the Acheson-Rusk disagreement would be confirming. In case 24 the Stevenson-

Rusk disagreement would be disconfirming. In case 25 the Acheson-Rusk disagreement would be disconfirming. In case 27, the Rusk-Kennan disagreement would be disconfirming. In case 28 the Rusk-Kennan disagreement would be disconfirming. So, disallowing the "going along" category would add 13 comparisons of which 5 would be confirming and 8 disconfirming. This would change the totals to 43 confirming cases and 19 disconfirming cases or 69 percent agreement (still statistically significant).

I would argue, however, that the "going along" judgment is realistic, and should be retained. The traditional historian's judgments that Day, Truman, Eisenhower, and Rusk often took a back seat is supported by their ratings as being of lower dominance. But it is true, in general, that "principal policy architects" tend to be high-dominance personalities. And those who "go along" tend to be of lower dominance. So, scoring in the way I have (necessarily excluding low-dominance individuals who agree to use of force), does tend to increase slightly the number of confirming cases.

One might wish as well to drop the confirming Robert Bacon citations in cases 4, 8, and 9 on the argument that he had to dissent because his superior Root dissented. My impression of Bacon is that he was more an independent actor than a lackey of Root. But support for the theory would not be significantly reduced by removing these cases.

From the earlier discussion there still is one important rival hypothesis, not ruled out by the research design, to be considered, namely that secretaries of state "role specialize" in advocating nonmilitary options. If we take the 20 disagreements involving a secretary of state, this turns out not to be the case: in 10 (or 50 percent) the secretary did oppose the threat or use of force (numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 21, 22) but in 10 (50 percent) numbers 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20) he was an advocate. There is, then, no general tendency for differences in these intra-administration roles to affect the observed results. This major rival hypothesis for explaining these findings can be excluded.

**An Analysis of Discrepant Cases.** There are, of course, discrepant cases. Each could be considered in the search for additional variables. But, since the major interest here is exploring the viability of an interpersonal generalization explanation, let me suggest one possible variable, marked extrapunitive, that retrospectively seems important in the relation between interpersonal dominance and a tenden-

cy to be inclined toward the use of force. I would nominate this variable as a candidate for consideration by future researchers working with other data bases. My reasoning is as follows: in two of the eleven discrepant cases President Hoover and Secretary Stimson disagreed in the opposite direction than was predicted by interpersonal generalization theory. Hoover, scored slightly more dominant than Stimson, opposed the Secretary's desire to "put teeth" into the Kellogg-Briand pact by invoking economic sanctions against Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Stimson also opposed disarmament proposals which Hoover advocated. In a third case, former Secretary Elihu Root disagreed with an ultimatum issued to Chile by Secretary Knox. In other cases former president Theodore Roosevelt, scored exactly as dominant as President Wilson, was critical of Wilson's "feeble" Mexican policies and Wilson's reluctance to enter World War I at an earlier date. Two additional cases found the slightly less dominant former Secretary of State Dean Acheson urging a harder line in the 1961 Berlin crisis and disagreeing with President Kennedy's decision to use a quarantine rather than an air strike during the Cuban missile crisis.

In each of these seven cases the men involved are close to each other on the rating scales. A revised conceptualization of interpersonal dominance would probably have reversed relative positions so that these cases would, as well, support the generalization hypothesis. In particular, special weight to tendencies to be extrapunitive or to "enjoy a good fight" would increase the dominance ratings of Theodore Roosevelt, Philander Knox, Henry Stimson, and Dean Acheson. All of these men were somewhat more noted for these characteristics than were Elihu Root, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, and John Kennedy. For example, Theodore Roosevelt was always sounding-off against someone or something. Elihu Root thought Knox's temper was decisive in the Chilean case:

Knox was a pappy sort of fellow. He got mad very easily. He did mix into things too much. He got mad at that old pelter of a case (the Alsop claim against Chile); that made no end of trouble. . . . The arbitration practically decided in favor of Chile in an amount she was ready to pay. Without saying a word to anybody, Knox took it up and gave them an ultimatum—ten days.<sup>14</sup>

Secretary Stimson was noted for his outbursts of temper; he would occasionally have fits of anger in which he threw books and papers at his secretary. Acheson was noted for his studied arrogance, his rapier wit, his aversion to "suffering fools gladly," his liking for a good fight. By contrast Elihu Root and Herbert Hoover were highly self-controlled, generally even-tempered, and disinclined to devastate an opponent. Wilson was a fighter—but less drawn to it as a pastime than the Rough Rider. Kennedy, I think, was less inclined than Acheson to enjoy a scrap, more interested simply in winning.

Still, even if these modifications were made, interpersonal generalization theory as formulated here would not explain all force disagreements. There would be four force cases (two involving Lansing and World War I, an Acheson-Dulles disagreement where Acheson wanted a harder line in Berlin in 1958, and George Kennan's advocacy of American troop movements to Europe at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) which would still not be explained by a single variable.

#### IV

Until this point, to rule out alternative hypotheses, comparisons among these men have been restricted to assessing the direction of their differences at the same historical moment. But the two policy tendencies studied may interact in specific situations, and collapsing the earlier 16-cell array of subjects into a four-fold table (Table 4) gives a basis for speculating about a more general psychological typology of orientations toward America's role in the international political system. Since my view of policy making is that multiple personality (situational) factors interact I suspect that such a typology may ultimately be more informative than single bivariate hypotheses in the broader task of giving an empathetic account of the personal coherence which may underlie a man's policies. It is obvious, for example, that people with different personality traits may favor similar policies—if so, however, their rationales may still differ, and one point of the exercise is to provide some general impression of what these differences may be. In each of the four cells (which I have labeled with a summary word or phrase) there may be one or two who do not fit the generalizations offered here—I was guided primarily by those in the extreme (original corner) cells. As well, there is obviously a small *N* in each cell, too small for any systematic test or study to be conducted conclusively. It will probably be another cen-

<sup>14</sup>Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, Vol. 2 (New York: Dodd, 1938), p. 250.

tury or more before there are sufficient subjects to make generalizations or tests with statistical rigor. But for the reader or future researcher who is not averse to impressions, let me propose the following ideas.

The *Bloc Leaders* and the *World Leaders* are, of course, those who are rated high in their tendencies to dominate their subordinates in their everyday lives. They differ from one another in their degree of introversion or extroversion. An example of a *Bloc Leader* (high-dominance introvert) would be Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; an example of a *World Leader* (high-dominance extrovert) would be President Theodore Roosevelt.

The *Bloc Leaders* tend to divide the world, in their thought, between the moral values they think it ought to exhibit and the forces opposed to this vision. They tend to have a strong, almost Manichean, moral component to their views. They tend to be described as stubborn and tenacious. They seek to reshape the world in accordance with their personal vision, and their foreign policies are often characterized by the tenaciousness with which they advance one central idea. Examples would be Woodrow Wilson's "puritanical" Mexican policies and his advocacy of a League of Nations, Elihu Root's dogged efforts to negotiate arbitration treaties and strengthen the rule of international law, Charles Evans Hughes' advocacy of the World Court, Herbert Hoover's pursuit of disarmament, Secretary Hull's determined efforts for reciprocal free trade, Secretaries Acheson's and Dulles' dominant concern with containing what they perceived as the Communist menace.

The *World Leaders*, more so than the *Bloc Leaders*, seem to want to be leaders of the entire world rather than just one bloc of the ideologically acceptable. They too have a ten-

dency to use military force. But in general they are more flexible and pragmatic, more varied in the wide range and scope of major foreign policy initiatives. They want to lead rather than to contain. They advocate change, seek to stir up things globally—for example: Theodore Roosevelt getting his hand into arbitrations to end the Russo-Japanese War, the Algeciras Conference, and so forth; Franklin Roosevelt planning for the Four Policemen in the post-World War II period; President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps, Congo operation, dispatching advisors to South Vietnam, and initiating efforts toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union; Lyndon Johnson's bridge-building with Eastern Europe, the Glassboro summit, the SALT talk initiatives. The *Bloc Leaders* seem relatively preoccupied with themes of *exclusion*, the establishment of institutions or principles to keep potentially disruptive forces in check. The *World Leaders*, while they share some of the same concerns, are relatively more interested in *inclusion*, initiating programs and institutions for worldwide leadership and cooperative advance on a wide range of issues.

People of low interpersonal dominance, the *Maintainers* and the *Conciliators*, are less inclined toward willful and major projects of reshaping the world political system. One element of this (which has already been documented) is their lower inclination to advocate the use of military force. Yet both groups also differ significantly from one another.

Those of low interpersonal dominance who are introverted, the *Maintainers*, evidence a common theme in their foreign policy orientations: a holding action for the status quo.<sup>15</sup> An

<sup>15</sup>Thus among the low-dominance individuals the introverts (*Maintainers*) should be more likely to use force to maintain the status quo balance.

Table 4. A Possible Typology of Orientations to the International Political System

	Introvert	Extrovert
High Dominance (Reshape)	<i>Bloc (Excluding) Leaders</i> Dulles, Wilson, Hoover, Hughes, Stimson, Acheson, House, Hull, Root.	<i>World (Integrating) Leaders</i> Johnson, T. Roosevelt, F. Roosevelt, Byrnes, Hopkins, Kennedy.
Low Dominance (Persevere)	<i>Maintainers</i> Herter, Kennan, Marshall, Colby, Knox, Lansing, Coolidge, Day, Sherman, Kellogg, Rusk.	<i>Conciliators</i> Bacon, McKinley, Stettinius, Stevenson, Truman, Bryan, Taft, Eisenhower, Hay, Harding.

Note: Typology derived by collapsing boxes from Table 1. Characterizations are better thought of as continua than dichotomies. Dulles and Wilson, for example, are more the "ideal type" *Bloc Leaders*, as are the men from the other corners of the original 16-cell array.



extreme case is Calvin Coolidge who mentions not one word about foreign policy in his autobiography. He was content to leave it in the custody of his secretary of state. Somewhat more representative of this group is Dean Rusk of whom Arthur Schlesinger comments: "If the problem were an old one, he was generally in favor of continuing what Herter or Dulles or Acheson had done before him. If the problem were new, it was generally impossible to know what he thought."<sup>16</sup> Another example would be Secretary Kellogg who, as one scholar notes, "kept the shop running, but few new goods were put on the shelves." I think George Kennan is exemplary of this group as well—his emphasis, for the past 30 years, has centered on maintaining those four out of five key industrial areas of the world now in friendly hands in those hands.

In the final category are the *Conciliators*, the extroverted individuals who have relatively egalitarian relations with their nominal subordinates. My impression is that they tend to respond to circumstances with the sympathetic hope that accommodations can be negotiated. They are not inclined to reshape the world in accordance with a grand vision. But they do seem less comfortable with only the status quo than are the *Maintainers*. They seem more flexible, more hopeful, more open to change. They also seem—in historical perspective—to lack consistent and strong willpower, to be humane but peripheral footnotes. They are the Adlai Stevensons of history. They are backed into a Spanish-American War (McKinley); policy carries the imprint of a Hughes, Acheson, or Dulles (rather than a Harding, Truman, or Eisenhower); they languish unhappily at the United Nations during the Vietnam War (Stevenson). Many of their own policy initiatives seem quickly lost: Hay's paper Open Door policy in China, Eisenhower's Open Skies and Atoms for Peace plans.

To my mind a striking cleavage among all of these men occurs between the introverts and the extroverts. The introverts seem to be drawn to the ideal of a world system operating by *impersonal mechanisms*. During the interwar (post-World War I) swing of the international political system into legalism, this allegiance adopted the superstructure of international law. More recently and at other times a balance of power has been their normative model. But, whether the vision has been alliance of the righteous or separate geographical spheres of

influence, the underlying theme has been an ideal of boundaries and impersonal mechanisms for maintaining those boundaries. It is as though these people sought a world order that was less personally engaging, more impersonally and automatically controlled. By contrast, the extroverts seem to transcend (if that is the correct word) only a balance of power orientation. They are more interested in involvement and collaboration. A paradigm case of similar policies favored for these different reasons would be the differing emphases of President Wilson and Secretary Stettinius. Wilson saw the League of Nations as dealing with international aggression by invoking moral rules and sanctions against the transgressor. Secretary Stettinius saw the United Nations operating more as a forum for discussion and negotiation. In the first case a cold, aloof, introverted person sought a mechanism to impose a solution by imposing a principle. In the second case a warm, egalitarian, extroverted person sought an institution for mutual give-and-take.

### Conclusion

Psychohistory studies have their share of methodological problems. But by existing standards the present study, I would submit, holds its own and the risk of error in accepting its major conclusions is small. The personality ratings are based on explicit criteria, they converge with available independent measures of similar traits, and their variation is not a product of the subject's role. The listing of cases, while extensive, may not be exhaustive but it did pass several independent checks for bias. The design, by making comparisons at the same point in time, ruled out major alternative explanations, and the data ruled out the remaining rival hypothesis of policy view as a function of intra-administration role. The data are strongly supportive (especially for hypothesis one) and their statistical significance is markedly insensitive to various objections. And the theory stands as consistent with other findings using other subjects, particularly with the State Department study cited earlier which tested interpersonal generalization theory (and found support for it) among a random sample of American diplomats.

One might be reassured if rational choice (and the possibility of intellectual influence on a president) prevailed in American foreign policy decision making, but that view appears, in major ways, to be a fantasy. The good reasons which are sold to the public—and which have been bought by many diplomatic historians and by some political scientists—are not a

<sup>16</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (New York: Houghton, 1965), p. 435.

complete story of the real reasons. Lasswell's pioneering formulation of self-expression is at least partially correct on a frighteningly large scale: personal motives systematically displaced onto policy issues with the results (e.g., war against a small country) rationalized as being in the nation's interest.<sup>17</sup>

The data point toward two further conclusions. First, there are structural sources of war in the nature of the American political system; second, there are structural sources of potential error in the decision to go to war.

The structural source of war and hard-line foreign policy lies in self-selection and political recruitment patterns which, as we have seen, frequently elevate to high office in America high-dominance individuals with greater personal predispositions to threaten or use force.

<sup>17</sup>Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (New York: Viking, 1960).

The data do not indicate any historical trend toward diminution in this character of the American political system.

Second, it is possible that these personalized decisions for war may end badly (e.g., the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam) unless there is a fortuitous coincidence between personal predispositions and the nature of external reality. We cannot be confident that there will always be happy outcomes if people enter a laboratory and mix chemicals self-expressively and according to personal style and emotional predisposition.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup>See the elaboration of these conclusions in Etheredge, *A World of Men* (to be published in fall, 1978) and Lloyd Etheredge, "Hardball Politics: A Model" (forthcoming). For supporting evidence from anthropology that societies in which males are ambitious and competitive are more likely to go to war, see David Levinson, "What Have We Learned from Cross-Cultural Surveys?" *American Behavioral Scientist*, 20 (1977), 757-92.