

Introduction - Part II

Introduction to Part II

Five Internet Projects That Can Change the World

"Conventional reformers cast their programs in terms of national policies, or in terms of laws and central planning. But in the end, what will shape the future is a creative potential that inheres in the new technologies . . ."

- Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983)¹

An innovation adopted by 500 million (of the world's six billion) people within eight years has compelling evidence to be a good idea. Yet, even as the technology continues its exponential growth and is about to move to a new level, our thinking about how to make the best societal and global use of this windfall is barely getting underway.

In this introduction to Part II I will review several points about where we stand. Next, I will distinguish two types of power in global politics and introduce an outcome-oriented framework that can help to develop the dimension of democratic power. Finally, I will preview the next five chapters that outline projects to accelerate the adoption of new broadband capabilities and change the world.

¹ Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Four Unnatural Institutions and the Road Ahead (1983)," in *Politics in Wired Nations: Selected Writings of Ithiel de Sola Pool*, ed. Lloyd S. Etheredge (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 237.

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I. Lessons from Part I

Concerning (Part I) the directions of technology and the social and market forces that will, relatively automatically, create part of the future:

- There is good news ahead: a revolutionary upgrade in global communication capacity is already installed. While some pioneers will have temporary difficulty paying their early load of debt, many already are profitable - and there is 98% unused capacity and photons are free.² With sufficient competition and wholesale purchasing, rapid growth of a global (and increasingly video) Internet can occur at minimal additional cost.

- Final mile broadband access to the Internet autobahn will be quickly available to large American organizations and nine-to-five users in urban areas who can contract directly and at wholesale. At first, the S curve will move slowly, but change is underway.³

- Suburban consumers, who wish to purchase two-way 2-6+ Mbps links, are currently restrained by the monopoly business plans of their cable companies. New competition and/or technical and regulatory solutions will be required before they have good and affordable broadband links.

² Temporarily bankrupt companies like Global Crossing will have their assets re-acquired and become profitable.

³ For example: Riva Richmond, "Video Streaming Is a Sleeper Hit with Business Crowd," *Wall Street Journal*, August 20 2001. Private networks are proprietary information and not reported in public statistics.

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II. The New World of Democratic Power

The formal structures may have seemed little changed. However, beneath the surface private citizens were caring about society, organizing to bring needed changes and services, exercising and building decentralized power. That's the essence of democracy. That's also what gives it its roots.

- Bill Drayton⁴

Power can be confused with position or privilege, but it requires neither: it is the capacity to make a difference. In world politics, power comes from two sources: *hard power* (that uses guns or money to secure compliance) and *democratic power* (that uses words, and is built from the organized allegiances and motivations of people).

A. Hard Power: In History and Now

Hard power has ruled world politics for most of history. The importance to ground any judgment of the future role of the Internet in an appreciation of hard power can be seen by the painfully simple story of Western nation-states for the past 500 years, a drama in 3 ½ acts (Table II-1).

⁴ Bill Drayton, "Introduction," in *Leading Social Entrepreneurs*, ed. Ashoka: Innovators for the Public (Arlingotn, VA: Ashoka: Innovators for the Public, 1998), v. However the concept of a global civil society is too strong for the international linkups discussed in Part II.

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The traditional actors in world politics - nation-states - are atypical of what we would find in a sample of statistically normal individuals. If we were to describe their baseline behavior in human terms, they would be extraordinarily high in motivation for power, money, and status. They would be selfish, without affiliation motivation or love. They would be coldly rational in a Machiavellian sense, unethical and unprincipled. In their perpetual battles to rule the world, and when they can get away with it, they would tend to take the view that the strong take what they can, the weak suffer what they must. (They also would live in continuing fear for their own survival, of being the victim of the predatory ambitions of their neighbors.)

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Table II-1⁵

Hegemonic Wars: 1495 - 2000

<u>War</u>			
	<u>Thirty Years</u>	<u>Napoleonic</u>	<u>WW I & II</u>
<u>Loser</u>	<u>Hapsburgs</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Germany</u>
New Leader (economically strongest, win- ning coalition)	Netherlands	Britain	U. S.
Eventual challenger (winning coalition, but economically devastated by last war)	France	Germany	USSR

Act 1

In the first act, 1495 to 1648, the Hapsburg family, linking

⁵ This overview and table draw upon Joshua Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) 346.

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Vienna and Madrid, seeks to dominate the rest of Europe - and everyone else maneuvers to prevent them from doing so. The conflict becomes especially fierce because of the Hapsburgs' Catholicism and the Protestantism of the European states opposed to them.

The final showdown with the Hapsburgs and their defeat is the exhausting series of wars, grouped as the Thirty Years War, ended by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Act 2

In a repeated pattern, the exhaustion and devastation of the last Great Power hegemonic war now creates the opportunity for the least exhausted member of the last winning coalition (in this case, the Netherlands) to expand its influence. However, it lacks the natural endowments to become the new long-term hegemon. As they rebuild, France and England increasingly compete with one another for world dominance. (Along the way, there is a sideshow in North America, where France and its Indian allies combine to attack the new British colonies in the French and Indian Wars; and then the French and Dutch combine to assist the Colonial revolutionaries in their War of Independence from Britain.) The second act reaches its climax in Napoleon's messianic effort to break-out of a normal framework of inter-state relations and achieve hegemony by conquest of the rest of Europe. Act 2 closes with Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815 and the Congress of Vienna.

Act 3

The third act is the rise of Britain - the least exhausted member of the winning coalition against Napoleon - to world leadership. The

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eventual challenger for hegemony is a unified, industrializing Germany. World Wars I and II are two phases of the same war - i.e., a prolonged contest between Germany's hegemonic/messianic ambitions and the efforts of other nations to contain Germany.

Act 4

Act 4 opens with America (the least exhausted member of the winning alliance, producing 40% of the world's GNP) emerging as the new world leader.

In its new role America - like Britain in the 19th century - engaged almost continually in conflicts on the periphery of its spheres of influence. These brush fire and proxy wars, and covert operations, were directed primarily against its new emerging rival, the USSR and its allies. Like Britain (or, earlier, the Romans) America also located large numbers of its own troops in forward deployment along the frontiers (in Western Europe, Korea and elsewhere.)

Such, at least, is a Realist story of world politics with which any discussion of the Internet (and democratic power and words) must begin.⁶ It is a warning against being naive. And the baseline psychology of hard power politics is not limited to Western Europe in the past 500 years: travel the Mediterranean world and you visit a long list of now-tamed countries that once succeeded, for a time,

⁶ While traditional academic theorists who described this behavior are called Realists, it may not be rationally derived or always realistic. See: Lloyd S. Etheredge, *Can Governments Learn? American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions*, ed. Richard Brody, et al., *Pergamon Government and Politics Series* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985).

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with a hegemonic breakout and held its neighbors beneath its heel: Greece, Rome, Spain, Turkey, Iran/Persia, Egypt (etc.)

However, the truly exciting development in this political psychodrama is that Act 4 changed at mid-point. History did not follow the earlier pattern that predicted a final escalation of the Cold War to an all-out war for world domination between the US (and its supporters in the Western bloc) and the USSR (allied with China).⁷ Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev wrote a new script.⁸

What changed? How deep and permanent is the change? Have all nations (e.g., with exceptions such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq) changed? We do not know. A full exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this book. However, we can identify at least three changes that support the case that a new era, which adds a dimension of democratic power, and substitutes a primary politics of mutual interest for a politics of mutual deterrence, is possible.

⁷ This discussion draws upon Lloyd S. Etheredge, "Notes on World History and Learning in International Politics," *Mind and Human Interaction* 1, no. 3 (1990). Lloyd S. Etheredge, "Change (and Learning) in International Politics: Case Selection and Theory Development," (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, 1991). Online at www.policyscience.net and www.policyscience.ws

⁸ Even Realist theorists concede that their observations are not necessarily a theory of American or other nations specific foreign policies, but primarily a theory of constraints - i.e., a warning of how other nations will behave. See: Alexander L. George, "Foreward," in *Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory*, ed. Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), x.

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- First, America has not sought to rule the world since World War II as earlier world leaders tried to do. Its use of hard power was modified by strong democratic traditions and values; informed by its Founding Fathers' mistrust of the moral corruption and entangled motives of many European wars, of which they wanted no part; and by the American idealism articulated by Woodrow Wilson. The genius (liberal democratic respect, in the phrase of political scientist Michael Doyle) was to add elements of democratic power and American sociability to the exercise of hard power, in rebuilding relationships with defeated opponents from World War II, and even in dealing with the Soviet bloc and China.⁹

- Second, the democratic spirit and Wilsonian idealism - combined with scientific progress - have been good economics. There has been a change in theories of securing wealth. For most of history, military domination - taking wealth from other people and exploiting them, and using hard power to maintain exclusive trading advantages - was a guiding rule for material gain. Today, the established route to economic growth is R&D and free-market competition on a global scale.

⁹ Michael W. Doyle, "Michael Doyle on the Democratic Peace - Again," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, *International Security Readers* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 364. A broader and suggestive discussion of values in the American case is: Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001). For an insightful study of the integration of hard and democratic power by four types of leaders and effectiveness in different situations: William K. Muir Jr., *Police: Streetcorner Politicians* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

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- Third, as we think about the future of democratic power, we can be less concerned about hard power because the US already has so much of it. America's current global capacity to visit military destruction on adversaries, often with extraordinary precision and (so far) negligible loss of American lives, has been demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, Central Europe, and (more recently) Afghanistan. America's twelve carrier groups and support aircraft vastly exceed the capacity of any other nation. It is without peer or rival - indeed, America's annual military expenditures exceed the combined current expenditures of the next nine nations (and it probably is even further ahead in military R&D investment.)¹⁰

The hard power reflected in the American economy also is remarkable. Potential rivals (e.g., Japan and the former Soviet Union) have found their economies in continuing trouble. America produces 30% of the world's GDP; it can afford both guns and butter.

The historian Paul Kennedy, who once wrote a famous forecast of American decline - a process similar to the decline of the British Empire - has forthrightly acknowledged a new and different reality (Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing.)¹¹

Yet, there is another history-based comment to be made about America's vast superiority of hard power: *This is about as far as hard power takes us.* If we want to create a better world, the next step is to develop the new capabilities for democratic power.

¹⁰ Paul Kennedy, "The Eagle Has Landed," *Financial Times*, February 2/3 2002.

¹¹ Ibid.,, I.

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B. Democratic Power: In History and Now

Democratic power, the link-up and collaboration of people across national boundaries, is a new dimension. Across the past 500 years - mostly, eras of absolute monarchs and insular nation-states - the independent role of democratic power in world politics was zero, or minimal: Typically, it was prohibited (ordinary people were expected to obey the monarch) and almost nobody except a small Establishment traveled or traded in wider markets or was interested in foreign lands or peoples.

Many changes contribute to the potential for democratic power. There is globalizing commerce - major U. S. corporations look to foreign markets as a significant component of their future growth (in 2000, total US imports and exports rose to about \$2 trillion/year; GDP in 2000 was about \$10 trillion/year.¹² And as the economist Lester Thurow has pointed out: That most American of American companies, Coca-Cola, now has 80 percent of its sales outside the United States.)¹³ There are more widely-traveled people (including businessmen): In 2000, world tourism receipts were about \$475 billion; there were about 690 million international border crossings in 2001 and 50 million visitors to the United States (about 5 million from Japan and 7.6 million from the United Kingdom, France, and

¹² U. S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001*, 121 ed. (Austin, TX: Hoover's Business Press, 2002) 799.. The recent growth has been striking: In 1995, five years earlier, the total was \$1,328. GDP: William A. McGeeveran Jr., ed., *World Almanac and Book of Facts 2002* (New York: World Almanac Books, 2002) 105.

¹³ Lester C. Thurow, *Building Wealth: The New Rules for Individuals, Companies, and Nations in a Knowledge-Based Economy* (New York: HarperBusiness, 1999) 7.

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Germany).¹⁴ Americans cross international borders to visit another country 60 million times each year, with about 12 million of the visits to Europe.¹⁵ It adds-up: many people are living in a more familiar world.^{16 17}

- Today, there also are more than 40,000 non-government organizations (NGOs) with international activities.¹⁸ These range

¹⁴ McGeeveran Jr., ed., *World Almanac and Book of Facts 2002* 757. World Tourism Organization, *World Tourism Stalls in 2001* (Press release) [Online] (World Trade Organization, January 29, 2002 2002 [cited April 14 2002]). Statistics represent the number of border crossings. The number of different individuals, who may visit more than once per year (e.g., Canada-US) is a smaller number.

¹⁵ U. S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001* 769.

¹⁶ This change is remarkable. It is worth remembering that, before World Wars I and II, the leaders of most of the major powers had never met each other.

¹⁷ After the Cold War, American foreign policy elites perceived that the American public lost interest in the world and wanted to disengage from participation beyond the water's edge. For evidence that this perception was inaccurate, see: Stephen Kull, I. M. Destler, and Clay Raynsay, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public* (College Park, MD: Center for International Security Studies, 1997).

¹⁸ See www.uia.org/homeorg.htm and www.uia.org/uiastats/stcnf98.htm. There are about 9,500 international meetings of these organizations, or other meetings with at least 300 participants (40%

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from the World Council of Churches and Catholic Relief Services to Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross, to almost every leading scientific and professional society;

of them foreigners) lasting at least three days, each year. For baseline data see: Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

Jackie Smith, "Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector," in *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*, ed. Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, *Syracuse Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997). For a discussion from the early days of the Internet: Chadwick Alger, "Transnational Social Movements, World Politics, and Global Governance," in *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*, ed. Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, *Syracuse Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997). Concerning the adequacy of NGOs to substitute for governmental institutions: Ann M. Florini, "Lessons Learned," in *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, ed. Ann M. Florini (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).

Kathryn Sikkink, "Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power," in *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, *Social Movements, Protest, and Contention* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). For a useful guide to early literature: Yahya A. Dehqanzada, "Annotated Bibliography," in *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, ed. Ann M. Florini (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).

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and alumni associations of leading American colleges and universities have growing international memberships. Many institutions have connections in international networks. As Richard Solomon, a former Director of Policy Planning at the U. S. Department of State, has written, nobody has waited for the U.S. Department of State: The mass media, the business community, the NGOs have their own links abroad.¹⁹

We also have a unique historical opportunity, a foundation that has not been available for the past five centuries: There is a new world of 120 democracies and open societies, and democracies almost never fight other democracies.²⁰ There is a new potential for

¹⁹ Quoted in Richard Burt, Olin Robison, and Barry Fulton, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age, CSIS Panel Reports, 0899-0352* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998) 47. See also L. David Brown et al., "Globalization, NGOs, and Multisectoral Relations," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, *Visions of Governance for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000). Julie Fisher, *Nongovernments: NGOs: And the Political Development of the Third World* (Kumarian Press, 1997). For early case studies of how NGOs use the Internet to increase their effectiveness: Craig Warkentin, *Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

²⁰ Number of democracies: Freedom House, *Tracking Democracy* (Freedom in the World: Tables and Charts) [Online] (www.freedomhouse.org, 2002 [cited May 2 2002]). There are 192 states, 86 (41% of the world's population) assessed as free, and 58

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good will, mutual respect, and democratic cooperation on a scale that has not existed before.

Democratic power does not necessarily change the surface appearance of formal institutions, as the social entrepreneur, Bill Drayton, emphasizes (quoted, above). In democratic states, there can be a broad consistency of values and interests between the government and its major institutions and people: a clash between the growth of the Internet and the foreign policy of governments seems unlikely for democratic states.²¹

(24%) as partially free : Freedom House, *World Population and Freedom Rating* (Freedom in the World: Tables and Charts) [Online] (www.freedomhouse.org, 2002 [cited May 2 2002]). Re democracies rarely fighting other democracies: Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). Early work includes: Bruce M/ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Reprint edition ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

²¹ Since I will not discuss inter-governmental initiatives, I want to emphasize that they can be very important. And governments can provide money, always welcome. However the realm of democratic power is primarily the linkup of many additional actors via new communications technologies. For a visionary discussion of new opportunities for multilateralism: John Gerard Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era, A Twentieth Century Fund Book* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). See also: Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). For democratic societies, a zero-sum argument about whether the state will win, or NGOs will win, or the people will win

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C. The Development of Democratic Power

The process of building democratic power operates in the same way beyond the water's edge as it does inside democracies. The key to democratic power is inspired vision, enrollment, and organizing. It has a natural fit with the skills of democratic societies and politics. In the hard power world, getting power is a focused, upwardly mobile career to secure position and privilege. By contrast, democratic power begins with listening and networking.

Thus, if America wants to become a post-Cold War world leader on the basis of *democratic* power, it must think of itself as running for the office. And if American politicians thereby operate with their native instincts for electoral politics beyond the water's edge, they can elicit voluntary support and move global agendas. Although it is not just governments and politicians that have this capability: any individual or institution with an enrolling vision, and a capacity to deliver, can be a leader.

Hard power is relatively primitive. The development and sustaining of democratic power requires more sophistication and knowledge.

For several, and perhaps many, practical projects to create a better world, this new dimension of democratic power will be more usable than America's hard power, however impressive it is. For example, Joseph Nye, a former State Department official and Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, describes the extent

(etc.) can be misleading: see the analogous discussion in Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Public and the Polity (1967)," in *Politics in Wired Nations: Selected Writings of Ithiel de Sola Pool*, ed. Lloyd S. Etheredge (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998).

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of America's hard economic power by the fact that, at the annual economic summit meetings of seven leading nations, the American GDP is about 45% of the total and equal to the GDP of the top three other attendees, combined.²² This is an impressive, but tricky statistic. Power exists in the mind, and - yes - leaders of other major countries or their publics might know and respond to such statistics by forming a unitary image of the United States, making a comparison with themselves, and deferring to US leadership.

Yet America is not a unitary actor personified in its President or the State Department: true, American GDP would assuredly be focused in a unified way in a time of war, or to combat terrorism or for vital interests. But any State Department official who is acting with his 45% idea of hard American power actually is speaking from a government that must fight for almost every penny of its non-military foreign affairs budget (except in an emergency); and is publicly known to have fought unsuccessfully for most of two Clinton Administrations for funds to pay UN dues. Any incantation that America has hard power superiority and it establishes a dominance ratio of we're number one and equal to the top three of you can be a dangerously self-deceptive American mind-set about power in the world. And especially when other national leaders are well informed of the political realities behind a State Department official's self-presentation.

The limitations of hard power can be observed in many cases. For example, in the spring of 2002, the Bush Administration exercised hard power in a highly impressive way in Afghanistan, using military firepower and money to extraordinary effect. Yet in April, 2002,

²² Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* 36..

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President George W. Bush called Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister of Israel, to end Israeli military operations against Palestinians and withdraw his forces without delay. President Bush also told Prime Minister Sharon (and leaked his phrase to the press) that he expected to see results. . .²³ And Prime Minister Sharon ignored President Bush, and within a week his supporters in America had organized demonstrations and strong pressure from Congressional leaders of both parties to strengthen President Bush's support for Israel.²⁴

In an historical perspective, we also may ignore the benefits of adding a new dimension of power at our peril. The global political process does not work as well as it should. While hard power is impressive, and it can, at times, win or deter war, it cannot secure the peace. In 1910, the British writer Norman Angell argued that modern weapons of war had become too destructive to use; it was no longer rational for nations to attempt to solve their differences by force. Norman Angell, the New York Times correspondent Thomas Friedman has noted, was right. But being right did not prevent World War I, or World War II, or wars since.²⁵ And the weapons of the 21st century will be even more destructive.

The potential for an evolving relationship between hard and

²³ David E. Sanger, "Mideast Turmoil: As Fighting Rages, Bush Demands Israeli Withdrawal," *The New York Times*, April 7 2002.

²⁴ Israel, too, is an example of how vast superiority in guns and economic resources does not provide peace or security.

²⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999) 197..

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democratic power can be seen in America's own history. Hard power played an essential role in the early wars for independence (1776 and 1812), in putting-down rebellions and in the Civil War, in the Westward expansion, and it continues to be essential in controlling crime. However, much of the greatness of America flows from the many institutions of democratic power in American society.²⁶ A challenge before us is whether the historical primacy of hard power in international politics can begin to evolve realistically, in a similar way. It is an opportunity that, with the capacity of new communication technologies, I think is worthwhile exploring.^{27 28}

III. An Outcome-Oriented Framework

²⁶ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). It remains unclear what additional data are required to interpret the increased flow of communications, and whether it has an independent effect on international relations. See Karl Deutsch's pioneering work, for which Shifts in the Balance of International Communication Flows (1956) in a good beginning: Karl W. Deutsch, *Tides among Nations* (New York: Free Press, 1979) 153-70.

²⁷ There is a long tradition of thinking about these issues, to which I cannot begin to do justice here. The reader may wish to consult: Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

²⁸ Nye has been a leader in urging attention to the growing role of soft power and credibility. His discussion is oriented toward foreign policy Establishments: Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* 74-76.

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The articulate value goals of mankind are remarkably uniform. In recent years they have been enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in countless speeches and public documents. It is not difficult to grasp the point that a world community adapted to the dignity of man provides opportunities for widespread rather than narrow participation in power, as in voting; in enlightenment, as in access to a dependable flow of information and scientific knowledge; in wealth, as in enjoyment of the benefits of technologies of production; in well being, as in safety, health and comfort; in skill, as in opportunity for the discovery and training of talent; in affection, as in opportunity for free choice of friends and marriage partners; in respect, as in recognition of fundamental humanity and of individual achievement; and in rectitude, as in opportunity for achieving a responsible relationship to life through religious and philosophic orientation.

- Harold D. Lasswell, *Toward World Community Now*²⁹

The challenge for planners, in Marshall McLuhan's phrase, is to look out of the windshield instead of the rear-view mirror.³⁰

²⁹ Harold D. Lasswell, "Toward World Community Now," in *Alternatives to Violence: A Stimulus to Dialogue*, ed. Larry Ng (New York: Time-Life Books, 1968), 124.

³⁰ Walter A. Hahn, "Futures in Politics and the Politics of Futures," in *What I Have Learned: Thinking About the Future Then and Now*, ed. Michael Marien and Lane Jennings (Westport, CT:

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One implication of this rule is to create a framework that enlists mutual cooperation rather than old categories of national self-interests.

The political scientist Harold Lasswell proposed a new kind of accounting for global progress, eight values (above) that can refine our analysis of global processes and who gets what, when, and how. Only one of the values (wealth) is traditionally measured by economists, but all of the values contribute to the quality of life (Table II-2).³¹

Greenwood Press, 1987), 124.

³¹ Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, *Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy*, 2 vols., *The New Haven Studies in International Law and World Public Order* (Boston, MA: M. Nijhoff, 1991).

Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman, and Andrew R. Willard, "The World Community: A Planetary Social Process," *U. C. Davis Law Review* 21, no. 3 (1988): 895-972. See also: John D. Montgomery and Alex Inkeles, eds., *Social Capital as a Policy Resource* (New York: Kluwer, 2001). Garry D. Brewer and Peter DeLeon, *Foundations of Policy Analysis* (New York: International Thompson Publishing, 1983). For a suggestive list of ten causal elements for a healthy world order (e.g., human rights, individual accountability, stewardship of nature) see: Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics* (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995) 241-55.

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Table II-2
The New World of Democratic Power:
The Capacity to Produce Outcomes in Eight Areas

Power
Enlightenment
Wealth
Well Being
Skill
Affection
Respect
Rectitude

Several additions might be possible.³² ³³ Yet I think it is a good

³² Value also can be created both ways: alongside receiving outcomes, people may achieve value in their lives by contributing along each of these dimensions to other people (e.g., to their education, or health, or conveying affection or respect).

³³ For example, 1.) Lasswell wrote before psychologists (such as Abraham Maslow and Lawrence Kohlberg) began to study processes of personal growth and development - and personal growth might be added as a separate category (or included under well-being); 2.) He left-out spiritual growth (i.e., a separate category than the psychology of personal growth), a possible category that probably is worth keeping in mind. And 3.) there is no explicit attention to esthetics. and beauty (he thought its creation to be primarily a skill) - it might be included more prominently at the discretion of the reader. Several of the goals (e.g., well-being) could be extended, again at the discretion of the reader, to include other

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checklist to begin fresh thinking about the issues in this second part, how the next level of the Internet could change the world.³⁴

IV. An Overview of Part II

To change the world requires concurrent engineering. Five types of innovations for cooperation and sharing can be added to the market systems for competition and selling:

- Chapter five: A Global Affairs Channel, modeled on our domestic CSPAN, to be a master catalyst for a constitutive (organizing) process for democratic power.
- Chapter six: A global purchasing cooperative and startup package to include Third World countries.
- Chapter seven: A new question-posing institution for democracies that uplifts and shifts the role of citizenship. It can be prototyped in the US by the National Science Foundation.
- Chapter eight: A national (and global) commitment to health quality. with broadcasting and Internet components that can begin in the United States and expand to benefit consumers worldwide.

animal species or the environment. Lasswell and McDougal, *Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy*.

³⁴ For a related approach: Amartya Kumar Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1999).

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- Chapter nine: A new world of high quality, large-scale collaboration systems (e.g., a global virtual library) and new financing mechanisms. These must have applications will be resources that, once created, everyone will want to have available. They can help to accelerate the S curve of innovation and benefits of the Internet's next level.

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