Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2010 08:33:19 -0400

To: "Dr. Baruch Fischhoff - Chair, National Academy Committee on Improving

Intelligence" <baruch@cmu.edu>

From: Lloyd Etheredge < lloyd.etheredge@policyscience.net>

Subject: 137. The Washington Post series: The Relevance of Behavioral Science

Dear Dr. Fischhoff and Colleagues:

I just wanted to be sure that you have been following both last week's <u>Washington Post</u> series, "Top Secret America," and the major followup (continuing) discussions on the <u>Post</u>'s Website.

The series focuses attention on many of the issues that I have raised during the past year. Today, these behavioral science questions are beginning to define a policy agenda for lesson-drawing and learning. It will be helpful if you can make the connections explicit - for example by an <a href="Executive Summary/propositional">Executive Summary/propositional</a> inventory of key emerging policy concerns to highlight how the behavioral science literature suggests we should think about the issues.

The <u>Washington Post</u> story also illustrates how national policy is [still] made when we lack a rigorous, cumulative behavioral science field of national security studies. There are, once again, an abundance of impressions and sound-bite diagnoses and resurgent claims - e.g., that - this time - somebody [even tougher and more capable] should *really* be put in charge to rationalize the system. One-quarter of one percent of \$75 billion/year is \$160+ million/year which is a cornucopia for university-based, interdisciplinary, behavioral science studies - a world where, as you know, it has not been possible to sustain many career paths and cumulative research programs.

If you agree, I hope that you will make bold recommendations about what, in the best judgment of the National Academy and the experts on your panel, we should be doing as a nation.

A useful policy framework might be the <u>Thinking in Time</u> analysis from the earlier CIA/Harvard project: After 9/11 we did not know the scope and nature of the threats that we faced. It made sense to build capacities in many directions and try many things. Today, we know a great deal more about the nature of the threats. The question is not whether we "over-reacted" or did something wrong earlier, but what we should do next - e.g., rebalancing portfolios, scaling back some operations while retaining surge capacities, etc.

Some of the new recommendations could be well-focused about Top Secret topics and terrorism threats. Most of the productive ideas, I suspect, will involve thoughtful identification of areas for recapitalization/innovation and understanding the implications of the 10 to the 24th (Yottabyte) databases. Especially in areas of forecasting and the emerging field [memorandum # 4] of political opportunity analysis.

This could be one of the most exciting, relevant, and important  $\underline{\text{Reports}}$  from the National Academy in recent years.

best wishes, Lloyd E.