

Chapter 3 EXECUTIVE BRANCH LESSONS, MONGOOSE, AND THE MISSILE CRISIS

To learn from failure, President Kennedy asked Maxwell Taylor (a retired general) to conduct a top-secret inquiry. The President appointed his brother, Robert Kennedy (the attorney general) to serve on the commission together with Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke.¹ In this chapter I define a conception of government learning and, in this light, analyze the commission's findings. I then describe the pressures in Laos and Berlin the president faced in these months, and contrast his decision to begin Operation MONGOOSE with his decisions during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

DEFINING GOVERNMENT LEARNING

I will define government learning as changes in *intelligence* and *effectiveness*. I will be concerned primarily with identifying individual learning by the president and senior policy officers.

To assess the growth of intelligence, I will use three criteria: (1) growth of *realism*, recognizing the different elements and processes actually operating in the world; (2) growth of *intellectual integration* in which these different elements and processes are integrated with one another in thought; (3) growth of *reflective perspective* about the conduct of the first two processes, the conception of the problem, and the results which the decision maker desires to achieve.²

An example of this conception of the growth of intelligence is the evolution of thinking about the physical universe. By an early view, the physical universe was composed of only four elements (earth, air, fire, and water); this has been replaced by the modern periodic table recognizing over 100 different elements, arrayed according to shared properties. The development of the intelligence embodied in this achievement was aided by the self-reflective creation and use of the scientific method.³

Effectiveness can be measured by the achievement of different values. In this book I will take the decision makers' own professed values as criteria.

Thus, this chapter poses two general questions: Following the Bay of Pigs, did the president and the executive branch become more intelligent? As a result, did they become more effective? As a first step, I will review the Taylor

Commission's report: originally classified "Top Secret," "Ultra-Sensitive," and "Eyes Only," it was substantially declassified several years ago and has been published, together with extensive minutes of evidence.⁴

EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEARNING

The Taylor Commission Report

There is a time when you can't advise by innuendoes and suggestions. You have to look him in the eye and say, "I think it's a lousy idea Mr. President." And nobody said that.

—General Maxwell Taylor⁵

The Taylor Commission was asked to diagnose the causes of failure and draw lessons for future paramilitary operations. It interrogated fifty-four witnesses and drew the following conclusions:

1. The operation had grown too large to sustain the disclaimer of American involvement. By November 1960, "this should have been recognized and the operation formally reviewed by the Eisenhower Administration."⁶ If the decision was made to continue, the amphibious operation should have been transferred to the Department of Defense.
2. Efforts to retain plausible denial for American involvement should have been introduced or maintained "only if they did not impair the chance of [military] success."⁷
3. Kennedy's advisers did not always present their case "with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officials of the government" so the latter would "appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions. This remark applies in particular to the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day strikes."⁸
4. Military capabilities were too marginal to sustain the operation in the face of its operational problems.⁹
5. The effectiveness of Castro's military was underestimated, and the short life of the beachhead was insufficient to trigger a popular response. Popular reaction was also made impossible by Castro's effective use of his police, which was underestimated.¹⁰
6. The president and other senior officials were told on many occasions "that the Zapata area was guerrilla territory, and that the entire force, in an emergency, could operate as guerrillas." "Greatly influenced" by their belief that this alternative was available, they believed "a sudden or disastrous defeat was most improbable."¹¹
7. Communication problems created time delays too great for the operation to be run adequately from Washington; especially on the night of D + 1 a better understanding of the ammunition shortages would have strengthened the case for U.S. air cover and better ammunition resupply plans.¹²
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave the impression of approving the plan, but

in their own view they had only acquiesced to it. Absence of written documents inhibited their review and left them with major differences in their perception of the plan.¹¹

9. Intelligence failures did not contribute significantly to the defeat. Formal CIA estimates of 2,500 committed supporters in the military, 20,000 active supporters in the population, and a favorable attitude by 25% of the Cuban people appeared reliable and responsibly made.¹¹
10. A formal decision process should replace the ad hoc and poorly coordinated Bay of Pigs process.¹⁴

The commission then declared America to be in a life-or-death struggle, to need more capability for paramilitary operations (perhaps, again, against Castro) and recommended:

11. Reorganization of the executive branch, and possibly a declaration of national emergency, to make the fight against Communism a major national priority.
12. A new official under the president be designated to give full time and attention to these operations and be delegated broad operational authority to conduct them subject to overall approval and guidance by the president.¹⁶

The Taylor report was factually accurate but weak in causal diagnosis. Its character reflected one cause of self-limited government learning: *The president's selection of advisers limited what he learned.*

Maxwell Taylor, a retired military officer, subscribed to a simple theory of organizational success. Commanders should forthrightly decide the objectives to be achieved. Staff should produce competent and forthright analyses. Subordinates should know their jobs, be assigned the resources needed for success, and do their duty. The report's diagnoses were a list of deviations from such an authoritative ideal.

Taylor's simple theory ignored the fundamental problem of improving the deliberation process required before a policy decision. This president and his advisers were not experienced military commanders with simple objectives and making familiar decisions. They were beginners, making complex judgments about novel problems in unfamiliar situations. Before becoming authoritative, they needed a process of learning, deliberations to allow them to assess reality, to grasp the rationales of proposals, to identify the new information and further advice they needed, to consider the values at stake, the trade-offs among objectives, and what choices they were willing to live with. The president needed to decide, after viewing the options and trade-offs, what he wanted.

For example, although the Taylor Commission concluded it "should have been recognized" in the fall of 1960 that this operation was too large to maintain the secret of its American sponsorship (a responsibility artfully delegated to the Eisenhower administration), it did not press beyond this disembodied,

surface observation that "someone" should have recognized it. Taylor's approach to improvement could be applied to simple, known-answer jobs ("Tell them to push the 'stop' button when the red light comes on."). But this failure was not the type to be corrected by authoritative injunction: it occurred when smart, experienced men did not have a process which allowed them to see a red light. Neither Nixon, who monitored the operation in the Eisenhower administration and wanted to implement it, nor President-elect Kennedy, saw "what should have been recognized."¹⁷ Taylor's authoritative solution—put someone in charge—evaded the problem of what a new decision maker should do differently.

The report was also limited because it respected authority too conventionally and thereby glossed over crucial facts; especially, it did not adequately and candidly criticize the president. Highly classified, with only one copy prepared, it might have ventured such criticism. It was written after a press conference at which Kennedy accepted responsibility for the failure. There was no external reason, only a cautious, deferential courtier attitude (which the Taylor report enjoined Kennedy's subordinates to overcome, yet itself repeated) to refrain from advising the president what his personal mistakes had been. Criticism of the president was not put into writing.¹⁸

Yet the report, an official truth all members of the panel and the government could live with, implied the president to be free of responsibility. The king can do (and would have done) no wrong—if only properly advised. Staff had not been sufficiently forthcoming; the failure was on their heads alone. The report was silent about the president's failure to recognize the disposal problem he created for himself in November, when he assented to an expanded force. It was silent about the apprehension formal large-group settings produced in his advisers. It was silent about his failure to give clear instructions to the Joint Chiefs to effect a critical review. It was silent about his failure to review the CIA's past record to see the sources of success and failure. It was silent about his own complicity in the defeat by cutting out and distancing people with military expertise when he cancelled a second air strike: it said only that Cabell and Bissell declined Rusk's offer to speak to the president, which misrepresented what happened in those moments.¹⁹

Such deference kept from the president a clear and forceful statement of how his own system worked and how, wittingly and unwittingly, he had acted, and failed to act, as a cause of the failure he wanted to understand. The Joint Chiefs and CIA had strong, sharp, and even realistic views about how the president himself had "screwed up." The president heard these only indirectly, via leaks to the press, not from his top secret committee.²⁰

A third block to intelligence was failure, after recommending strong authoritative norms, to say how to implement such a prescription. To the extent stronger authoritative norms were needed, they ought to have been strengthened. But it was farfetched to believe that only by writing a "Top Secret," "Eyes Only" report, stating norms to make the world work better, one could

accomplish this objective. Placing authoritative injunctions atop a malfunctioning system does not correct its behavior, either in people or organizations. The world has not been lacking in virtuous, plausible, authoritative prescriptions: the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule are examples; even God has had implementation problems. A useful analysis of Kennedy's implementation problem was needed.

The fourth limit to learning reflected in the report was the questions it did not raise. The four men self-limited their sense of responsibility.

Among its formal charges, the group was instructed to develop general lessons for future paramilitary operations. It overlooked evidence before it and endorsed the preconceptions of its members.

Consider the finding that Castro's preparations and effective response blocked any incipient uprising. This implied, against future opponents who also learned from history and prepared for a Guatemala-style operation, that regular American troops would be required. Realistically, "paramilitary" warfare had become a dubious idea.

The commission also overlooked the complications past CIA operations produced for the American government's ability to interpret reality. Had the commission reviewed Cuba's detailed charges submitted to the Organization of American States in late 1960, to the United Nations in 1961, or *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, it would have concluded that Castro's alleged paranoia and hostility had been a response, at least in part, to realistic information.²¹ This implied – and I will return to the issue in chapter 5 – that the earlier diplomatic tests of the Eisenhower administration to explore the possibilities for a modus vivendi were inconclusive. The American government had not yet conducted a credible test of whether Castro was a dedicated Marxist whose primary commitment was to become an ally of the USSR and spread anti-American revolution. Before embarking upon Operation MONGOOSE (described below), an increase of American-sponsored violence certain to increase the Soviet role, the commission needed to ask whether this was the only alternative. Was it not time to accept, even if begrudgingly, a stalemate? Could not Cuba now become a partial advantage – Castro's threat providing political motivation to secure momentum for the Alliance for Progress, and Cuba's survival now become a prime bargaining chip for Soviet sobriety in Berlin and Laos? The questions were not asked.

The Taylor Commission's fervent recommendation to strengthen paramilitary activism also ignored the issue of foreign public opinion. America's adversary was a charismatic guerrilla leader with a strong nationalist and socialist-communist appeal. The White House hope that his people would join to overthrow him also imagined, against the background of America's past associations with Batista, that America was a benevolent rescuer. Now, there was no evidence to believe such ethnocentric premises – and good reason, too, for thought about why they had been believed. The Taylor report had no comment on the problem.

Too, American public opinion was divided, and important sectors of opinion were angry about official deception. Domestic support for foreign policy requires, in part, that crucial American ideals (or at least symbolisms) be honored, and liberals were ambivalent about counterrevolutionary interventions in Central America. It is easier to recognize this lesson (and the one above) in the light of later experience in Vietnam. But the public outcry was so consequential (it led Kennedy to stop the D-Day strikes) and news media disaffection so badly miscalculated that the failure of the Taylor Commission to consider the issue (and boldly recommend a declaration of national emergency to override criticism) was a stark omission.

That such issues would be overlooked was predictable. Kennedy appointed a chairman with a military view of organization, and all appointees shared similar political outlooks and agreed that paramilitary operations were necessary. He excluded plausible appointees who might have wanted to re-argue old questions or cast doubts on the future of paramilitary operations: When Stevenson, Bowles, Fulbright, Schlesinger, other liberals, and politicians, were excluded he had already determined the issues he did not want debated. Kennedy pre-selected the advice he would receive and excluded what he did not want to hear. That he got what he wanted, and liked its spirit, is suggested by his next assignment for Taylor: That fall Taylor and Walt Rostow from the White House staff were sent to Vietnam where, predictably, they found a situation in which they imagined greater American counterinsurgency involvement could be successful and America a benefactor welcomed by the people.

These aspects of reality that (primarily as a result of preselection of advisers) were either not recognized or not integrated into the report are summarized in table 3.1.²²

Table 3.1. Learning and the Taylor Commission Report:
Important Elements of Reality Not Recognized or Integrated

I. *Cuba and Future Paramilitary Operations*

- A. Against intelligent and prepared opponents, past CIA successes were unlikely to be repeatable. The issue was not addressed.
- B. Long-term consequences for American and foreign public opinion were not assessed.
- C. New alternatives for Cuban policy were not assessed, especially the risks of failure to find a modus vivendi and of increased hostilities.

II. *The Policymaking Process*

- A. Design of a deliberation process for learning by beginners facing novel, complex problems and unwelcome trade-offs.
- B. Methods for safeguarding presidents from their own hasty actions that are uninformed or demand results that are unrealistic.
- C. Design of bureaucratic "trip wires" to sound alarms when earlier crucial assumptions need reevaluation or growing constraints jeopardize success.
- D. Ways to induce people to tell the complete truth to the president.
- E. Ways to overcome intellectual deference and the muted force of critical arguments made by subordinates.

Kennedy's Lessons

After he appointed a review board, Kennedy's next decision was political: Dulles, Cabell, and Bissell would have to go. He kept Dulles in office for several months to work with the Taylor Commission and likely because, as he was a Republican tied to the Eisenhower administration, Dulles inhibited criticism of the failure.²¹ Kennedy named another Republican, John McCone, to replace Dulles.

Kennedy thought about administration in terms of people, not organizational design. His basic theory was that he needed new people who would be straight with him and look out for his interests. He appointed a tough, experienced Washington lawyer, Clark Clifford, to a new board to monitor foreign intelligence. He included men with strong personal loyalty to himself to be in the room during future foreign policy crises, especially Robert Kennedy and Ted Sorenson. He supported an expanded role for McGeorge Bundy and his NSC staff in the White House. He appointed Maxwell Taylor to "watchdog" the CIA's execution of Operation MONGOOSE (discussed below) and later appointed Taylor his new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²² He changed the CIA's leadership, appointed in the Eisenhower administration, for this reason as well.

To those who had entered the administration with him, Kennedy provided leadership to help them recover from the experience and use it constructively. He took full public responsibility and put out the word that he meant it; he did not want faultfinding in press leaks. There was more than enough blame to go around, he said. He told them to keep the failure in perspective, that it would pass — "We'll be kicked in the can for a few days" — and maybe it was better that, if it had to happen, it occurred at the beginning. He was not openly vindictive, treated the departures of the top CIA men as a political necessity, and was personally gracious to them.²³

Yet support for his staff had a limit and, ironically, Chester Bowles became the scapegoat. After the failure, Bowles angered the president and other advisors by a long-winded, poorly organized discussion of future, nonviolent alternatives for eliminating or blocking Castro.²⁴ His fate was also sealed when he appeared to leak stories to his friends about his personal opposition to the entire Bay of Pigs scheme.²⁵

Unconsciously, Bowles was likely set up: He was given little time to prepare a plan and the task — a nonviolent way to eliminate Castro — was not realistic. The key decision makers were not in the mood to be chastised, particularly not by a man who appeared egregiously soft-headed. The brief byplay and execution of a liberal dissenter (on the alleged grounds he was a weak administrator, which appears not to have been the case) can probably be interpreted as reflecting Kennedy's inner process of dealing with his own liberal instincts and their fate in the decision for MONGOOSE.²⁶

Kennedy accepted the proposal to run his large-scale "irregular" operations through the Defense Department, ordered its capabilities expanded, and gave special emphasis to the Green Berets corps (designing their uniform personally). He did not officially declare a state of limited national emergency, but did speak fervently in public about America's need to compete against guerrilla insurgencies he feared would increase, worldwide, in the 1960s.

The White House staff loyally created a public relations image to assure liberals (and the world) that Kennedy had been misled by the CIA. Leaks suggested he was outraged, would now "get control," that he was forewarned and would resist any further paramilitary schemes. In fact, this intelligent and effective learning to maneuver public opinion obscured a movement of policy in the opposite direction: Kennedy implemented Maxwell Taylor's recommendation to place a single man in charge of paramilitary operations (it was Taylor, to review operational details), and assigned him to get rid of Castro without press-generated constraints and damage. Rejecting the ineffective half-measures from Bowles and State Department liberals, Kennedy acted in concert with the Taylor Commission's emotional consensus which, although not based on a thoughtful study, did reflect his own feelings: "We feel we are losing today on many fronts . . ." and "There can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor."²⁷

AT CENTER STAGE: LAOS AND BERLIN

To understand the subsequent MONGOOSE phase of America's Cuban policy it is necessary to discuss the simultaneous, grave pressure Kennedy felt on a world stage. Conflicts were not merely local; they were battles, too, in this larger war: tests of resolve for oneself, public demonstrations of resolve to deter other anti-American initiatives.

America faced, by Kennedy's perception, new and dangerous Soviet assertions of power. Before he assumed office, the USSR had begun to deploy newly developed intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads throughout much of the United States. Kennedy's earlier belief that Soviet missiles outnumbered America's changed by February 1961, when McNamara reviewed top secret U-2 spy plane evidence the new administration had not previously known to exist (and which Bissell had made possible), but the fact remained that Soviet Premier Khrushchev increasingly boasted of his new rockets in warnings to the West.²⁸ His country also advanced to a dramatic lead, both psychological and technical, in outer space: The Soviet Union orbited the first earth satellite, Sputnik, in 1957; the first man placed into earth orbit was Yuri Gagarin, a Soviet cosmonaut — and his success (April 12, 1961) occurred the week before Kennedy's Bay of Pigs debacle.²⁹ Anticolonial movements in Africa and Asia adopted Marxist rhetoric and threatened to expand the territory friendly to, or neutral toward,

the so-called Sino-Soviet bloc. Just prior to Kennedy's inauguration, on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev had proclaimed Marxism-Leninism preeminent in the world, at the forefront of history. (Earlier, he had boldly applauded Castro's victory, declaring the Monroe Doctrine dead and recommending it be interred as "a stinking corpse.") Now, he declared Soviet support for expanding the revolutionary movement around the world.³²

Khrushchev also began to act on such bold movements. By March 1961, a massive Soviet airlift began to supply advancing pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces in Laos. A dangerous, and possibly nuclear, confrontation appeared likely in Europe. Kennedy's assertiveness (and caution) in dealing with Cuba reacted to these global conditions.

Laos

The situation in Laos presented a tangled history of indigenous factions and personalities drawn into cold war politics even though the categories Washington applied — "freedom" versus "Communism" — had only modest ability to provide clear analysis of the motives of the contenders. The Eisenhower administration had desired to make Laos a "bastion of freedom" in Southeast Asia. It made strenuous efforts to prevent a coalition government which included Communists or which might otherwise become neutral in the cold war. By 1960, more American aid per capita had been provided Laos than any other country; almost none served the cause of economic development, but did pay the full cost of the Royal Laotian Army. Widespread graft and corruption, and spreading Western influence, gave those excluded two additional issues, virtue and nationalism, to unite a competing movement and, with Marxist rhetoric, to solicit aid from the Soviet Union. With massive Soviet aid, pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces made steady military advances and Kennedy's advisers judged they would win without American intervention. As he decided what to do about Cuba, Kennedy devoted even more time to Laos.³³

As Kennedy saw it, the problem was that past American policy had been wrong and neutralization was the proper answer. But such a viable long-term policy was now out of the question: American prestige had been publicly committed. This, then, made Laos important in the cold war, and he could "not accept any visible humiliation."³⁴ However, the Lao proved, for the most part, to be a people without zeal for warfare ("not believing in getting killed like the civilized races," remarked John Kenneth Galbraith, then on leave from Harvard as Kennedy's ambassador to India), and the fierce nationalist determination of the numerically smaller Pathet Lao seemed likely to prevail if America only supplied arms to the defenders.³⁵

In March, President Kennedy had made diplomatic and military preparations to intervene with American troops, not for the purpose of combat but

to demonstrate resolve and serve as a dramatic warning and bargaining chip, their removal to be part of a hoped-for neutrality agreement with the Soviet Union. He also moved elements of America's Seventh Fleet to the South China Sea, had helicopters and 500 marines relocated to Thailand across the Mekong River from Laos, and placed combat troops on alert at American bases in Okinawa.

Initially, the demonstration of toughness seemed to work: Khrushchev signed a neutralization agreement on April 1. However, agreement on a cease-fire was not forthcoming, and Kennedy's advisers again feared the Pathet Lao could overrun the country while the Soviets strung Kennedy along by a paper agreement. On Thursday, April 20, the day after the Bay of Pigs defeat, the president decided to send a renewed message of toughness in Laos, ordering American military advisers there to wear uniforms (rather than the civilian clothes they had previously been instructed to wear) and giving them official designation as a Military Assistance and Advisory Group. But the gesture failed; within the week, on April 26, 1961, the Pathet Lao launched a new, major offensive.

A turbulent meeting of the National Security Council found the government in disarray. A month earlier, the Joint Chiefs had recommended Kennedy deploy 60,000 troops, although they declined to guarantee success. Chastened by the Bay of Pigs defeat, and consistently opposed to land wars in Asia ("Even the Marines don't want to go in" Robert Kennedy noted), they now wanted 140,000 men and authorization to use tactical nuclear weapons before they would tell the president they could guarantee victory if an all-out war ensued.

Burned badly by problems at the Bay of Pigs landing site, Kennedy now critically probed the new military plans for Laos. Focusing — this time — on detail, he found the two airstrips in Pathet Lao territory, proposed for use, could accept 1,000 troops a day but were surrounded by 5,000 Pathet Lao; airborne resupply to the disembarking troops would be restricted to daylight hours; and in the event of prompt and vigorous Pathet Lao counterattack — akin to Castro's — it would be more than a week before land reinforcements could reach the outnumbered defenders. He was not impressed by this military planning (perhaps especially because he discovered such problems himself), and he also gave the impression of being frustrated and angry with the Joint Chiefs for insufficient enthusiasm, for resisting a limited intervention, and for wanting nuclear and massive manpower commitments from him before they would guarantee success.³⁶

From the Bay of Pigs failure Kennedy learned skepticism toward the government's top experts, and his earlier failure likely prevented immediate intervention in Laos.³⁷ But Kennedy still prepared to do it and ordered 10,000 marines on Okinawa to stand ready. That dramatic escalation apparently made the difference at the negotiating table. By May 1 a cease-fire was signed,

and its effectiveness confirmed soon thereafter.³⁸ Khrushchev, apparently observing his locally advantageous position and expressing his new confidence, later said Laos had not been worth going to war for, especially as it would, in the course of events "fall into our laps like a ripe apple." (In 1962 Kennedy began another covert war in the country to forestall this possibility, an effort that was eventually to recruit 30,000 Meo tribesmen and cost \$300 million.)³⁹ On May 11, 1961, the president moved boldly to block a Cuban- or Laotian-style deterioration in neighboring South Vietnam, declared (in his National Security Action Memorandum #52) a U.S. national objective "to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam," and ordered 400 Special Forces advisers to that country to begin to train the army of its central government: 3,200 American adviser-soldiers were there by the end of the year.⁴⁰ Throughout the rest of 1961 and 1962, the question remained unanswered whether the Laos cease-fire would hold, whether American firmness would be called as a bluff. Whether Kennedy *was* bluffing is not clear. Probably he was not, although likely he was undecided and postponing a decision he hoped, ultimately, not to make.

Berlin

The new Berlin confrontation, which Kennedy faced simultaneously with these other crises, was a legacy of World War II. At the end of the war the Allies shared occupation of different sectors of the German capital, Berlin, located 120 miles within the new East Germany (the Soviet sphere); France, Great Britain, and the United States held rights of air and land access to their sectors of Berlin along a corridor from West Germany. The arrangements were considered temporary, but a final settlement was never achieved. Stalin had once attempted to choke off Berlin in 1948, resulting in a Berlin airlift by the Allies to sustain the Western sector until the Soviets backed down.

In 1958, Khrushchev boldly raised the Berlin issue again and demanded a German peace treaty to legitimate the division of Germany and end Allied occupation rights within East Germany's sovereign territory (i.e., Berlin). His demands were to be discussed at a 1960 Paris summit with President Eisenhower, but Khrushchev walked out of the conference. (He linked his action to America's arrogantly insulting and intrusive U-2 spy plane operations over Russia, publicly revealed after the shooting down of a U-2 plane in May 1960, the capture of the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, and Eisenhower's admission he had authorized such overflights).⁴¹

Khrushchev presented new demands forcefully at a meeting with Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961. He bluntly announced that there would be a negotiated treaty to end Allied occupation by the end of 1961 or, unilaterally, he would sign such a treaty with East Germany. After he did so, he said, if the West then sought to violate East Germany's territorial sovereignty by assert-

ing occupation and access rights to Berlin, the Soviet Union would be forced to defend that sovereignty. If the United States wanted war, so be it. "No force in the world," Khrushchev declared, would prevent the USSR from signing a treaty.⁴²

This heavy-handed ultimatum threatened a nuclear confrontation. If Khrushchev made good his threat, Soviet conventional superiority in East Germany would compel NATO to use nuclear weapons in an all-out military contest if it were to avoid defeat.

Kennedy, shaken, interpreted Khrushchev's ultimatum to mean he had sent a dangerous message of weakness by his Bay of Pigs equivocation. Khrushchev had acted decisively and brutally to suppress the 1956 Hungarian uprising. If Kennedy was not tough enough to use violence to see through an effort to eliminate Castro, ninety miles from American shores, would he not surely back down over remote Berlin when faced with the threat of direct nuclear reprisal against America?⁴³

Kennedy responded to the Berlin deadline crisis with public firmness, called former Secretary of State Acheson from retirement to develop contingency plans, requested Congress grant standby authority to call up reserves, augmented American forces in July, consulted allies, and adopted other open preparations, convinced Khrushchev must be dramatically deterred else he miscalculate.⁴⁴ During the summer of 1961, while he debated what to do about Cuba and Laos, Kennedy's greatest concern was how to manage his Berlin deadline crisis.

Accepting, at least temporarily, the neutralization of Laos, Khrushchev now appeared to increase his pressure on Berlin. On August 13, 1961, Soviet troops built the Berlin Wall to seal boarders between East and West Berlin by a high wall, barbed wire, a mined "no-man's land" and guard posts. Those seeking to escape were shot. The wall was designed to end a westward exodus of East Germans which, by that summer, totaled 3.5 million and, because economic prosperity in West German contrasted sharply with the poor performance of the East German economy, had increased to over 10,000 a week. The outpouring depleted East Germany, in a public and humiliating way, of able and ambitious workers. Arguably, Khrushchev's actions were forced upon him, but given the climate of the time and the belligerence of Kremlin rhetoric, the wall was judged a maneuver to demoralize West Berlin and an ominous sign of the dangerous turn in Soviet-American relations.⁴⁵

OPERATION MONGOOSE

"You could sack a town and enjoy it!"

—Maxwell Taylor to Robert F. Kennedy (commenting on RKF's browbeating of CIA officials).⁴⁶

Operation MONGOOSE was ordered by Kennedy in the early fall of 1961.¹ His order was to do everything that could be done—secretly and without using American troops—to destroy Castro. The logic of the enterprise was to strike against the economic well-being of everyone on the island, and MONGOOSE planners developed a steadily escalating campaign of commando raids and sabotage to destroy crops and every major plant and factory on the island. Worldwide operations coordinated from Frankfurt were intended to block, delay, or sabotage all Cuban international trade, especially imports of machinery and repair parts. Every CIA station and embassy was directed by Washington to assign a “Cuba” officer, develop plans, and be effective.⁴⁸ “No time, effort or manpower be spared,” Robert Kennedy ordered, with the authority of the White House behind him.⁴⁹ The orchestrated campaign of espionage and worldwide economic warfare would exact punishment; if it destroyed Castro it would do so because the Cuban people would suffer such grievous economic hardship that, believing Castro to be the cause, they would rise against him.

MONGOOSE did not emerge from a systematic and thoughtful policy process; after Chester Bowles was unable to suggest nonviolent measures that would eliminate Castro, meetings of the National Security Council quickly consolidated an emotional consensus that made prolonged thought unnecessary. The discussion of Cuban policy was highly emotional, “almost savage,” “the emotional reaction of people unaccustomed to defeat whose pride . . . had been deeply wounded.” Their sessions were filled with “fire and fury,” recalled one participant, and a large majority urged the president to invade Cuba immediately with American troops.⁵⁰

Although Kennedy did not accept the majority’s advice for an immediate invasion, he was determined that Castro be eliminated. He restricted further policy debates to a small group of like-minded men. (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., his attitudes known from his earlier dissenting memoranda, was excluded. So were other liberals.) He appointed the CI (Counter-Insurgency) Group, chaired by Taylor, pushed by his brother, to get control of the CIA, review every detail (down to “the gradients on the beach and the composition of the sand”) and produce results.⁵¹ Kennedy judged (accurately) that large, dramatic operations attracted the press.⁵² These were forbidden. He redoubled both his pressure for results *and* his initial restrictions that all vital trade-offs be honored: eliminate Castro, absolute secrecy for American complicity, and no regular troops.⁵³

MONGOOSE remained secret (from Americans) for almost a decade and, because it never appeared dramatically on the front page of the *Times*, the impression has remained that MONGOOSE was inconsequential. In fact, the operation was several times larger and more destructive than its Bay of Pigs predecessor. Under White House pressure the CIA quickly expanded its station in Miami to become the largest in the world, with 600 full-time agents.

A larger expatriate force, now 3,000 Cubans, was recruited and commando raids were launched almost weekly. Almost 100 “safe houses” were purchased or rented, dozens of small “front” businesses (travel agents, boat repair, etc.) were bought or begun. A large paramilitary fleet was acquired: “mother boats,” attack craft.⁵⁴

Robert Kennedy’s approach to management did not depend on organization charts but on a combination of leadership, drama, and tyranny: he fiercely demanded results, “the elimination of Castro.” The rude way Bobby Kennedy treated the CIA—“chewing my ass out” Richard Bissell described it—was not designed to produce gestures or be kindly of excuses.⁵⁵ QJ/WIN, a foreign-born contract assassin, was used; William Harvey, one of the CIA’s gun-toting stars was brought in, and—with tradecraft to forge documents and make it appear the work of a Soviet-bloc agent—the CIA tried six more times during the next year to assassinate Cuba’s self-advertised “Maximum Leader.”⁵⁶

The president was consistently informed the CIA could see no way to overthrow Castro by clandestine means.⁵⁷ And the CIA’s forecast of improbable success was realistic, albeit unacceptable to the Kennedys and a source of their anger. They hadn’t “a god-damn asset in the place,” and Castro was even more of a national hero.⁵⁸ Assassination was an intelligently integrated policy tool prior to an invasion: now Castro, if it succeeded, would be a martyr and Ché Guevara, Raoul Castro, or other hard-liners would just take over. His Board of National Estimates warned the president, in the fall of 1961, that “it is improbable that an extensive popular uprising could be fomented . . . [Castro’s death] would almost certainly not prove fatal to the regime.”⁵⁹ There was no end game.

The American planners, of course, spoke of the American-sponsored violence as “economic sabotage”—or sometimes “boom and bang”—rather than as “terrorism.” And perhaps, judged with definitional rigor, it was not terrorism: that term implies a coherent policy to effect terror in a population. Bombs exploded every few days in Havana, but there was no well-conceived plan to achieve specific objectives, only determination that (in the phrase of Robert Kennedy’s partisan, Arthur Schlesinger) “the terrors of the earth” should be directed against the collective entity “Cuba” and its personification, “Castro.”⁶⁰

Why did the president order MONGOOSE? Along with the strong (and probably competitive) emotions stirred by Castro, Communist challenges in Laos, Berlin, and elsewhere likely made it seem prudent to act toughly, yet without the use of regular American troops.⁶¹ It was the wrong time both to acquiesce passively to a new, revolution-espousing Soviet state in the Caribbean and to provoke the Soviet Union to a tit-for-tat response in Berlin or Laos. And these major pressures from other arenas probably contributed to stress and the difficulty of thoughtfully designing a patient, complex diplomatic effort.⁶² MONGOOSE was likely a case, too, of simply redoubling

commitment and effort after initial failure rather than rethinking basic motives.⁶¹ That was consistent with a Kennedy theory of political causation; the missing ingredient in success was the will and vigor to make it happen.

The record suggests MONGOOSE was an emotionally driven policy, not a thoughtful one: "We were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter," Robert McNamara acknowledged in retrospect (and he was not a man easily given to hysteria).⁶² Robert Kennedy was militant and zealous; he warned that America's defeat now made Castro truly dangerous, and, with the president's knowledge, made the elimination of Castro a personal obsession.⁶³ He spoke of an insult to America, Castro "thumbing his nose" at the United States, of Castro "crowing."⁶⁴ Over many months he was on the telephone constantly to CIA officials at all levels prodding, pushing, demanding to know why there were no results, attending weekly review meetings which often extended to seven hours of tough questioning and detailed review.⁶⁵ (And Castro, passionately denouncing the "imperialist worms" who attempted to conquer his country and destroy his revolution, opened schools in Cuba to train guerrilla cadres for anti-imperialist revolutions throughout Latin America.)

Robert Kennedy, writing in his private journal, confessed "not to know whether it will work" but he saw "nothing to lose in my estimate" by trying.⁶⁶ "Nothing" included, in reality, the economic welfare of the Cuban people, dozens and perhaps hundreds of people killed in the first year of MONGOOSE, and some degree of his own reputation. It was a judgment reflecting a sensibility about power that, I will argue, in chapter 6, underlies such policies. But he was proud of the activity he was generating: "[By August, 1961, it] was better organized than it had been before and was having quite an effect. I mean, there were 10 to 20 thousand tons of sugar cane that was [*sic*] being burned every week."⁶⁷

Was MONGOOSE More Intelligent?

Was MONGOOSE more intelligent than the Bay of Pigs? In some respects, yes. The learning to avoid trouble in the press was rapid: only small raids were used and the source of previous leaks (liberals) appeared correctly diagnosed. And the chance of undoing the Cuban revolution appeared, technically, to be realistically estimated, although the estimate was rejected as a basis for policy.

But if technical aspects of the operation reflected tactical learning, the rationale for the operation itself became less intelligent. Its principal result — an unanticipated nuclear confrontation — made it, in reality, a menace.

Setting aside momentarily the Missile Crisis, was it worth the cost? To decision makers, the Bay of Pigs had a positive "expected value": a "no cost" guerrilla dissipation and a positive chance for success. Now, a national securi-

ty rationale for MONGOOSE — given it could not eliminate Castro — was that it "increased the cost to Castro" of pursuing his revolutionary objectives. Yet the Soviet Union could increase aid to offset the severity of the punishment — and it did so. The net economic cost to the Cuban people would not topple Castro. While the data are still classified, several hundred expatriate commandos and Cuban defense forces probably were killed. No questions were raised about the benefit/cost ratio to America, the waste involved, nor about a better use, elsewhere, for the money and lives.

Beyond harassment, there would have been two reasons to "raise the cost" via MONGOOSE. The primary purpose was to deter Soviet expansion by conveying a message of American toughness; but, as I will discuss momentarily, Khrushchev began secretly to introduce nuclear missiles into Cuba in the summer of 1962. Obviously, then, no credible deterrent message of tough resolve was conveyed; planners had become too self-absorbed by the tough militancy of their own mood.

A second justification would have been "message sending" to other potential revolutionaries. The logic of this justification is complicated. If MONGOOSE was *truly* secret, no one (Soviets or otherwise) would believe it to be American policy, infer they faced similar punishment, and be deterred. It had to be recognized as U.S. policy *elsewhere* in the world yet *not* in the American press. If this is unlikely footwork could have been achieved, MONGOOSE might have had a deterrent effect.

However, what messages *were* sent is obscure. MONGOOSE *might* have sent deterrent messages to other revolutionaries. Or it might have taught them Kennedy would not use America's regular troops (even ninety miles from America's shores) and thus would be an ineffective opponent. Or it might have taught idealistic youth in Latin America to see the United States in a Marxist light, as reactionary (as it did in the case of the founders of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, as I will discuss in chapter 7). Or it might, in the later unfolding of history, have had all these effects or none at all. MONGOOSE ended too quickly for us to know what the long-term results might have been. (Among these results, the willingness of many of Kennedy's advisers to send hundreds of thousands of American troops to Vietnam several years later, to an area of the world of far less geopolitical significance than the Caribbean, suggests an invasion might have been launched if a modest, indigenous anti-Castro movement could have been created.)

The intellectual integrity of Operation MONGOOSE was lower than that achieved for the Bay of Pigs plan. The president split off and abandoned his liberal ideals and human instincts; thus he reached, and probably crossed over, the edge of hypocrisy. Earlier, he had said he wanted to be a benefactor of the Cuban people. Now, they and their welfare ceased to exist; there was no Cuban benefit from devastation that had "no evidence" for success and no end game. Robert Kennedy's "nothing to lose" phrase echoes across the

decades as a lesson of the limits of technical rationality when applied only within a self-absorbed world.

Without an end game, the use of Cuban expatriates also became cynical. Again, they were motivated by American handlers with the fantasy that America supported their success. (The CIA could not motivate people to risk their lives merely to "increase the cost.") But the Bay of Pigs had been judged to have a realistic chance. With greater perspective than Robert Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor later admitted, "in a strategic sense [the commando raids] weren't anything more than just pin pricks," and there was no American commitment to ultimate success.⁷⁰ The patriotic illusions rallied by the CIA among its 3,000 surrogate troops must count as a cruel and hypocritical maneuver that men of conscience could design or be involved with only by a massive and systematic disregard of conscience, reality, or both.

Table 3.2 reviews government learning from the Bay of Pigs to MONGOOSE.⁷¹ The Kennedy administration ended MONGOOSE abruptly, in fear, when the U-2 photographic reconnaissance overflight on October 14, 1962, showed the Soviet Union had introduced nuclear missiles into Cuba. Analysis of this next encounter is the final concern of this chapter.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

JFK: Now why does he put these in there though? [W]hat is the advantage of that? It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in Turkey. Now that'd be goddam dangerous, I would think.

Bundy: Well, we did, Mr. President.

— White House Tapes, October 16, 1962, 6:30-7:55 P.M.⁷²

Why did American leaders not anticipate Khrushchev might place nuclear missiles into Cuba? On its face, such a move had precedent: American had placed its own nuclear missiles in Western Europe in the territory of its allies and—early in the Kennedy administration—had placed them directly on Russia's borders in Turkey. There had been no American expectation Russia would risk nuclear war to prevent or reverse such actions (and, while angrily denouncing the danger of such moves, it did not).⁷³

Apart from the international norms America had created, there were at least three other reasons to expect a Soviet move. First, Khrushchev was perceived to become bolder, even reckless, in other areas (e.g., Laos, Berlin). Second, an inner group of advisers knew of Operation MONGOOSE and its aggressive message that threatened an invasion, which neither Russia nor Castro could reliably forestall by conventional arms. If Kennedy would face the nuclear brink to secure America's Berlin outpost, would it be farfetched to believe Khrushchev might not take a similar risk to secure, dramatically, Russia's own Cuban outpost? And third, could not Khrushchev expect major symbolic ad-

Table 3.2. Changes in Executive Branch Intelligence and Effectiveness: The Bay of Pigs to MONGOOSE

I. Intelligence	
A. <i>Realism of Assessments</i>	
+	1. Assessments of Cuban reality were apparently accurate: MONGOOSE judged unlikely to succeed.
+	2. Bureaucratic redesign to effect control of the CIA well thought out (assuming the MONGOOSE assassination plans were intended by the president.)
+	3. "Trip wire" for American press coverage correctly learned and incorporated into the new design.
-	4. Major costs ignored as "nothing."
-	5. Deterrent message to the Soviet Union incorrectly calibrated.
-	6. Cuban and Soviet fear of an imminent second invasion underestimated.
B. <i>Integration of Thought</i>	
-	1. No end game or integrated negotiation strategy.
-	2. Conflicting messages to Latin America and other potential revolutionaries not assessed.
C. <i>Perspective and Value Integration</i>	
-	1. "Forgetting" and original purpose to contribute to the welfare of the Cuban people.
-	2. Dishonest recruitment and use of expatriates for an operation expected only to "increase costs."
-	3. Personalized revenge motives as a basis for national policy.
-	4. Overlooking Castro's vital contributions as a potential hostage to effect Soviet forbearance in Berlin and Laos and to spur Alliance for Progress momentum.
II. Effectiveness	
+	1. Modest increased economic cost to USSR and to Cuba.
-	2. "Expense to America"/"damage to Cuba" ratio probably was quite high.
-	3. Long-term demoralization and bitterness of Cuban expatriate forces and some CIA case officers.
-	4. Modest loss of domestic and international credibility and legitimacy as assassination plot was revealed in next decade.
-	5. Deterrent v. arousal effects on Soviet Union, Castro and others in other arenas unclear.
-	6. Undeterred (and partially created) confrontation crisis threatens nuclear war.

Note: + = increase; - = decrease.

vantages from placing his missiles in the Western hemisphere, underscoring his message to the underdeveloped countries of the region that the Monroe Doctrine was dead and Soviet power on the march?

The American government's position in the crisis was that the Soviet missile introduction was so unthinkable, no senior administration official or Soviet expert had predicted a move so alarming and dangerous to world peace.⁷⁴ Given the available record, that appears to be true, *strictly defined* as an assertion that no one has come forward who predicted the emplacements to be *likely*.⁷⁵ But beneath the confident conviction, which stemmed in part from the fact that the Soviets were thought to be extraordinarily cautious and had made no forward emplacements in Eastern Europe, ran a deep undercurrent of worry that a missile emplacement *was* conceivable. John McCone, direc-

tor of the CIA, was aggressive and serious about monitoring the possibility of offensive missiles.⁷⁶ By the end of the summer of 1962, the apprehensions of Kennedy's advisers were sufficiently great to cause him to issue public warnings against Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba or use of Cuba as a Soviet base.⁷⁷ The U-2 reconnaissance overflight of Cuba which detected the missiles had been specifically ordered to test an offensive-missile hypothesis. The shock when missiles were finally discovered was oddly disconnected from the uneasy anticipation which motivated the search. (I return to this disconnection in chapter 6.)

Perhaps no one could have known a missile emplacement was likely, and we do not know why Khrushchev acted as he did. But several analysts have concluded, probably correctly, that Khrushchev simply failed to anticipate that the American response would be to declare a crisis and to move to a nuclear confrontation and the brink of nuclear war.⁷⁸ In retrospect, Kennedy failed to estimate what was required to deter any emplacement and probably failed to anticipate one of the grave threats—a visibly humiliating destruction of his Cuban ally—that Khrushchev wished to prevent in a theatre with massive American conventional superiority.

As we have seen, MONGOOSE obviously did not convey messages that deterred Khrushchev. "Pin-prick" raids were scarcely the sign one faced a tough competitor. Kennedy did communicate several warning messages directly to the Soviet Union, and in public statements, but—as best we can determine—these came in the summer of 1962 after Khrushchev's decision had been made, the Soviet government committed, and the missiles on their way.⁷⁹ Moreover, in retrospect, it is difficult to read the messages without wondering whether they contained loopholes, especially in what was not said. "Offensive" weapons were ruled out, but there was no certain, definitive statement that *any* such weapons would be destroyed promptly. The statement that an act may be intolerable, or dangerous, could be variously interpreted as angry rhetoric, a bluff, or—as it turned out—a serious warning.⁸⁰

In retrospect, it would have been more intelligent had Kennedy used consistent methods to communicate deterrent resolve to the Russians (i.e., acting as he had done to dramatize serious resolve elsewhere, in Laos and Berlin, by mobilizing troops and conducting massive war game exercises in the waters around Cuba), eschewing ambiguity and spelling out directly (and privately) the consequences of immediate invasion and destruction of any missiles. There was something unconnected, almost dreamlike, in his thinking about Cuba and Russia. (I will want to consider this problem further in chapter 6.)

While, as far as we know, Kennedy had no intention to invade Cuba, the restraint of MONGOOSE apparently did not communicate that fact.⁸¹ In his memoirs, Khrushchev wrote that when he observed MONGOOSE, he thought it an obvious preparation for a serious, larger invasion with regular American troops. It was a prelude while the next round was being prepared—and he did not expect Kennedy to fail the second time.⁸² The Soviet and Cuban fear

was probably a fear anyone in their circumstances would reasonably share.⁸³

The American press, public, and most members of Congress, unaware of MONGOOSE's ferocity, faced a mystery and were led to believe the nuclear missiles were unjustified, solely introduced by Khrushchev to threaten America and change the global balance of power. To be sure, there were more missiles introduced than would be needed "rationally" to deter America, and Khrushchev would receive major symbolic, geopolitical advantages to counter America's own forward deployments. But in retrospect, it seems likely that nuclear missiles were the only reliable means open to Khrushchev to deter his own "visible humiliation" in Cuba, and Castro's sole (albeit risky) means to secure his own survival. And, for those purposes, both men calculated correctly.⁸⁴ Kennedy settled the crisis with a "no invasion" pledge for Castro and removal of American missiles from Turkey.⁸⁵ He also stopped Operation MONGOOSE.⁸⁶

In retrospect, MONGOOSE was a bizarre and badly designed geopolitical plan. It was sufficiently fierce to arouse fear of a second invasion, too ineffectual to succeed, and too weak, indecisive, and covert to communicate that its author would boldly risk a nuclear war over conduct which had been deemed acceptable for America.

There is a further, albeit elusive, issue raised by the failure to recognize the fear which American actions—taken for self-perceived defensive purposes—could engender. American national security managers may have had an inner conviction of virtue and innocence—and great difficulty recognizing that use of their viewpoint to define reality could be a presumption lost on other nations, and American policies experienced by others as inherently hostile. We now know the brief exchange during the missile crisis deliberations, captured on White House tapes quoted at the beginning of this section: It suggests Kennedy had not previously stopped to consider that America's "deterrent" missiles in Turkey, placed there during his administration (the decision had been made earlier, by President Eisenhower), would engender Soviet fear or motivate Soviet counterassertion. Soviet assertiveness was attributed to something about Khrushchev, not to American actions. The evidence is inconclusive, but it does suggest that American leaders imagined too readily that their minds were read—almost telepathically—by the other side, and that their own understanding of the character of American policy—the expression of a nation that was tough, determined to avoid visible defeats, but not aggressive—would be the understanding to which others, even those with a Marxist perception, would respond.⁸⁷

Learning and the Policy Process

From the Bay of Pigs defeat, the important lesson for Kennedy's advisers was the experience itself and the knowledge, their personal abilities and past success notwithstanding, that they could be disastrously wrong. Their pride

was hurt. Perhaps naturally, each searched his conscience but concluded the major fault had been elsewhere. (The White House thought the CIA to blame, and the Joint Chiefs who failed to watchdog the CIA; the Joint Chiefs believed the president and the CIA had made a botch of it; the CIA's view was that the president scuttled his own operation.) But the civilians did become more of a genuine deliberative group after the departure of Dulles and Bissell, less an assemblage of individuals unsure of their standing. Schlesinger reports they became more assertive, more openly skeptical, more given to irreverent remarks. Chastened, now they seemed to want honest discussions, were able to convey that to one another, sense it within one another, and make it work.⁸⁸

The missile crisis deliberations showed that a marked improvement in the policy process *could* occur. In doubt, the president wanted genuine discussions, not presentation of agency positions staged for his benefit. Aware that his own presence had created inhibition before, he excluded himself from many deliberations of the NSC executive committee and brought in former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who would not be deferential to him nor awed by the titles of the men seated around the table. He used his brother to monitor discussions, give voice to arguments he felt should be heard, and to produce closure when he, himself, had decided. He added informal discussions with individual members of his staff away from the formality of official meetings.⁸⁹

But there is an important caveat. Decision makers did eschew a first instinct to use violence, debated intensely for over a week, and their resulting policy of measured firmness (a naval "quarantine" to force a Soviet missile withdrawal without direct violence) produced an acceptable outcome.⁹⁰ Thus the new crisis could be resolved without violence, and they adopted a lengthy deliberative procedure which allowed them to see possibilities they had not originally imagined. They had the capability for creative and productive discussion, and they used it. The question is: why thoughtful deliberations, measured use of coercive diplomacy, and negotiation now—but not in the earlier MONGOOSE decision?

The record is persuasive that the *invocation* of this capability for collective thought was a function of political power: specifically, the Soviet nuclear threat caused a more thoughtful and systematic policy process. During the first week of debate, almost all advisers favored immediate air strikes and American invasion *even* considering the Soviet military personnel on the island. What stopped the immediate and devastating resort to violence—and made them think further—was the presence of nuclear missiles which might be launched against the United States.⁹¹ Nuclear deterrence worked, it sobered decision makers, engaged their individual and collective capacities to think, and produced a measured reaction.

We may observe, in the contrast of MONGOOSE with other policy pro-

cesses (Berlin, Laos, and the Cuban Missile Crisis), an important conclusion: the learning rate, how much people thought and to what effect, was a function of motivation, itself an effect of the issues of power at stake. Against powerful opponents, when the potential damage to America was great, or American troops might be required, latent capacities for extensive, searching analyses of alternatives and reflective discussion were used. But the capacities were not engaged when—as in MONGOOSE—a challenger was perceived weak in power to retaliate.⁹²

NOTES

1. The CIA's inspector general conducted his own investigation. It was tough, even brutal, and produced a rebuttal ("reclama") by Bissell's group. Neither document has been declassified but they are knowledgeably discussed by L. Kirkpatrick, "Paramilitary Case Study: Bay of Pigs" *Naval War College Review* (November-December, 1972), P. Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 322-324, and T. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Pocket Books, 1979), pp. 132-147.
2. For discussions of aspects of integrated complexity see L. Etheredge and J. Short, "Thinking About Government Learning" *Journal of Management Studies* 20 (1983): 41-58, which includes a more technical discussion of measuring learning and intelligence as systemic properties; P. Tetlock, "Integrative Complexity as a Variable in Political Decision-Making" Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. (Photocopy: March, 1980); P. Tetlock, "Accountability and Complexity of Thought" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45 (1983): 74-83, which has special relevance to effects of national security secrecy on policy formation; J. Loevinger with A. Blasi, *Ego Development* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1977); E. Jaques, ed., *Levels of Abstraction in Human Thought and Action* (New York: Heinemann, 1981); E. Jaques, *A General Theory of Bureaucracy* (New York: Heinemann, 1981); R. Axelrod, "Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition" *American Political Science Review* 67 (1974): 1248-1266; R. Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. press, 1976); D. Campbell and W. Gruen, "Progression from Simple to Complex as a Molar Law of Learning" *Journal of General Psychology* 59 (1958): 237-244; A. Miller and P. Wilson, "Cognitive Differentiation and Integration: A Conceptual Analysis" *Genetic Psychology Monographs* 99 (1979): 3-40. Earlier discussions include J. Langer, "Werner's Comparative Organismic Theory" in P. Mussen, ed., *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1970), H. Werner, *Comparative Psychology of Mental Development* (New York: International Universities Press, 1948), H. Werner, "The Concept of Development from a Comparative and Organismic Point of View" in D. Harris, ed., *The Concept of Development* (Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1956) and H. Werner and B. Kaplan, *Symbol Formation* (New York: Wiley, 1948). See also the references cited earlier, in the introduction.
3. By using the concept of integrated complexity I rule out a general conception of learning as *any* change produced by experience. The reason to emphasize the criteria of effectiveness will become clearer in chapters 6 and 7: complex and highly

- integrated thought may lack external validity, or otherwise reflect an interpretive system which blocks efficacy.
4. M. Taylor, *Operation ZAPATA: The Ultra-Sensitive Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs*. (Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books, 1981 (1961)). The inquiry was extensive and serious. It also appears factually accurate. However, the subject of assassination is not discussed in the report.
 5. Quoted in Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, p. 317.
 6. Taylor, *Operation ZAPATA*, p. 40.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Ibid., p. 41.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Ibid.
 11. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
 12. Ibid., p. 42.
 13. Ibid.
 14. Ibid., pp. 20, 42.
 15. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
 16. Recommendations 11 and 12: Ibid., pp. 44-53.
 17. Nor (to take another example) was it adequate analysis to say only that requirements imposed for secrecy should not have affected the chance of military success; the president was decisive about the constraints he wanted to honor. If he had to choose "all or nothing," it would have been "nothing." He wanted to do better than that.
 18. There is no evidence such criticisms were made orally. The taboo against criticizing the president in writing would likely have been so well understood that it was not an option considered. As I will discuss in chapter 4, such automatic deference appears a more consequential inhibition than the small group dynamics of a "groupthink" syndrome. See also Dexter (1977).
 19. Taylor, *Operation ZAPATA*, p. 21.
 20. Kirkpatrick's analysis paralleled Taylor's, although it was more critical of the CIA. It directed its most severe criticisms at the effort to mount a large covert military operation in which the requirement for deniability stifled the operation itself. It was too big to hide, too small to succeed. Kirkpatrick was harsh on his professional associates at the CIA for promoting it. He characterized their Guatemala precedent as succeeding only by unusual good luck, and he believed its use to guide the Cuban mission uninformed and overconfident. His judgment was that, below the top, people assigned to Bissell's team were of C-quality; the operation did not fail because of them, but it was slipshod. He criticized both the lack of contingency planning and the failure to stand firm against political pressures that weakened the operation. Robert Amory's interview in the Kennedy Library contains a good discussion of the report and some of the personality issues involved. See also Kirkpatrick, "Paramilitary Case Study," Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, pp. 322-324, Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, pp. 131-148.
 21. R. Roa, "Charges Delivered Against the United States Before the U.N. Security Council," *New York Times* (January 5, 1961) discusses his country's formal charges. See also H. Dinerstein, *The Making of a Missile Crisis, October, 1962* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), passim.
 22. "Preselection" is an interim diagnosis. I will reconceptualize the problem in chapter 6 and there will discuss it as a symptom rather than a cause.
 23. A. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 290.

24. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, p. 169 et passim discusses Taylor's role. See also R. Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 443-498 passim.
25. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 295-297 discusses these actions. Cabell's dismissal is noted in Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, p. 119.
26. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 472.
27. It may be less likely lessons are learned if they require recognition of unpleasant truths, and especially if they imply a decreased sense of efficacy. See A. Bandura, "Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change" *Psychological Review* 84 (1977): 191-215; D. Campbell, "Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes," *Psychological Review* 67 (1960): 380-400; D. Campbell, "Evolutionary Epistemology" in P. Schilp, ed., *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, vol. 14-1 (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1974).
28. Kennedy may not have known that Bowles was angry because he had wanted to present his opposition but had been put off by Rusk. Whether Rusk was forthcoming with the President about the incident, or remained silent and allowed the departure of an unwanted subordinate, is not clear. Schlesinger's *A Thousand Days* account of the departure must be treated skeptically: As a liberal, he appears to have been maneuvered by the President to accept the more broadly stated rationale of Bowles's "managerial ineffectiveness." Bowles clearly felt deeply hurt and, a decade later, in his memoirs, provided a long rejoinder to this charge and to the allegation that he had leaked his views to the press: C. Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 453 et passim. A common theory, advanced by W. Bundy, "The National Security Process: Plus Ça Change . . . ?" *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982-1983): p. 99, is that opponents—especially those who are excluded from the policy process—are the most likely to leak. It is possible that Stevenson or Reston, seeking to promote Bowles' career, were the source of the stories.
29. Taylor, *Operation ZAPATA*, p. 52. G. Wills, *The Kennedy Imprisonment: A Meditation on Power* (New York: Pocket Books, 1983 (1981), chapter 20 puts these events into correct perspective.
30. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 302. Dinerstein, *Making of a Missile Crisis* reviews Soviet statements during this period. For a review of the missile estimates issue, see J. Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength* (New York: Dial Press, 1982).
31. Quickly following his Bay of Pigs defeat, Kennedy publicly committed the United States to beat the Russians to the moon. See H. Young, B. Silcock, and P. Dunn, "Why We Went to the Moon" *Washington Monthly* 2 (April, 1970): 29-58, who discuss the political connections.
32. Kennedy regarded the speech as an authoritative statement: Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 302-304.
33. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 329 et passim. C. Stevenson, *The End of Nowhere: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1972) discusses the background and evolution of Laotian policy.
34. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 332.
35. Ibid.
36. These details of Kennedy's policy are drawn from Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 323-334; H. Parmet, *JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Dial Press, 1983), pp. 131-155.
37. Robert Kennedy oral history interview (JFK Library), vol. 1, p. 72.

38. However it proved temporary: D. Hall, "The Laotian War of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971" in B. Blechman and S. Kaplan, ed., *Force Without War: The U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 135-221 discusses the next round.
39. T. Fain, K. Plant, and R. Milloy, ed., *The Intelligence Community: History, Organization, and Issues* (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1977), p. 702.
40. L. Gelb and R. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 80.
41. D. Wise and T. Ross, *The U-2 Affair* (New York: Random House, 1962). The Soviets had possessed the military capability to bring down the planes for several months. That they had not done so previously was grounds to speculate Khrushchev designed the sequence of events to dramatize his new assertiveness. Likely there were other causes, especially nationalistic pressures within the Soviet government to use the improved missiles. There could have been no assurance the pilot would survive to give proof of American sponsorship and thus force Eisenhower to retract the CIA cover story of an off-course weather plane: thus, it is unlikely Khrushchev's scenario was planned in advance.
42. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 366-374, reviews the meeting with Khrushchev.
43. N. Lebow, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly" *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (1983): 431-458, reviews the sources of this story and discusses the validity of the interpretation.
44. For detailed reviews see S. Walker, "Bargaining Over Berlin: A Re-Analysis of the First and Second Berlin Crises" *Journal of Politics* 44 (1982): 152-171; R. Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973); A. George, D. Hall, and W. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). For general reviews of the problems of lesson drawing in coercive diplomacy and deterrence see A. George and R. Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974).
45. See N. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (translated by S. Talbott) (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 454 and Talbott's editorial note, *ibid.*
46. Quoted in Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, p. 135.
47. The name was intentional: A mongoose is a small, ferret-like animal noted for its ferocity in attacking and killing poisonous snakes.
48. General reviews include T. Branch and G. Crile, "The Kennedy Vendetta: An Account of the CIA's Entanglement in the Secret War Against Castro" *Harper's* 251 (1975): 49-63; Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, pp. 130-137 et passim; Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, pp. 171-181 et passim. U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*. Senate Report 97-465. November 20, 1975. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 134-179 et passim reviews assassination planning. Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, pp. 452-498, 533-534 is based upon access to still-restricted documents (e.g., Robert Kennedy's private journal). W. Hinckle and W. Turner, *The Fish is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981) introduce a wide range of issues, including the post-1962 period.
49. Quoted in Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, p. 174.
50. These characterizations are drawn from Bowles, *Promises*, pp. 330-331, 450. (I will return to this characterization in chapter 6). Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 473, reports that the early emotional consensus for invasion faded by early May.
51. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, p. 135. There were overlapping groups with varying members, including the SG/A (Special Group Augmented).
52. Branch and Crile, "Kennedy Vendetta" imply widespread press collusion to maintain secrecy during this period.
53. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, p. 178 et passim.
54. See Branch and Crile, "Kennedy Vendetta" for a general review.
55. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, pp. 123-124; U.S. Senate, *Assassination Plots*, pp. 139-170.
56. The count varies slightly depending on sources and definitions.
57. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, pp. 140-141.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
60. "Every few days a bomb explodes in Havana, sometimes in a park, sometimes in a show window, sometimes in a hotel washroom." E. Halperin, "Cuba on the Kremlin Path" *Die Zeit* (December, 1961), p. 51. See also Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, p. 480.
61. L. Etheredge, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), chapter 1 et passim provides a more detailed review and discussion of President Kennedy's personal orientation.
62. See M. Hermann, "Indicators of Stress in Policymakers During Foreign Policy Crises" *Political Psychology* 1 (1979): 27-46 for a review of such effects.
63. L. Festinger, H. Riecken, and S. Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails* (Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1956) discuss this phenomenon; see also R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 404-406.
64. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 472.
65. Castro was seen as a charismatic foe who taught Communist revolutionaries they could challenge even the United States and win.
66. For example: Lansdale remarked, "[RFK] felt his brother had been insulted . . . He felt the insult needed to be redressed rather quickly." Quoted in Branch and Crile, "Kennedy Vendetta," p. 50. Ray Cline, the Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA: "Both Jack and Bobby were deeply ashamed . . . and they became obsessed with the problem of Cuba. . . . [T]hey vented their wrath on Castro . . . in all ways that they could. . . . [RFK] was as emotional as he could be." *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 60. The existence of a parliamentary system, in which a government would fall after the Bay of Pigs failure, would have prevented this intrusion of personal pride and perhaps increased intelligence.
67. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 472.
68. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 476.
69. RFK oral history interview, Kennedy Library, vol. 3, p. 411.
70. Taylor spoke of MONGOOSE awkwardly as "a neighbor who is kicking you in the shins" and America showing it could "retaliate a bit and remind him that we're still around—an oddly casual metaphor for the hoped-for devastation of an economy and the resulting suffering of people the president has been so enthusiastic to aid. Quoted in Branch and Crile, "Kennedy Vendetta," p. 60.
71. After the Bay of Pigs, and to his credit, Robert McNamara ordered the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) studies to monitor the behavior of government decision makers during foreign policy crises and draw cumulative lessons for improved crisis management. The 14 reports, based on studies conducted automatically during the remaining major foreign policy crises of the 1960s, typically run to 600 pages or more and were based, in part, on wiretaps of senior government officials during these crises (without the knowledge of many). When eventually declassified, these reports may prove the most important contribution to government learning from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. They were highly classified,

and their original circulation restricted, to preserve the integrity of the unobtrusive measures. Reportedly, the Defense Department has retained possession of the original, still-classified tapes.

There may have been other lessons drawn, possibly involving government employees. Four groups had motives to engage in a conspiracy to kill the president: Castro, in retaliation for efforts to assassinate him; the Mafia, which was being threatened and hard-pressed by Robert Kennedy; lower-level CIA operatives bitter at Kennedy's indecisiveness that had resulted in unnecessary deaths of personal friends; and Cuban expatriates, their private supporters, and CIA operatives who could combine revenge with Oswald's pro-Castro link to induce Lyndon Johnson to retaliate against Castro and finish the job. These issues are extraneous here: in evaluating the evidence it is useful to keep in mind that, via standard "trade-craft," agents may be misled about who, in reality, they are working for, i.e., if Oswald displayed pro-Cuban sympathies, this does not necessarily mean that it would be pro-Cuban groups who might have hired or supported him. A useful introduction to the complex problems of inference in counterintelligence is Martin's *Wilderness of Mirrors* account of the "search for the mole" in the CIA.

72. Transcript, John F. Kennedy Library, p. 26.
73. Parmet, *JFK*, p. 295; Eisenhower had decided to install the missiles in 1959, but they were put in place during the Kennedy administration. Their removal (prior to the crisis) had *not* been ordered by Kennedy, contrary to the cloud of dust kicked up to sell the missile crisis settlement to the public. See B. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Spring, 1980): 97-125.
74. I will return, later, to the fact that Kennedy, McNamara, Marine Commandant Shoup, and others felt it "made no real difference" to American security that the missiles were in Cuba, although they felt they could not act upon that interpretation.
75. See R. Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight" *Foreign Affairs* 43 (1965): 691-707; Parmet, *JFK*, pp. 282-284. The CIA's Board of National Estimates concluded an evaluation on September 18, 1962 that the Soviet Union would not install offensive missiles: Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, p. 142. General discussions of the problem of deception and surprise, with relevance to analyzing lessons, include K. Knorr, "Failure in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles" *World Politics* 16 (April, 1964); R. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable" *World Politics* 31 (1979): 31-89; R. Betts, "Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed" *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (1981): 551-572; and R. Heuer, "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach" *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (1981): 294-327.
76. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, p. 142; Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, pp. 203-205; Parmet, *JFK*, pp. 282-284.
77. The Soviet government also lied to Kennedy about the missile emplacement, but Kennedy's warnings may have come after the emplacement decision had been made and the missiles were en route. See Lebow, "The Cuban Missile Crisis."
78. Lebow, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," reviews these issues. See also Dinerstein, *Making of a Missile Crisis*, pp. 150-183 et passim; the Soviet press expressed continuing anxiety concerning a new invasion.
79. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 795-801. Kennedy also asked for standby authority to call up reserves but linked this with publicly calming statements that "defensive" weapons were acceptable, leaving ambiguous where he would draw the line. See also the review by Lebow, "The Cuban Missile Crisis."

80. A. George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983) reviews efforts to standardize Soviet-American communication.
 81. A Soviet tendency to misperceive American improvisations and ambivalences as a rational coherent policy is discussed in L. Bloomfield and A. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's* (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 404. See also O. Holsti, *The 'Operational Code' as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems*. Final Report to the National Science Foundation. Mimeo, (1977) and Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, chapter 8, for related discussions of this phenomenon.
 82. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 494-495: "I said it would be foolish to expect the inevitable second invasion to be as badly planned and as badly executed as the first. I warned that Fidel Castro would be crushed if another invasion were launched against Cuba . . ."
 83. Further corroborating evidence for a defensive motive is that the missile emplacement was part of a broader defense buildup. By the end of August 1962, Soviet ground-to-air missiles had been supplied to Cuba and were operational. After the discovery of the Soviet MRBMs (October 14) and the president's national speech (October 22), low-level aerial reconnaissance revealed 5,000 well-armed Soviet combat troops, equipped with battlefield rockets, at four sites on the island apart from the missiles.
 84. Whether Soviet actions deterred a second invasion that might have been launched eventually is unknown, but it is worth recalling that within a few years the American government - with most of the same senior decision makers - was dispatching hundreds of thousands of American troops to South Vietnam, an area of the world with far less geopolitical importance to the United States, and with far less rationale for doing so, than in the Caribbean area.
 85. G. Allison's classic book, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) was written before knowledge of MONGOOSE came to light. Now I think we can see more clearly why Kennedy felt a no-invasion pledge, and removal of Jupiters from Turkey, would be an acceptable *quid pro quo* to settle the crisis. National security secrecy surrounding MONGOOSE did make it more difficult for Kennedy to operate with "outsiders" (e.g., Congress) who did not know that an American invasion of Cuba would have seemed imminent. See also M. Halperin, "Covert Operations: Effects of Secrecy on Decision Making" in R. Borosage and J. Marks, ed., *The CIA File* (New York: Grossman, 1976), pp. 159-177.
- Commentators may have under-estimated Khrushchev's dramatic threat to West Berlin as a policy to deter American aggression against Cuba, a deterrent which appears to have worked. See R. Slusser, "The Berlin Crises of 1958-59 and 1961" in Blechman and Kaplan, ed., *Force Without War*, pp. 343-439 for a partial reconstruction of reciprocal lessons and interpretations in the early 1960s.
86. Parmet, *JFK*, p. 297. "Low level" sabotage was resumed in early 1963. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
 87. For example, when Kennedy ransomed the Bay of Pigs prisoners he declared publicly, in an emotional speech: "This [Brigade] flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana!" Kennedy did not intend this to be a promise he would assure the overthrow of Castro, but it was one of a series of statements, in addition to MONGOOSE, that could be interpreted as ominous. Quoted in Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, p. 168.
 88. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 296-297.
 89. *Ibid.*

90. See Parmet, *JFK*, p. 297. We now know Kennedy did promise Khrushchev the removal of the Turkish missiles although he felt he had to do it secretly and could not tell the American people at the time. In fact, Adlai Stevenson was publicly trashed in the press for suggesting such a move of "weakness"; in retrospect, one has the impression Stevenson and Bowles often gave good counsel but took substantial damage as a result. Thus, Schlesinger's perception of the personal dangers of this route probably were accurate. An extraordinarily critical view, characterizing the decision as succeeding by "plain dumb luck," is by former Secretary of State Acheson, whose criticisms have suffered the fate—to be ignored—that Rusk (in the case material) and Cleveland predict for critics of policies which succeed: Dean Acheson, "Dean Acheson's Version of Robert Kennedy's Version of the Cuban Missile Crisis" *Esquire* (February, 1969); H. Cleveland, "Crisis Diplomacy" 41 *Foreign Affairs* (July 1963): 638-649.
91. See Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 794-819; Parmet, *JFK*, pp. 277-300; Allison, *Structure of Decision* passim.
92. Longer-term lessons are reviewed in G. Duffy, "Crisis Prevention in Cuba" in A. George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*, pp. 285-318.