Change (and Learning) in World Politics:

Case Selection and Theory Development

by

Lloyd S. Etheredge

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Comments Welcome

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International politics is a sequence of return engagements with similar issues. In principle, there is ample opportunity for experience to accumulate, for learning to occur, for innovation and experiment -- and a record of change, improved effectiveness, and even wisdom to emerge.

Five years ago, the study of change (and learning) in the international system was reserved for a minority of visionaries who were skeptical that surly and toughminded realpolitik analyses gave a sufficiently deep, accurate, and critical account of human beings and political behavior. Today, the study of change (and learning -- although it is hasty to use this description for every recent change) is emerging as a leading framework to organize research.

This essay will discuss selections of cases that may inform our theoretical understanding of these processes. But the most compelling cases may confront the reader in tomorrow's headlines. Against the background of realpolitik behavior, we may be living in the most remarkable period of change in the international system in the past 500 years (an argument I defer to a later section).

1. Selecting Cases

1.1 Baselines and Continuities

The study of change -- baseline behavior and innovation -- is a project to build a mid-range theory integrating system-level dynamics and the grounded processes of each nation-state's decision making. To make the connections explicit, this

essay suggests groupings of cases by dependent variable characteristics, and groupings of cases by independent variable characteristics, which may provide informative, cumulative insights.

1.2 Definitions

The relationship of change to learning requires a brief discussion. With limited exceptions, change is the broader term.[1] Usually, a change will be justified by a policy maker as learning. Because the academic and scientific worlds are so intimately involved, themselves, with learning -- and have established traditions (and standards) of definition, argument, and disagreement about their use of the term -- it seems prudent to treat political claims that changes have been caused by learning (and now reflect better understanding) with a degree of skepticism. (My intuition is that true learning does occur and is a principal cause of recent beneficial changes -- but this is an empirical argument for another place.)[2] I will, in this essay, use the broader category of change.

1.3 Formal Strategies.

To analyze change in world politics, what do we study? At the end of the day, the only satisfactory answer is "Everything."[3] But between now and then, how does one structure an inquiry that is creative and useful?

One may pick several strategies.[4] Random sampling of baselines and change might help to assure a representative general theory. But we bring a knowledge of recent history, and judgments of political significance, to the inquiry: there are

cases (Nixon's opening to China, Sadat's peace initiative, the end of the Cold War) we want any theory to explain. Political leaders probably share similar assessments of the political significance of different decisions that affects their decision making. Thus, I suggest we begin by grouping cases according to the extent of political impact intended -- for example, whether a nation is launching an ambitious messianic drive to dominate international politics (e.g., Hitler in World War II), or making more routine decisions in bilateral or regional relations.[5]

2. Baselines and Levels of Changes

Anwar Sadat, it is said, believed peace with Israel could only be negotiated, and supported by his people, if he first redressed Egypt's earlier defeat at Israel's hand. Thus, with realistic perceptions that he could not defeat Israel, he launched the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and gained sufficiently -- the return of the Sinai -- that the way was open for his later peace initiative.

This story, if true, illustrates a caution when interpreting change in a nation's behavior. Whether Sadat making peace, Tito and Mao breaking with the Soviet Union, or de Gaulle withdrawing from Algeria (to the surprise of many of his initial supporters), etc., higher-level motives for mastery and dominance -- and perhaps a long-term vision that was always implicit -- can be seen to continue although the public evidence of changes -- whether we designate them as changes in strategies, tactics, or alterations of goals and objectives may appear dramatic. The interpretations I make will be provisional, for the purposes of argument.

2.1 System-Level Trends

If you heat a gas in a closed container, the molecules bump into one another with greater energy, at a greater rate. If you interviewed the gas molecules, they probably would explain their changed behavior by telling you what other (inconsiderate or aggressive) neighboring molecules were doing to them. At the level of individual decision maker, you will miss the system-level change that affects everyone.

Similarly, international system-level changes occur, and they may be among the most important causes of the changing decisions of individual states. The inquiry, at the end of the day, needs an integrated explanation that includes these system-level trends. A change from t_1 to t_2 may appear different if we compare it to a different decision in a similar situation a decade earlier. And a decision from t_1 to t_2 may have an even more dramatically different explanation if we see it located in a historical trend, for the nation and the entire international system, stretching from t_{1-n} to the present: in this case, the most important causes of a particular decision may be historical forces that operate in the background and are taken forgranted by a decision maker.[6]

For example:[7]

Look back to the first 91 years of the 20th century and take a sequence of 7 major cases: three major wars or periods of conflict (World War I, World War II, and the Forty-Years (Cold) War); the two earlier experiments to create New World Orders following World Wars I and II; and two tidal shifts in the conduct

of international relations -- the "standing up to hegemons" trend reflected in decolonialization and the end of empires; and the long-term evolution to the GATT regime of free trade and free international financial markets.

B. Creating New World Orders:

The next two cases are the two earlier experiments to create New World Orders, after World Wars I and II.

The first experiment (Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations, the swing of the entire international system into legalism) is usually thought a failure. But there was remarkable success in the settlement of World War II that led to a uniting of Europe and (so far) continuing alliance and friendship between the United States and its allies with former adversaries in Western Europe and Japan. (Even this 45 years without a war between France and Germany would appear, to European statesmen of earlier generations, another miracle in world history.)

The second experiment, I think, deserves to be honored as Wilsonian in spirit, although the U.S. partly substituted its leadership for the quasi-judicial and multilateral institutions Wilson had hoped to rely upon. Wilsonian principles, once ahead of their time, were finally accepted, and to good effect: war guilt clauses and punitive reparations against Germany were part of the settlement of World War I, then abandoned after World War II. The creation of the EEC has also attempted, in a Wilsonian spirit, to end the intensity and insularity of national identifications and rivalries (so far to good effect.)

I would argue that genuine learning from the first experiment informs the design of the second experiment. The victors learned, and the changed treatments of losers (of Japan and Germany -- perhaps of Italy) probably have been critical to the experiment's success. And, too, the foreign policy elites in the United States probably have learned: America's leadership and commitment of resources to effect and maintain the settlement of World War II (political, military, and economic) have been far greater, and more extensive, than Wilson could ever have dreamed.

C. Basic Rights: Two Wilsonian Trends

Two tidal changes in the 20th century involve claims of basic human rights that are, for the first time, increasingly settled with justice for the claimants.

1.) Standing-up to Hegemons

The recent cases of successful peasant resistance to superpowers -- in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Cuba -- are part of the new decolonialization trend that began after World War II. Increasingly, native peoples are standing-up for rights, fighting back, and winning. National self-determination has become an increasingly asserted -- and successful -- political formula.

We may infer changes in decision making in two arenas: the oppressed assert basic rights and fight more successfully; and colonial powers and other hegemons are increasingly willing to surrender in the face of a combination of such claims and

armed rebellion, perhaps at an earlier threshold.

2.) The GATT Regime

The second major innovation has been to seek and achieve widespread agreements for free trade in goods and money (not yet, labor). The GATT regime, and free markets in international exchange, have changed both the character of international commercial relations and foreign policy decision making.

And the change also seems a good idea for world peace, altering the domestic political pressures on everyone's decision making. Until the early 20th century, states often sought national wealth by foreign conquest. It was common practice to use military force to secure foreign markets and access to foreign raw materials, cut-out competitors, and to defend these commercial advantages against the incursions of other nations who were similarly motivated.[1]

Today, these causes of war appear to have been eliminated. The principles of free trade (in practice, "fair" trade, with residual protectionist policies) are universally accepted as a common normative framework for international relations. Thus, of the current wars (>1,000 deaths/year) in the world, most are ethnic disputes, revolutionary wars, and civil wars. None involves the fierce commercial competition, using military force, that characterized the international politics of

[1] See, for example, Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, "Lateral Pressure in International Relations: Concept and Theory," in Manus I. Midlarsky (Ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 289 - 326.

previous centuries.[2] Like the decoupling of Church and State that began with the Treaty of Westphalia, the decoupling of economic market competition from preferential state intervention has been (so far) a slow but persistent trend that has altered everyone's decision calculus.

2.1.1 Relations Among Major Powers

The sequence of US - Soviet relations -- especially from alliance in World War II, to Cold War and nuclear arms race, to current cooperative relations -- is extraordinary.[8] Since World War II there have been 45 years without a war between France and Germany (or on the mainland of Europe) -- a miracle in world history. The post World War II system-restructuring decisions of genuine statesmen (European and American) in the creation of the EEC, NATO, and other institutions of integration are an extraordinary change of direction -- especially against the background of the previous centuries of nationalism.[9] The reduction of American-Chinese tensions (although the nature of the change is more elusive) has also been a remarkable change against the background of the previous 40 years of an adversarial relationship.

The European trends are further along than elsewhere, but the world-wide trend toward international cooperation, "regime" formation, and the rise of non-government (NGO) actors reflects system-changing initiatives, and possibly a rise

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[2] See Ruth Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987-88 (Washington, DC: World Priorities Inc., 1988), 12th edition. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait is the only current exception. That the United States and other nations will fight to assure free access to oil for themselves is a constant.

of international networks of influence that partly bypass (and move more quickly than) traditional governments.[10]

2.1.2 Decolonialization; Standing-Up to Hegemons

The 500-year-old pattern of hegemonic empires has apparently ended. Dominated peoples now stand-up to, rather than be pushed around by, hegemons; most major powers have accepted this phenomenon. Decolonialization wars, the "breaks" of Tito with Stalin, of China with Russia, America's failure in Vietnam and Russia's in Afghanistan, the end of the successful application of the Monroe Doctrine (Cuba, Nicaragua) are among the cases. They did not occur in isolation but involve role modeling, tactical learning, the refined use of symbols drawn from both Marxism-Leninism and nationalism for empowerment, etc.

Recent "standing up to hegemons" cases include the Arab oil cartel. Arab leaders reversed traditional Arab deference, made-off with hundreds of billions of dollars of real assets - and received scarcely a harsh word.

2.2 System-Restructuring Changes

What is the baseline behavior of states against which to assess profound changes? A useful contrast is between a realpolitik baseline (and the problem of hegemonic breakouts associated with it) and the still-unexplained (slow) trend toward a Wilsonian world order.

2.2.1 Realpolitik Baselines

To identify extraordinary changes in foreign policy decisions it is helpful to establish a baseline -- the standard behavior of nation-states as this can be observed since their inception in the 16th century. One summary against which to assess change would be the narrative of world history told (below, in abbreviated and simplified form) by the realist tradition in political science[11] - i.e.,:

- The cast of actors -- states -- show behavior atypical of what we would find in a sample of ordinary, statistically average individuals. If we were to describe the baseline behavior of nation-states in human terms, they would be extraordinarily high in motivation for power, money, and status -- and single-minded about such pursuits. There would be no apparent affiliation motivation or love. They would be rational, self-interested actors -- a term that means, in practice, they are amoral and selfish. When in positions of dominance, and when they can get away with it, they would tend to take the view that "the strong take what they can, the weak suffer what they must." They also would be potentially treacherous, opportunistic, and highly Machiavellian, admitting (in the classic phrase) to "permanent interests but no permanent allies."

- Being located in a world with other nation-states who are similarly motivated -- to get as much as they can get away with -- induces the realistic fear of becoming a victim of the predatory ambition of one's neighbors. Thus, calculation based upon the desire for security shapes foreign policy decision making alongside the triad of the competitive ambitions to maximize power, money, and status.

The unpleasant drama these competitive and insecure "maximizers" have created over the past 500 years can be summarized in three-and-a-half acts, outlined in

Table 1.[12]

Table 1

Hegemonic Wars: 1495 - 1991

	War		
	Thirty Years	Napoleonic	WW I & II
Loser	Hapsburgs	France	Germany
New Leader (economically strongest, winning coalition)	Netherlands	Britain	U. S.
Eventual challenger (winning coalition, but economically devastated by last war)	France	Germany	USSR

Act 1

In the first act, 1495 to 1648, the Hapsburg family, linking Vienna and Madrid, seeks to dominate the rest of Europe -- and everyone else maneuvers to prevent them from doing so. The conflict becomes especially fierce because of the Hapsburgs' Catholicism and the Protestantism of the European states opposed to them.

The final showdown with the Hapsburgs -- and their defeat -- is the exhausting series of wars, grouped as the Thirty Years War, ended by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Act 2

In a repeated pattern, the exhaustion and devastation of the Great Power hegemonic wars now creates the opportunity for the least exhausted member of the winning coalition (in this case, the Netherlands) to expand its influence. However, it lacks the natural endowments to become the new long-term hegemon. As they rebuild, France and England increasingly compete with one another for this position. The second act reaches its climax in Napoleon's bold effort to break-out of a normal framework of inter-state relations and secure hegemony by conquering the rest of Europe. It ends with his defeat at Waterloo in 1815 and the Congress of Vienna.

Act 3

The third act is the rise of Britain -- the least exhausted member of the winning coalition against Napoleon -- to world leadership. The eventual challenger for hegemony is a unified, industrializing Germany. World Wars I and II are two phases of the same war -- i.e., a prolonged contest between Germany's hegemonic ambitions and the efforts of other nations to contain Germany.

Act 4

Act 4 opens with America (the least exhausted member of the winning alliance, producing 40% of the world's GNP) emerging as the new world leader.

In its new role America -- like Britain in the 19th century -- has been engaged almost continually in conflicts on the periphery of its spheres of influence. These brushfire and proxy wars, and covert operations, have been directed primarily against its emerging rival, the USSR and its allies. Like Britain (or, earlier, the Romans) America has also located large numbers of its own troops in forward deployment along the frontiers (today, over 1,250,000 including personnel in the Persian Gulf).

Such, at least, is the realist or realpolitik baseline story of world politics against which fundamental changes in the logic of conduct can be assessed.

2.2.2 Hegemonic Breakouts

During the past 500 years -- and even earlier, before the development of the state system -- decisions to attempt hegemonic breakouts have been among the most dramatic events in world politics. Table 1 (above) records the recent examples (the Hapsburgs, Napoleon, Germany). But travel the Mediterranean world and observe the now-tamed and diminished countries that once succeeded, for a time, with a hegemonic breakout and held its neighbors beneath its heel: Greece, Rome, Spain, Turkey, Egypt (etc.)[13]

The realpolitik story of power politics may not do justice to this phenomenon. It merely assumes any nation will attempt hegemonic domination -- to conquer and rule the world -- if it has sufficient advantages in resources and, therefore, thinks it can get away with it. But the problem is worth studying directly because other factors than relative capabilities are probably implicated -- e.g., changes in national identity, especially tied to motivational changes, and these may not always coincide with requisite capabilities or occur only during brief periods (e.g., first-generation Communist regimes).[14]

[Recently, we have the cases of Iraq's attempted hegemony in the Persian Gulf. There are also cases in which, apparently, the expected pattern of messianic breakouts has not occurred (e.g., Brazil; the Chinese preference (since the Mongol invasions) for traditional boundaries rather than world conquest).][15]

2.2.3 Building a Wilsonian World Order

A third trend of system-restructuring cases includes the statesmanlike efforts to restructure the international system that I will label efforts to create a Wilsonian

world order. Examples of the series include Wilson's own attempts to create a new world order after World War I (through principled agreements, the League of Nations, and the World Court), the swing of the international political system into legalism after World War I (including disarmament treaties), the settlements of World War II (including the creation of the United Nations), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the spirit of Eisenhower's original "Open Skies" nuclear inspection plan, the Helsinki Accords, and the Bush Administration's quest to realize a Wilsonian vision of a New World Order in the Persian Gulf.

The continuing intrusion of these constructive impulses into decision making can best be seen in relief. Since 1500, against the background of realpolitik behavior, several Wilsonian system-restructuring initiatives have worked, and these efforts of statesmen appear, progressively, to have eliminated at least three major causes of international wars by establishing certain principled agreements.

The three cases are: 1.) the development of religious tolerance between Catholics and Protestants; 2.) the growing acceptance of the principles of free trade (e.g., the GATT regime) that has apparently ended the use of military power for the pursuit of national commercial advantage; 3.) new, Wilsonian principles of war-ending.

2.2.3.1 Principles of Tolerance and Respect

- No current international dispute we seek to solve today is as emotionally-charged -- or apparently intractable -- as the extraordinary massacres conducted against each other by Catholics and Protestants earlier in European

history. Yet the Wars of Religion period ended, and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) began to formulate new principles of religious tolerance. (It was not a solution either side found easy to accept: in some areas of Germany 80% of Catholics and Protestants massacred one another before principles of religious tolerance and rights became an acceptable alternative). Today (except for small-scale outbreaks in Northern Ireland), Catholics and Protestants no longer massacre each other for religious reasons.

2.2.3.2 Principles of Free Trade

- Until the early 20th century, states often sought national wealth by foreign conquest. It was common practice to use military force to secure foreign markets and access to foreign raw materials, cut-out competitors, and to defend these commercial advantages against the incursions of other nations who were similarly motivated.[16]

Today, these causes of war appear to have been eliminated. The principles of free trade (in practice, "fair" trade, with residual protectionist policies) are universally accepted as a common normative framework for international relations. Thus, of the approximately 18 wars (>1,000 deaths/year) in the world, most are ethnic disputes, revolutionary wars, and civil wars. None involves the fierce commercial competition, using military force, that characterized international politics in previous centuries.[17]

In this unfolding Wilsonian logic (besides the EEC and the emergence of the GATT regime) I would place the world-wide change to freely fluctuating exchange

rates. Like the decoupling of Church and State, the decoupling of economic market competition from the state has been (so far) a slow but persistent trend which has altered everyone's behavior.[18]

2.2.3.3 War Settlements: World War II v. World War I

The final case is the remarkable success of the settlements of World War II, that have led to a uniting of Europe and (so far) continuing alliance and friendship between the United States and its former adversaries in Western Europe and Japan. (Even a period of more than 45 years without a war between France and Germany would appear, to European statesmen of earlier generations, a miracle in world history.) The changed treatments of the losers (of Japan and Germany -- perhaps of Italy) have been critical; Wilsonian principles, once ahead of their time, were finally accepted, and to good effect: war guilt clauses and punitive reparations against Germany were part of the settlement of World War I, then abandoned after World War II. The creation of the EEC has also attempted, in a Wilsonian spirit, to end the intensity and insularity of national identifications and rivalries (so far to good effect.)

2.3 Bilateral Changes

A step lower than the study of system-level changes is the study of bilateral relationships. Such cases focus attention upon distinctive issues of decision processes and long-term change. For example:

2.3.1 Relationship-Building

Bilateral changes may have a special theoretical importance if Saunders' conception of "relationship-building" is valid. In Saunders' view, relationships between nations can develop in a rough analogy to interpersonal relations.[19] His first-hand assessments of this process, based upon his work with the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy work, and Camp David accords are compelling. If true, it is possible that cases of change in bilateral relations across time, especially where this has been accompanied by major investments or experiments in relationship-building activities (Council on Foreign Relations, Trilateral Commission, etc.), would clarify important changes in the international system.[20]

Table 2

Illustrative Cases: Relationship-Building

Israel - Egypt
Ostpolitik
U. S. relations with Western Europe, post World War II
U. S. - Japanese Relations post World War II
U. S. - China
U. S. - USSR
Japan - China

2.3.2 Wars: Hot, Cold, Covert

Not all wars are hegemonic breakouts by major powers. The routine wars of history may be explained by different (more statistically average) causes than seeking to dominate the international system. Starting and stopping wars involve cases of change, on both sides. During the wars, changes of strategy and tactics, escalation and de-escalation, may be identified. In addition, the negotiation process involved before (and after) will involve sequences of decision, major and minor. The war itself, as Rubin reminds us, may become an entrapment, with both war aims and decision processes altered by the process of war-fighting itself.[21]

Of other bilateral cases, among the more interesting are the unchanging "trouble spots" where nations continue to fight one another, concerning similar issues, across decades, without major change or progress.

Table 3

Illustrative Cases:

Continuing Hostile Relationships

Greece and Turkey, esp. re Cyprus
Israel and its Neighbors
Ethnic disputes in multi-
cultural states[22]: India
Nigeria
Northern Ireland
Sri Lanka
Sudan

Besides enduring hostility (or amity), bilateral relations shift from amity to enmity and back. One pattern of cases (to which decolonialization may be added) is the client states that break-free from dependence upon former patron states:

Table 4

Illustrative Cases: Client States Assert Independence

Tito splits with Stalin
Castro asserts independence from Moscow
Sino-Soviet split
Nasser, Sadat, expel Soviet advisers
France asserts partial independence of NATO

Client states may assert independence, but patron states also may abandon their client governments. (American policy makers, for example, often abandon right wing dictators when their cause -- faced by a leftist revolutionary challenge -- appears hopeless.) Among the cases:

Table 5

Illustrative Cases:

Patrons Change Client Governments

U. S. abandons:	Batista (Cuba)
	Shah of Iran
	Somoza (Nicaragua)
	Marcos (Philippines)
U. S. involved in coup replacement of:	Diem (South Vietnam)
	Trujillo (Dominican Republic)
	Greek governments (Colonels)
U. S. force used overtly:	Noriega (Panama)
Others:	King Hussein (Jordan) expels PLO

2.4 Unilateral Changes

Two types of unilateral decisions also may be important. The first reflects decisions to withdraw entirely from the international system (or at least to isolate one's internal population and institutions), and then (sometimes) to reenter.[23]

2.4.1 Isolation and Reentry

Table 6

Illustrative Cases: Isolationism and Re-Entry

Burma
"Iron Curtain" countries
China
Arab feudal monarchies (e.g., Saudi Arabia) (partial)

2.4.2 National Dramas

Consider General Charles de Gaulle explaining to Dean Rusk the drama of European political reality:

"'Well, what is Europe?' Pointing with his finger as if at an imaginary map,

> he said, 'Here are the Benelux countries.' And he brushed them aside with a wave of his hand. 'In the south, there is Italy,' and he scoffed, 'Pshhh. Then there is Germany,' he continued, 'and Germany must be kept in its place. And there are the British. But the British are not Europeans, they are Anglo-Saxons.' Then he smiled benignly, 'And here is France at the heart of Europe, the soul of European culture."[24]

Or, consider a traditional Chinese view of their hierarchical position as the Middle Kingdom, half-way between Heaven and the lower-level barbarians that surround them:

> "The Confucian view of the foreigner depends partly on the stress given to the unique nature of the earthly authority delegated to the Son of Heaven. Such authority precludes the need for or the legality of other political units, and comprizes a [legitimate] temporal power over all members' of the civilized world. . ."[25]

Both expositions suggest that a highly insular phenomenon may be critical to establish the logic of a nation's decisions. National leaders, at least sometimes, may exhibit highly-developed senses of the dramas of world history and the roles, within the drama, which they wish to act-out -- and wish (in relation to themselves) others to act out. The growth, nature, intensity -- and receding -- of such dramas may be critical intervening mechanisms in messianic breakouts to achieve hegemonic dominance (Hitler, Napoleon, first-generation Communist revolutionaries, Ayatolleh Khomeini and Saddam Hussein in the Middle East). Such role images also may establish special receptivities to non-military initiatives [as in what

some Canadians call their "Boy Scout" role].

If -- as McVicar suggests -- there is a phenomenon of "normal" (perhaps, relatively boring) international politics, it may turn-out that drama is critical to explain major change. The nature and intensities of national dramas -- about which we know very little, systematically, besides the messianic cases -- would deserve a systematic inventory.[26]

2.5 Paired comparisons

Historical sequences ($t_1...t_2...t_3...$) lend themselves to the study of change. But paired comparisons of such sequences also may be informative:

Table 7

Illustrative Cases: Paired Comparisons

U. S. Marines to Lebanon: Eisenhower (success) v. Reagan (failure)

U. S. Intervention in Indo-China: Eisenhower (success) v. Kennedy, Johnson (failure)

Nixon: Opening to China (success) v. detente with USSR (partial failure)

Arms control: Glassboro v. early Carter (partial failures) v. Reagan-Gorbachev (success)

U. S. intervention in Vietnam (failure); Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (failure)

2.6 Change with Partners; Signaling

From the outside, it may appear that national leaders are free to undertake bold initiatives. The truth, from the decision maker's viewpoint, may appear the opposite -- the world primarily offers him constraint. Change in his direction will occur when others give him opportunities, openings, or signals. Changes are elicited by perceived partners in other nations: Chinese leaders played their "America card" when President Nixon played his "China card." President Sadat went to Jerusalem and signed the Camp David accords, but it was Sadat's understanding of the Israeli government (itself a consequence of signaling) that led him to make such a bold attempt.

If this is true, the development of international networks, outside formal government channels, may prove important to lay groundwork for initiatives that -- in public -- appear bold and unexpected. Behind the cases, already identified, of favorable developments for peace, one might detect important processes of quiet preparation extended over many years. The inventory of cases -- given the requirement for insider information -- is not large, but evidence to dentify such cases would be theoretically important.

3. Cases by Policy Area and Policy Instrument

Changes in foreign policy may often reflect lessons that occur within specific policy arenas or involving specific policy tools. Space limitation precludes a complete list, which would include both system-level changes (e.g., economic development or international finance, where national experts may learn directly from another) and bilateral and country-specific changes: economic development assistance (including the ability to buy influence); military aid and political development; coercive diplomacy; intelligence forecasts; deterrence and the breakdown of deterrence; negotiating styles with other countries; covert operations; terrorist tactics (and counter-terrorism); hostage-taking and hostage-rescues; arms races; environmental issues; international law of the sea, etc.

4. Cases by Region

For major powers, cases grouped by regional relations may be more informative than an analysis of time-series in bilateral relationships. As U. S. policies toward the Sandinistas in Nicaragua expressed concerns of regional consequences from their survival, so Soviet policies toward specific countries in Eastern Europe have reflected their own domino concerns, and experience with policy tools (including use and threat of military force) to manage relations with the region as a whole. For example:

4.1 U. S. and Central America

American policies toward Central America, have changed little in their proprietary and hegemonic character since the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed. The most recent incursions of American force -- against the "contras" fighting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, Grenada, and into Panama to remove General Noreiga -- are part of a long-standing pattern. Revolutionary instability (especially involving any extra-hemispheric influence), or even too-assertive resistance to American wishes, has always led to American intervention in the region. American troops were sent into Central American countries 43 times in the 19th century. Then, in the first third of this century, U. S. military interventions occurred in Cuba, Panama, Mexico, and Honduras. The United States occupied the island of Haiti for more than nineteen years, set up a military government in the Dominican Republic from 1916 until 1924, and launched two major military interventions in Nicaragua.[27]

Each time, there has been controversy. But political controversy is a standard feature of the policy process. The issues repeat, and regardless of the personality or party of the President, the decision process used, or the specific foreign countries involved, an interventionist response has followed in every case.

During recent decades, before hostilities, there has been an initial "feeling out" process with each new leftist government, to see if relationships could develop within traditional (American hegemonic) frameworks. These processes may have involved misperceptions. Such tasks of reality-testing also occurred in the decision to polarize US-Soviet relations at the time of the Truman Doctrine, and a full set of similar cases may be useful to analyze:[28]

Table 8

Illustrative Cases: Ambiguity, Break-Points, & Polarization

Truman Doctrine/Cold War (US)
Guatemala, 1954
Cuba, 1961
Nicaragua (Carter-Reagan)

The American shift to covert operations and proxy armies had its first trial in Guatemala, in 1954. The CIA overthrew a government using with 110 men, an old station wagon, and a couple of old bombers flying token air runs. By the Bay of Pigs, in 1961, the size of the invasion force had expanded to 1,200 (and there were plans for an assassination of Fidel Castro). By the 1980's the next return engagement, creating and using the contras to fight the Sandinista's in Nicaragua, envisioned 10,000 - 15,000 men. Only in 1954 did the CIA plan work.

Thus, across three return engagements, U. S. policymakers tried to repeat earlier successes and expanded their efforts using a similar model. There have been tactical changes, but most of the change has been by opponents and the press (which no longer accepts the secrecy of CIA operations and official denials).[29]

American changes in decision sequences can, however, be observed since 1900. In the early part of this century, unrepaid loans would have produced the incursion of Marines to seize state treasuries and run the country until the money was recovered. Today, debt forgiveness and loan rescheduling (alongside economic aid) are probably a credit, jointly, to a modestly greater American compassion, a higher GNP/capita in America, and the discovery of other ways to gain repayment (e.g., shifting costs to the American taxpayer).

Long term goals (rather than mere maintenance of hegemonic dominance) also change, although episodically. In cycles, the American government declares an idealistic commitment to economic progress, social justice (and stability), and well-run, honest democratic government. Accompanying such idealistic goals is an increase in American interventionism (of the non-military variety) as a diverse policy tools -- including economic development aid, land reform projects, public health, military aid, etc. are temporarily and energetically employed until the enthusiasm dies.

A notable feature of these American cases is the decoupling of rational analysis from policy -- a New Year's Resolution foreign policy in which a vow to change direction is initially adopted, then support gradually diminishes. During each return engagement American leaders appointed a national commission to analyze the problem of revolutions, develop national consensus, and recommend plans for the long term. (In the 1950's, Milton Eisenhower, the President's brother, had the assignment; in the early 1960's, the Alliance for Progress planners; in the 1980's, the Kissinger Commission.)

In its turn, each official report observes that, had the recommendations of the earlier, similar Commissions been followed -- to create economic growth, social justice, and competent, responsive and democratic governments in the region -- this latest period of revolutionary violence might have been avoided. They then recommend military aid and suppression ("Change must occur, but violence isn't the way") accompanied by energetic (but unreliable) vows to sustain a long-term, constructive policy. In the phenomenon of New Year's Resolution Policy governments vow to change direction, but support dwindles and political systems do not follow-through and sustain the policies that responsible members of their elites have judged in the country's own rational interest. For America, the list is longer than simply the Central American cases and its now-failing Caribbean Basin Development program:

Table 9

Illustrative Cases: System Failures

Yangtze River Development Plan (Truman)
Alliance for Progress (Kennedy)
Mekong River Development Plan (Johnson)
Caribbean Basin Development Plan (Reagan/Bush)

4.2 Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

A similar regional grouping of cases is Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. There have been major changes in decision-making outcomes in response to similar circumstances. From the imposition of hated dictatorships and the violent and brutal suppression of the Hungarian uprising (1956), to the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), to the mere threat of force in Poland, to the ending of hegemonic policies and the reunification of Germany. (The parallels and contrasts with American policy in Central America are also instructive: they offer an interesting test case of whether a system-level logic does determine decision outcomes -- as a realpolitik model might suggest -- or whether there are major differences due to national decision processes.)[30]

4.3 Israel and its Neighbors

A third case of regional analysis is Israel and its neighbors. More than 4 decades of decisions have been marked by change, as well as continuity. The invasion of Lebanon, the acquisition of the West Bank, the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel catalyzed by Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and Sadat's visit, the use of terrorism (and counter-terrorism), and the intifada, are among the historical time series that gain richness when viewed as return engagements with similar issues across, and potential exemplars of learning and counter-learning by both sides.

4.4 China and its Borders

Another illustrative regional sequence is the relationship of Communist China and its neighbors across the past 40 years.[31]

From the Chinese point of view, their resort to military force may reflect sequences of decisions required by the perceived effrontery of barbarian states who doubt the words of Chinese leaders. Chinese leaders apparently pride themselves in never bluffing; in each case when they have resorted to military force, they have warned the nations whose behavior they find objectionable what the consequences will be.

But the other nations do not listen, and then China must resort to force. America did not heed Chinese warnings in the Korean War, and China had to intervene. The Soviet Union did not heed warnings about the Chinese use of force in border disputes. The Indian government did not heed warnings. The North Vietnamese government did not heed warnings. A recycling policy sequence without apparent learning: China warns; the warnings are ignored; China must punish.

The sequence is especially interesting because it may illustrate an insular, self-enclosed logic of changes and reveal a self-insulating breakdown of feedback. To a Western social scientist the Chinese case may be a candidate to be an appalling record of error -- of total failure in credibility and the use of coercive diplomacy. (A Chinese warning conveyed privately to an ambassador, or on the front page of People's Daily, carries little impact in the American political system, which responds more reliably to warnings that achieve the front page of the New York Times. In the Korean case, we know the deterrent message Chinese leaders

thought they sent to President Truman did not arrive with the visibility, force and credibility they assumed.) But the Chinese traditional interpretation of feedback does not appear to admit a self-diagnosis of its own profound error due to a fundamental ignorance of how one sends credible messages to foreign political systems. Rather Chinese leaders appear to attribute the failure of credibility externally, to the effrontery that is natural to barbarians, who must (always) be retaught lessons they never learn.

5. Cases by Independent Variable Mix

As chapters in this volume illustrate, the comparative study of foreign policy decision making is well-advanced in providing a taxonomic inventory of causal processes that are well-studied and have a well-specified organizational location.

But as we look back across this century, and observe the decades ahead, several additional factors may become increasingly recognized to play a critical role. If so, cases involving these factors may be of special interest. For example:

5.1 Western and Non-Western Culture

Change may be an unfolding of an already-encoded conception of progress that is inherent within a culture. Thus, Western conceptions of human rights, with origins in Ancient Athens, early Christianity, especially shaped and transmitted by the British Empire, may have a dynamic power that is under-rated in normal analysis of international politics. The Wilsonian trend (discussed above), including

the surrender of anti-Wilsonian forces and the decision to honor new claims for human rights -- may reflect both a common normative frame and the political expectation that (for example) historical forces favor the inevitable triumph of such claims.[32] If so, a contrast of cases drawn from Western and non-Western cultures may be theoretically revealing about the deeper logic expressed in international political change.

5.2 Education of Elites and Attentive Publics

It is a wholly self-serving argument of the academic world -- but perhaps accurate -- that a principal cause of improved international politics will be improved education levels of world elites. (It is worth recalling that, in world history, only in recent decades do the elites (and attentive publics) in all major powers (with the lingering exception of mainland China), have advanced university-level education and worldly knowledge based upon first-hand experience.) The processes involved (e.g., a preference for hypothesis and evidence, which undermines ideological loyalties; socialization to universalist values; a wider identity and capacity for empathy with foreigners; acquisition of factual knowledge, etc.) require careful analysis. But comparisons among countries (e.g., Bulgaria and Albania v. Yugoslavia) or historical data from within the same country (U. S. decision makers' understandings of Japan 50 years ago, and today) may prove informative about critical system-level trends altering the processes and outcomes of national decision making.

6. Cases and the Improvement of Practice

To improve decision making directly, cases can be selected by several strategies:

6.1 Monitoring Value Outcomes

Like the study of biochemistry and the practice of medicine, the scientific study of change in the international system may be strengthened by a focus upon the values one wishes to promote -- how to change decisions and directions for the better, as defined by the analyst. (Independently of this rationale, the selection of cases by value outcomes -- who gets what -- has much to recommend it as a rule, especially as so many key participants in decision making may be motivated (openly, or in a rationalized way) by these considerations.)

The policy science tradition has pioneered the most comprehensive map for monitoring value outcomes and processes, across eight categories of values.[33] It provides a useful check list for a Wilsonian agenda of promoting human rights (economic, social, and political), what Harold Lasswell termed a "world commonwealth of human dignity." One theoretical virtue of human rights research is the perspective it may give (alongside the case of the environmental movement) to the growing causal role international organizations (e.g., Amnesty International) and networks of serious and concerned people, in shaping government decisions.

6.2 Touch-Stone Cases

As literary critics continue to discuss Shakespeare's plays -- and use the discussion to gauge their theoretical progress and frame their disputes -- so, for any cumulative study it is valuable to develop a set of touchstone cases, which a

profession can share. Such cases probably would justify, in principal, an unusual investment of government and foundation resources in data (including, where possible, oral histories prepared with psychological and theoretical alertness.

The Cuban missile crisis and Bay of Pigs invasion, World Wars I and II, the Vietnam War are examples. Bundy's pioneering work concerning the history of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy -- including astute observations of error, and paths not taken -- is an outstanding example of the analysis of return engagements with similar issues, change, and learning.[34] The beginning and (surely) the end of the Cold War also have an importance, a richness of available data for process-tracing, and a complexity that make them outstanding candidates.[35]

6.3 Testing Diagnostic Theories

If we believe the conduct of international relationships can be improved by technical improvements in decision making, what exemplar cases, supporting which theories, should we select to make the argument? Each author in this volume will have suggestions. Here are several illustrations of the case-selection logic.[36]

6.3.1 Cognitive Development and Time Horizons: Individual and Institutional

Based upon research with large private and government organizations in several countries, Jaques has proposed that certain levels of cognitive development and

work ability are necessary to perform senior roles competently.[37] These characteristics include the ability to deal with levels of abstraction and anticipation in decision making. Thus, for example, while U. S. Representatives could prosper, and be returned to office, by working with a short time horizon (e.g., 18 months or 2 years, the time between now and the next election), nations may require 10, 20, or even 50 year planning horizons.

An example is environmental issues, where the trends that a nation should rationally monitor and address in its interest require decision makers (in principle) to spend substantial parts of their day with projects whose results will not be observed for 10 or 20 years or more. (Their job -- done well -- also may require them to address problems lacking well-developed constituencies or press coverage.)

This emerging research concerning the time frames of decisions -- and individual (especially collective) capacities for abstraction and anticipation -- suggests a variety of cases (e.g., environmental issues) where decisions to change (and, especially, inertia or non-decisions) can be informatively explored.

6.3.2 Developing Applied Contributions of Social Science

A second set of cases reflects opportunities where improved social science knowledge -- either about decision making, the external world, or both -- might have made a valuable difference to policy outcomes. Thus, querying historical databases to identify all cases (of continuity or change) which turned-out badly, from the values and goals of the decision makers themselves, or from the perspec-

tive an independent analyst would wish to bring -- would be a helpful exercise.

Deutsch, White, and others have told us that, in this century, the majority of aggressors in international conflict has lost; it is an extraordinarily important conclusion if it turns out that even a small subset of past (and possible future) wars reflect remedial errors.[38] Another possibility with the same logic:

6.3.3 Testing Cognitive Biases

Among the most prominent psychological theories of bias in international relations decision making has been Jervis's Perception and Misperception in International Relations. Jervis appears to assert that misperceptions are common in international politics, and that four types of misperception are expecially prominent. This list of misperceptions is partly drawn from cognitive psychology, and its origin implies that the rigorous training in the analytical scientific methods that typically accompany advanced research training would noticeably improve international relations.

Jervis argues his case with vivid examples but without systematic sampling or testing. Any set (or representative sampling) of important cases that established his conclusions would be timely and valuable.[39]

6.4 Practitioner Folk Wisdom About Induced Changes

Another strategy of constructive engagement is to test beliefs of practitioners about how to induce change in the foreign policies of other countries. Two examples:

6.4.1 Appeasing Aggressors

A simple social learning (SR) theory is prominent among practitioners. Aggressors who succeed are rewarded, and thus will be more likely to continue such behavior and aggress in the future. Aggressors who are defeated, or achieve successes at an unusually high cost, will be more likely to change their policies and become less aggressive in the future. Unfortunately, a simple statistical test suggests the theory is wrong -- and thus there is a discussion, concerning their views of inducing change, that social scientists might have with practitioners.[40]

6.4.2 Lagged Rationality

An unusual feature of the Cold War was the American reliance upon rational decision engineering to create a case for arms control, to which it hoped the Soviet Union would respond. Several times specific attempts were made, at high levels, to press the case (American policy makers apparently testing this academically-based rationality assumption). For example, at Glassboro, in 1968, Lyndon Johnson had only partial success. And at the beginning of the Carter administration, another attempt was ill-fated. Both cases apparently illustrate an (erroneous) elite theory of rational decision analysis: by the reckoning in Washington, Soviet leaders -- acting rationally (i.e., as the MAD stop-point had been reached) should have been willing to sign an agreement. That it took an additional 20 years, after Glassboro, for such

a "rational" case to become effective points to other crucial ingredients (e.g., learning processes) that experience may show are vital components (i.e., besides making a rational, intellectual case) of a good theory about how to induce change in another nation's behavior.[41]

6.4.3 Two Domino Theories

The domino theory of international relations has two versions. The original, Eisenhower, metaphor expressed a conception of power derived from his World War II command. In World War II the principle route of victory was hard-fought ground battles. Thus the metaphor of falling dominoes was closely tied to a conception of physical proximity and actions in physical reality -- new territorial acquisitions gave a new physical staging area for military invasion into physically contiguous territory.

The second (Milgram) variant of the domino model assumes a more psychological theory of power -- a global drama, with attention, salience, and emotional involvement on a wide (often global, scale). Power lives (so to speak) as a function of imagery and self-presentation -- a single, unitary image of a nation-state that impresses itself, as a persona, on the mind of a potential adversary. A visible defeat of a major world power, in a local arena, changes the space of imaginative possibilities of its challengers in all arenas.[42]

The second version of the domino theory obtains support in face-to-face experimental studies of power. Stanley Milgram designed an experiment in which a scientific researcher commanded adult subjects to give painful and dangerous

electrical shocks to another person. He obtained high rates of obedience and deference to the scientific researcher. But, in circumstances when several people (paid by Milgram to play a role) were also present, and even one of these other people openly defied the experimenter, the obedience to the experimenter dissolved quickly and almost totally.[43]

Thus, the critical scientific question is which version of the domino theory best fits international political relations? As hateful as the psychological version of the domino theory might be, especially if used to maintain a repressive political order, can the panic and militarily repressive responses
be validly criticized on technical grounds, as some critics have attempted?[44]

7.0 Conclusion

When he reached the concluding page (1,019) of his History of the World, the historian J. M. Roberts wrote: "Only two general truths emerge from the study of history. One is that things tend to change much more, and more quickly, than one might think. The other is that they tend to change much less, and much more slowly, than one might think. . . and so, for good and ill, we shall always find what happens somewhat surprising."[45]

The study of change, or learning, does not claim that either is the main story of international politics. Indeed, the invitation to the inquiry arises, in part, from a desire to foster beneficial change and the application of intelligence and vision. It may be one of the lessons of history that this does not occur reliably and naturally. But there is hope, too, in the recognition that, against the realpolitik baseline, we

can (even if slowly -- and with their causes still partly mysterious and their permanence unknown) be pleasantly surprised by several recent trends.

Footnotes

1. E. g., learning may confirm existing beliefs and cause a decision maker to persist.

2. For conceptual discussions of learning by political institutions and systems, see the report from an NSF project in the early 1980's, Lloyd S. Etheredge, "Government Learning: An Overview" in S. Long (Ed.), Handbook of Political Behavior (NY: Plenum Press, 1981), vol. 2, pp. 73 - 161, and the more definition-oriented article by Etheredge and James Short, "Thinking About Government Learning" in Journal of Management Studies, 20:1 (1983), pp. 41 - 58. For recent work see the thinking of Tetlock, Haas, Breslauer, and others in Breslauer, George W. and Tetlock, Philip (Eds.), Learning in U. S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, in press).

3. E.g., the satisfactory explanation of change also requires the satisfactory explanation of continuity.

4. Harry Eckstein's classic discussion of case study methods, in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Ed.), Handbook of Political Science reviews a range of selection criteria.

5. International finance is probably an exception to this rule. To social scientists, the shift to freely floating exchange rates, by creating a world money supply, gave away a major portion of national economic sovereignty. It is unlikely such consequences were fully appreciated by political decision makers.

6. For development of this argument, see Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn: American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions (NY: Pergamon Press, 1986).

7. See also the discussion of slow trends toward a Wilsonian world order.

8. What occurred -- it is worth remembering -- appeared mysterious and implausible at the time. The United States in the Reagan years began the largest arms buildup in human history, spending trillions of dollars on new armaments. The Republican President spoke of the Soviet Union as an "Evil Empire." The Soviet government's entire legitimacy seemed to rest upon an ideology which portrayed America as an implacable enemy -- and the history of Soviet-American relations contained strong evidence in proxy wars, crises, and rhetoric to support the drama. And yet, apparently suddenly, the Soviet government decides to trust the United States? Nuclear arms are being cut dramatically. Germany is reunited, and Eastern Europe is cut-free of Soviet (and Communist Party) political control...

The list of causes cited to explain the Soviet-American arms race is so formidable, it is difficult to imagine how anything changed, especially since few (if any) of the conventional theories (except those that posited a learning process) could explain the effects. In the mid 1980's popular discussion and conventional wisdom viewed, with alarm the logic of nuclear superpower confrontations. Political scientists and popular writers pronounced reasons and rationales for such continuity, with ideas ranging across the board. The Cold War was an almost mystical expression of natural nation-state behavior, discerned by de Tocqueville (or

Morgenthau, or Waltz), who foresaw Soviet-American conflict for world domination inevitable. Or it was the expression of narcissism and infantile acting-out (especially by males). Or brilliantly rational and profit-maximizing military-industrial complexes. Or psychic numbing. Or fear of death. Or wishes for death and Armageddon. Etc.

9. Similar efforts elsewhere (e.g., LAFTA) have not gone as far. The Central American work sponsored by Terry Sanford, Kissinger and Associates, and others, while it does not use formal government channels, prove a useful experiment. See William Ascher and Ann Hubbard (Eds.), Central American Recovery and Development: Task Force Report to the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).

10. E.g., Robert Keohane (Ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (NY: Columbia University Press, 1986); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown,. 1977); Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).

11. Other baselines may be established, with a rigorous empirical base, by Artificial Intelligence models that codify generative grammars or operational codes, and the general world dynamic simulations as GLOBUS. (See, for example, Dwain Mefford, "A Case-Based Approach to Foreign Policy: The Implementation of a System." Unpublished paper presented to the International Society for Political Psychology meetings, July, 1987.) Both traditions have the useful capabilities of generating counter-factuals. See also McVicar's analysis of routine international behavior, K. McVicar, Political Communication and Verbal Foreign Policy Behavior: A Comparative Adaptation of Harold Lasswell's Concept of Values to Public Discourse in the European Economic Community, 1958 - 1968. (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1989).

12. This account draws upon Joshua Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 - 2000 (NY: Random House, 1988).

13. Northern Europe also presents an interesting case of Sweden -- peaceful in recent centuries, but a scourge of its neighbors in the 17th century.

14. See David McClelland, Power: The Inner Experience (NY: Irvington, 1975) and David Winter, The Power Motive (NY: Free Press, 1973).

15. See also the work of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita for a discussion of baselines -- e.g., "The Contribution of Expected-Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict" In Manus I. Midlarsky (Ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Boston, MA: Unwin, Hyman, 1989), pp. 143 - 169. It would be especially helpful to run the equations in simulation mode to determine which wars (for example) the United States should have fought if it were a classic hegemon, and what countries ought to fight one another in the future.

16. See, for example, Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, "Lateral Pressure in International Relations: Concept and Theory," in Manus I. Midlarsky (Ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 289 - 326.

17. See Ruth Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987-88 (Washington, DC: World Priorities Inc., 1988), 12th edition. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait is the only current exception. That the United States and other nations will fight to assure free access to oil for themselves is a constant.

18. It may be an error to explain Wilsonian trends toward more univeralistic values in foreign policy (e.g., the dissolving of nation-state loyalties in the West European unification movement; or the abandoning of fixed exchange rates in favor of free currency markets; or the apparent ending of the Cold War in the 1990s) as caused by ethical sensibilities alone. Many such values make business easier -- and reflect, among other features, an important system-level change in economic theories of profit-making. Today, economists and business schools teach theories of profit-making (R&D competition, marketing) very different from (and more benevolent than) theories of early capitalists (e.g., that one makes profits by holding down labor costs, including exploitation and union-busting; or by securing sources of raw materials and markets and locking-out competitors by the use of the military forces of the state.)

In this perspective, it is the rise of international business, and universalist theories of economists, that may drive policy decisions, especially in the financial markets. It made the conduct of international business easier to abandon the gold standard and allow free markets in international finance and currency -- and the Nixon Administration (and most other governments) gave away an unusual degree of national sovereignty (probably, never to be regained) with surprising ease. Indeed, since World War II, the economics profession has rewired the world monetary system twice (Bretton Woods and de-regulating world financial markets) and finance ministers routinely engage in market operations to alter relative currency values by several times the size of effects reserved to the formal political process in trade legislation. That Kantian ethics and Wilsonian principles are believed good for markets and profit may prove the important causal route in these cases.

19. This may be especially true because of the extraordinary changes in travel and communications technology in the world.

20. Harold Saunders, "Beyond 'Us' and 'Them': Building Mature International Relationships." (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988). Xerox. See also Joseph Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy" in John W. McDonald, Jr. and Diane B. Bendahmane (Eds.), Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1987). Across time, in the post World War II world, ethnocentric misperceptions in bi-lateral relations, and the kinds of primitive misperceptions proposed by Jervis (see the discussion, below) may gradually have been replaced -- via experience, learning, and the kinds of processes Saunders discusses: a model of long-term trends is Lloyd S. Etheredge, "Managerial Responsibility and the World's Need: Reflections on Perception and Misperception in American Foreign Policy" in George Andreopoulous (Ed.) Greek-American Relations at a Turning Point (forthcoming).

21. See Jeff Rubin,

22. A long list. See the excellent overview by Joseph V. Montville (Ed.), Conflict and Peace-making in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1990).

23. The Japanese case offers an interesting historical example.

24. Quoted in Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace & War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy & Johnson Years (NY: Simon and Schuster), p. 359.

25. Michael Lowe, quoted in Coral Bell, "China and the International Order" in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Eds.), The Expansion of International Society (NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 255 - 267, p . 267.

26. Ken E. McVicar, Political Communication and Verbal Foreign Policy Behavior: A Comparative Adaptation of Harold Lasswell's Concept of Values to Public Discourse in the European Economic Community, 1958 - 1968. (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1989.)

27. See Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions (NY: Pergamon Press, 1986), pp. 135 - 137.

28. See, for example, Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

29. The CIA's dual recent failures at the Bay of Pigs, and against the contras, may produce a reversion to the more typical -- Grenada and Panama -- pattern.

30. Policies toward Afghanistan and/or China may also be informative, especially if the Soviet elites were affected by lessons from Eastern Europe and vice versa.

31. I am endebted to Chou Ming for a discussion of this case.

32. The argument that Western culture is a mixed blessing, compared with others, could also be explored. The ambitions to colonize or remake the entire world do not appear to be Japanese or Chinese concerns.

33. See Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman, and Andrew Willard, "The World Community: A Planetary Social Process," U. C. Davis Law Review, 21:3 (Spring, 1988), entire.

34. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (NY: Random House, 1988). See also the Breslauer and Tetlock volume, op. cit., and Etheredge, "On Being More Rational...".

35. See Bloomfield's CASCON computer database inventory (available from its author at MIT), the Pew Charitable Trusts, Diplomatic Training Initiative Case List (Philadelphia, PA: Pew Charitable Trusts, 1988), and the cases analyzed by Janis, op. cit.. See also the thoughtful analysis in Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia University Press, 1974).

36. Broad and useful discussions may be found in any of the pioneering works of Alexander L. George. See, for example, the forthcoming edited collection, Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, in press).

37. Elliott Jaques, "In Praise of Hierarchy," Harvard Business Review (January - February, 1990), pp. 127 - 133.

38. Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, p. ; Ralph White, [Presidential Address to ISPP].

39. Irving Janis's scientific work has been exemplary in identifying a series of touchstone cases, and this would be a good list of major American cases. See his Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management (New York: Free Press, 1989). See also Lloyd Etheredge's "Managerial Responsibility and the World's Need: Reflections on Perception and Misperception in American Foreign Policy" in George Andreopoulous (Ed.), Greek-American Relations at a Turning Point (forthcoming) for a suggested integration of Jervis's theories and learning processes in bi-lateral relations since World War II and Lloyd S. Etheredge, "Is American Foreign Policy Ethnocentric: Notes toward a Propositional Inventory." Unpublished paper presented to the American Political Science Association meeting, 1988.

40. See J. D. Singer, " ." Among other explanations, the theory may hold primarily in the case of attempted messianic breakouts.

41. See Lloyd S. Etheredge, "On Being More Rational Than the Rationality Assumption: Nuclear Deterrence, Public Drama Requirements, and the Agenda for Learning" in Eric Singer and Valerie M. Hudson (Eds.), Political Psychology and Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, in press); Bundy, op. cit., and Breslauer and Tetlock (eds.), op. cit., especially the article by Weber.

42. For a more extended discussion, see Lloyd S. Etheredge, "On Being More Rational Than the Rationality Assumption: Nuclear Deterrence, Public Drama Requirements, and the Agenda for Learning" in Eric Singer and Valerie M. Hudson (Eds.), Political Psychology and Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, in press).

43. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (NY: Harper and Row, 1974). For a broader discussion see Lloyd S. Etheredge, "On Being More Rational Than the Rationality Assumption: Nuclear Deterrence, Public Drama Requirements, and the Agenda for Learning" in Eric Singer and Valerie M. Hudson (Eds.), Political Psychology and Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, in press).

44. See, for example, Betty Glad

45. J. M. Roberts, The Pelican History of the World (NY: Penguin-Viking, 1980), p. 1019.

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