# Public Drama, Economic Growth, and the Agenda for Learning by Lloyd S. Etheredge

Because of the nature of the state, national political systems often address questions of economic policy by a confused blending of two different classes of models. This impasse-producing confusion has been especially notable in America since the early 1980s.

The confused intellectual jumble of economic policy debate arises because, historically, academic economists made a conceptual choice to base their analysis of the economy on the assumption of individuals who already have a maximum motivation for profit. This simplifying premise makes possible impressive mathematics and yields technical recommendations that focus priority attention upon such issues as the size of the federal deficit.

But this primordial assumption isolates academic economics in periods as, for example, the past decade - when political leaders sense that motivational issues, themselves, are critical. Thus, for example, President Reagan emphasized his commitment to restore a collective national self-confidence and revitalize entrepreneurial spirit by altering the relations of individuals to government, which (in the perception of his Party) had become too big, idealized, and distant, inducing dependency and reducing economic vitality and work motivation. His views had little credibility among the mainstream of the economics profession. They may or may not have been wise. But the policies had a rationale, and an integrity, that followed from different beliefs about human behavior and the relationship of hierarchical dramas (e.g., government) to collective psychology. (And they produced - the Republican party assured us in the last election - the longest period of sustained economic growth in our nation s history.)

Similarly, President Bush has spoken of the 1,000 points of light of individual energy and initiative, growing ever-brighter as we stay the course of his policies. Economic growth, the revitalization of voluntarism in our communities, and a growing self-confidence will be among the rewards if we resist the misguided clamor for major tax increases and an increase in the size of government.

Traditional social science accounts of such ideological thinking have often treated it dismissively, as ritualized (and relatively uninteresting) discussions of thinly disguised rationalizations of self-interest (etc.). When ideological thinking has been taken seriously, social scientists have still dealt in a highly abstract and abridged fashion with the mainstream ideological beliefs which shape public policy discussion in America. Rokeach, for example, treats conservatism, and the disagreements between conservatives and liberals, as arising from different rank orderings of values and the nature of such value differences, internal to the individuals, seems to provide meager opportunity for discussion or learning by testing beliefs about reality.<sup>1</sup>

However, recent developments in the descriptive language of psychoanalytic theory (self psychology and object relations theory), psychometric advances in the assessment of authority relations and psycho-social maturity, and the assessment of differences in social and political imagery, make it possible to recognize more clearly that behavioral science hypotheses (concerning the psychology of hierarchical dramas) are expressed by traditional ideological views. (There is a clinical psychologist s or psychiatrist s logic, as I will address below, to the diagnoses of dependency and the healing changes in hierarchical relationships which recent conservative Presidents seem to have in mind.) Thus the good news is dual: a.) ideological ideas may prove to have insight and value, notwithstanding their anthropological status as the public discourse of politicians untrained in academic social science; b.) Recent developments in social science provide new opportunities to test

national drama (ideological) models concerning the role of motivation in economic growth, and the role of political leadership in affecting motivation, and thus develop intellectually-integrated, ideologically-integrated, and politically-relevant models.<sup>6</sup>

To establish a framework, I will describe a revised model of man as a two-track decision maker. In this model the first track is rational and analytical decision making, the standard image extensively developed in micro-economic theory. The second track of the mind is the encoding of political information in imagination (e.g., drama), resulting in reciprocally-defined identities, emotional engagement and arousal, intuitive knowledge, and motivations which - as in the solution to a set of simultaneous equations - are jointly determined in an insular package.

First, I will describe the new analysis of ideologies I have in mind. Then I will use it to explain key features of the economic thinking and motivations of liberal activists and the free market conservatism of the Reagan-Bush administration. From these analyses, I will then draw lessons concerning the recycling basic themes (rather than learning) of policy debates.

#### IDEOLOGIES AS TYPES OF PUBLIC DRAMAS

To develop this model of decision makers as two-track processors, I first suggest the image in Figure 1, a general form of highly dramatized knowledge I will call a strong imagination system (SIS). Subjectively, the individual is located inside a larger-than-life drama facing forward and upward in perceiving government. By the term system, I refer to this entire creation: a.) a sense of self below; b.) the higher location, substantiality, and other qualities of the government image; c.) the motivational logic of the response encoded


by the nature of the drama. The adjective strong, refers to an image that has gone solid, become reified and so strong as to become reality.<sup>10</sup>

Table 1 develops this general form into a class of second-track, strong imagination system models. I will describe the logic of these cells briefly, and next turn to a detailed description of the 2B and lB systems, the two different (often, competing) dramatic constructions of political reality which have established the central terms of public debate in the United States in this century.<sup>11</sup>

[Figure 1, Table 1 about here]

# FIGURE 1:

A MODEL OF POLITICAL DRAMA



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TABLE 1

TYPES OF POLITICAL IDRAMAS

Subjective tie	Vividly-Dramatized Qualities of Images Above the Self		
	SIS-1. Gov't. aggressive. controlling, hostile	SIS-2. Gov't. caring, good, generous	SIS-3. Secular
close			
"Loyalty"	A. Authoritarian	A. Quiescent & Loyal	A. Elite Game Player
"Voice"	B. Rebellious victim (radical, free market, conservative)	B. Liberal activist	B. Spectator
"Exit"	C. <u>Underworld</u>	C. Anomic Despair	C. Apolitical
unconnected			
Key psychology	fight/flight; image pathology : paranoia	dependency; image pathology: suicidal despair	secular society

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#### SIS - 1:OLD TESTAMENT GOD

The first column is a government potentially harmful to the self - harsh, controlling, inhibiting, and vigilant to detect deviance from high standards and commandments. An archetype (to use Jung s phrase) is the God of wrath and vengeance on the Old Testament: such a drama generates intimidated loyalty or other *fight-flight* responses to potential danger of three subtypes.

## 1A: Authoritarian

System IA is the traditional authoritarian system.<sup>12</sup> The knower s sense of self is closely allied with the restrictive authority of a strong government. He shapes his behavior by inward flight (repression) to effect control and maintain security. Society is held together by discipline from above. Shaping-up someone s behavior, law and order - Mrs. Thatcher s preference of discipline - are the policy solutions of choice.

## 1B: Rebellious Victim

System 1B dramatizations reflect partly unreliable control over a higher, partly inimical government: in these dramas political activists react against the experience of being a victim or potential victim. Both radicals and free-market conservatives, while sometimes portrayed as logical opposites, share 1B dramatizations.

I return to a detailed analysis of this dramatic form of reality which elicits free-market conservatism. It can be illustrated here by noting the zero-sum logic involved which, to a psychologist, marks an underlying imagination encoding - for example, freed om is a zero-sum experience in this mode: free e nterprise is defined by the exclusion of government, which is typically experienced as seeking to intrude its control and tell people what to do. As President Gerald Ford cautioned, a government strong enough to give us

everything we want is strong enough to take everything we have.

With a different twist, radicals also live inside a IB drama. Leftist revolutionaries tell us they seek to overthrow a government. By a two-track interpretation, they are not motivated by abstract ideas but by an extraordinarily vivid image above them which is absent to men and women of other political persuasions. For revolutionaries, the dramatized reality of the state (or capitalism) is the reality of Moby Dick to Ahab: a persecuting, demeaning presence they are self-defensively driven to destroy to restore human dignity and achieve peace of mind.

#### 1C: Underworld

A third imagination system reflects an experience of a hostile, capricious, dog-eat-dog, and hierarchical reality in which there is no method to control or reliably defend against the inimical use of power by people in authority whose interests oppose those of the individual. The logic in such an underworld is that, to remain secure, one must avoid being noticed by people in power. Reciprocally, government authority has no reliable mechanism of psychological control (it is not internalized) save for fear of punishment if an individual happens to be observed and apprehended.

#### SIS - 2: NEW TESTAMENT GOD

The second major type of dramatic sensibility which energizes, and gives the logic to, conventional forms of policy thinking is the fundamentally different experience that American government is beneficial to, and nurturant of, the self. It is - or can be - a government which truly cares, as good as its people - solicitous, loving, generous and bountiful, empowering and organizing economic growth by its leadership, imparting inspiration and transcendent grace to one s life.

# 2A: Quiescently Loyal

Inside political drama of type 2A the knower is closely integrated with an experience of an ideal government which embodies his will - thus, the psychology of the quiescently loyal. It is perhaps a dim current memory, but this experience of reality apparently characterized American democracy during much of the 1950s when over 90% of the population felt that, all of the time or most of the time, government could be trusted to do the right thing.

# 2B: Progressive (Liberal) Activists

The second type 2 system is characteristic of liberal activists who do not yet experience the needed blessings that could flow from government. (I will discuss 2B liberal activists in more detail in the next section.)

# 2C: Anomie and Depression

Citizens in 2C are inside a drama deserted of love and wholly bereft of inspiring, effective guidance from government. They are not called to activism - government offers no hope. They are disillusioned. We are alone and abandoned on the barren, windswept landscapes of modernity. Nothing will work. It is a depressed, disillusioned, anomic sensibility, a lapse, finally, into despair and depression, the individual dependent and needful, yet in a world void of anything one can depend upon, or look to with hope for fulfillment or charismatic rescue.<sup>13</sup>

#### SIS-3: SECULAR REALITY

Late in the day - but only late in the day - does a diminution of second-track dramatizations allow a comparatively greater play for rational faculties. SIS-3 is a secular

reality in which governments set the rules and see (more or less) that these are observed, but such rules are pragmatic and secular agreements, created by human beings, not moralistic or charismatic injunctions from a higher location. The individual is more fully independent and autonomous, no longer psychologically integrated into a strong and politically subordinate dramatization and does not merely react emotionally. He is more rational and pragmatic, assessing evidence, thinking of alternative theories, models, and ends-means relationships.

## 3A: Elite Game Player

3A is an elite participant actively engaged in an arena of secular games. An example is the professional socialization of lawyers: beginning law students may have SIS-1 or SIS-2 experiences of the law or judges, deferring to them as metaphysical presences with fear, exalted admiration, or both. But as they grow up (subjectively) to become professionals, such dramatizations simultaneously dissolve and they experience the law as a secular contest between lawyers, a process of reasoning and persuading other men and women (judges and juries) in an everyday reality; they become realistic, objective, more strategic in their argumentation.

### 3B: Spectators

A less involved subjective location is a relationship to politics from greater distance with less personal involvement, as a spectator to a sports team, engaging in pragmatic commentary about merits and strategies of different players. (American newsmen may often relate to government within this drama.)

## 3C: Apolitical

Type 3C reflects apolitical citizenship. Politics is subjectively distant, neither dramatized in the imagination nor salient (nor even experienced to be related to life).

With this overview, I next turn to a detailed description of two second-track policy systems which create imperatives for economic (and other) policies, liberal activists and free-market conservatism.

#### EXPANDING THE ANALYSIS: 2B AND 1B

# 2B: THE LIBERAL ACTIVIST CASE

As discussed briefly above, the liberal activist (2B) drama is assembled jointly by liberal activists sense of themselves and a distinctive experience of government. Liberal activists experience the federal government not simply as men and women in Washington, but primarily to be a substantial presence located above their sense of themselves and above society as a whole. They encode this strong government image with a primarily benevolent power, whose full potential has not been realized.

In liberal activists, beneath government, a deficient sense of themselves faces upward and forward. The self feels deprived of, and in need of, qualities government could provide - specifically needful of being recognized, loved, empathetically mirrored, and uplifted by it. Thus the liberal activist agenda expresses itself in an effort, through both magical and practical action, to empower fully and elicit the charismatic, loving, solicitous potential of such idealized images so these higher powers of an affirmative government connect to, nurture, and inspirit the (lower) selves of all of us within its purview. The a priori confidence that government can do this arises because imagination systems are zero-sum; as Hegel might appreciate, the unrealized potential of an affirmative government mirrors exactly the imagined needs of the people. The need and the potential for fulfillment are two dialectical halves, in the imagination, of a future whole.

Thus, while liberals often have an affinity to the activist government associated with Keynesian economics, the attraction does not derive from economists equations alone. The associational logic of the dramatic model used by liberal activists can be further explored through an analysis of five themes:<sup>14</sup>

# 1. Construction of, and Preoccupation with, Political Life Imagined Vertically

As I have suggested, 2B systems create a reality of societies structured as hierarchical dramas. Government is above us, here in America. Beneath it, the liberal looks outward and upward from his (or her) point of origin, a subjective sense of self-vaguely, and sometimes slightly desperately, unfulfilled and needful of the benevolent power which the government presence is experienced to embody in material form. At a par with him- or herself, and even further below, are most of the rest of us, needful of care, rescue, and vitalization. The poor, whales, dolphins, wolves, students, women, children, Blacks, or other disadvantaged minorities stand in this needful imaginative (social and psychological) location. In foreign policy thinking, underdeveloped countries, and especially their poor, are typically located lower than the liberal activist in a vertical dramatization of international relationships.

Within this drama, the motivational logic for redemption and progress is to effect beneficence from above to nurture the welfare of those below. The plan is to secure progress via both downward and upward movement. First, to make government more caring, responsible for economic opportunity and growth, more compassionate, generous, better managed, closer to the people, and improve outreach programs as it faces downward and outward toward those lower in society and in the world; second, an effort to use power from above to uplift those beneath to a place in the sun where they will feel respect, recognition, empowered, confirmed in the value of their existence. U pward mobility economic and social prescriptions reflect the imagined blessings (already

encoded) of upward movement, as those afflicted with depression, despair, and partly transparent existence become fulfilled through a social and economic transformation which is, at its core, a transformation and rescue of morale and spirit.

# 2. Underlying Alienation, Despair, Fear of Catastrophe

Unfulfilled dependency in the liberal activist is associated with the complaint of partial alienation, an alienation the liberal activist is striving to change. The claim that the meaning of life is deficient, and partly absent, is the experience that the set of animistic images located above the self (ideas and institutions) are inadequately charismatic, inadequately inspiring, inadequately uplifting.

Inside this drama there is a moderate amount of separation anxiety, a feeling some people have when they are lost on country roads without a road map: worry, frustration, despair, disorientation - as if they are apart from society and cannot get their bearings a fear of coming apart, too, themselves.<sup>15</sup> Liberal activists express this tendency to feel lost, despairing, and uncertain about their own identities within historical and social coordinates (see below, on intellectual quests) even though, of course, they know full well where they, and other people, are located physically.

Unfortunately, our government's capacity to let its face shine upon the people and give us peace is not yet realized, in the 2B drama. A feared loss of the potential to effect such rescue, and its present problematic character, make the liberal activists fear catastrophe should government cease its efforts or be unable to cope: without a strong, bold, effective and charismatic government, liberal activists worry that the partially realized coherence of their identities, the components of their sense of self (and our national identity) would disintegrate and lapse in despair. A response characteristic of liberal activists to the question, How would you feel if you stopped trying to make a better world? is I feel as

though I would come apart.

# 3. Attraction to Charismatic Leaders and Integrating Intellectual Formulations.

Because liberal activists think of policy issues from within a strong imagination system, they seek to evoke and nurture the psychological and spiritual well-being of themselves, as well as of society, in dramatic, symbolic action, as well as by practical solutions. Of primary, and often exclusive, importance is that governments empower society by dramatized statements of caring: commitments, new programs (every year) that will spend money doing something for constructive purposes. The restless haste of liberal activists, with their sense of time claustrophobia and their desire that government always do more, has a driven quality. This displaced need to bring together and hold together elements of their own selves may compel manic-depressive patients in mental hospitals to save the world on a minor scale through such ritualized projects as hyperactive dusting and cleaning; in a similar way, liberal activists projects are driven by the logic of a dramatic form that is independent from rational analysis about exactly how efficient or effective the objective outcome will be.

The quest to realize the power of higher ideals for the well-being of the people extends to charismatic leaders; and it attaches to compellingly attractive, albeit vaguely defined, ideas of progress: these images (above and forward) are also attributed power to rescue the nation if only they can be brought fully to life and merged with the people (e.g., by going faster into the future). Another manifestation of hope and underlying despair is the attraction to novel ideas about well-being: the political actor with a 2B script may seize each hopeful development with euphoric enthusiasm (the strength of the enthusiasm expressing the inner desperation of the need), as if this will provide rescue. Science and technology can also be created as idealized images whose blessings then are sought. As the high hopes for each new Democratic President and the progressive liberal reforms in

government budgeting -PPB, ZBB, MBO - are recent examples in political life, so too, in other areas of activists lives, are jogging, health foods, gourmet cooking, transcendental meditation, est, new psychotherapies and consciousnesses, all of which are experienced hopefully as sources of excitement, rescue, surcease for the spirit, and fulfillment of the self s well-being and needs for growth and self-actualization. (For some of my subjects this quest includes, too, cycling through love affairs and marriages, with early idealization and excitement ever giving way to disillusionment.) Such activities may have practical benefits, but they are also seized to ward off and deal self-therapeutically with impending catastrophe and demoralization that threaten to manifest themselves without continually new sources of hope and reassurance.

Liberal activists also show energetic attraction to words and theories, reflecting the drama they are inside. The quantity of talk and writing reflects a hierarchical encoding: ideas, images, theories, and words are located above the sense of the self and liberals activists thus seek love, empathy, and an integrating solicitude from overarching symbolic formulations. They have a wish to be understood by theory, to create theories which understand us.

In second-track modeling, the dramatic forms of the needed and effective solutions are already known a priori. Thus the Democratic Party (assigning to government the responsibility for economic growth) now seeks a national industrial growth strategy while still searching for the intellectual details it will contain. But if the natural (psychological) extension of a liberal activist s political economy projects is socialism it is not, as lawyers might construe it, a matter of legal changes on a piece of paper. It is truly a spiritual quest to create a coherent, empathetic government presence above us all, caring about us, and personally connected with us in a welfare state. And so, too, the natural (psychological) extension of the liberal activist s hierarchical intellectuality is empathetically accurate,

compassionate, integrated intellectual policy formulations that care about us, mirror us, and give us a perspective to recognize ourselves in context. Such an achievement is known, a priori, to be the key to creating the control, confident and coherent identity, and perspective that we all need in our lives.

Thus, one of the further seductions of the socialist dream is that it will realize a utopian society (self) that is organized coherently and integrated harmoniously. Rational economic and social planning is a central commitment, but the term rational - as used by liberal activists in economic policy - is infused by a special kind of imagining and has a distinctive meaning: government institutions will be the rational overmind of the new, more coherent and harmonious, collective identity. Indeed, one way liberal activists I interviewed in Washington define and recognize a problem, and a need for government extension, is by the lack of rational intellectual coherence in areas of national life (the welfare system, fifty different state health systems). The inferential logic is: below and unorganized = demoralized.

### 4. <u>Idealism and the Fate of Aggression</u>

Compared with other strong imagination systems, a distinctive liberal altruism and idealism are manifest in special solicitude for disadvantaged groups, in vicarious and empathetic suffering on their behalf, and in identity transformation efforts, both practical and symbolic, to eliminate from life greed, selfishness, virulent hatred, callousness, repression, brutality, and other sources of disharmony thought to arise from people s lack of mutual understanding. Because there are people out there who are suffering, it can be a good guide to humane, compassionate progress.

In liberals, altruism is allied with guilt, aggression turned against the self, in the conviction that deficiencies in the self are responsible for the lack of fulfilling nurturance

from above. (If only I worked harder...). And, since they participate in their created experience of government so closely, liberal activists feel personal responsibility for, and a special guilt about, their government s inaction in the face of the world s problems.

There is one additional source of the quest for redemption through idealistic activism: the mutual identification and rapport linking liberal activists needful and vulnerable sense of themselves with their images of the disadvantaged or victimized elicits, in addition to genuine compassion, an anticipatory self-defense motive. Liberal activists imagine themselves to be potential victims, as others have become victims.

Their imagination-encoded logic to create a better world leads liberal activists to be skeptical of (in some cases to reject) market capitalism - 1.) in part because they imagine businessmen to be aggressive, lacking in genuine idealistic commitment, and selfish - characteristics they reject and seek to overcome in themselves, and in an improved common (human) identity and wish to eliminate to create a more harmonious world; 2.) because the market system, and its large organizations, are thought to treat people impersonally and make them victims; <sup>16</sup> 3.) they fear themselves vulnerable to be victims in a world run by predatory businessmen; 4.) because they believe the failure of the market system to solve the nation s and world s problems already reflects both deficiency of organization and planning and a deficient moral commitment to progress. And alongside businessmen, failure of other people and institutions in American society, at state and local levels, to have created a humanitarian utopia already means they do not care enough: thus such people are also assigned a flawed moral standing when protesting against a growing federal role that restricts their freedom.

## 5. Bi-polar activism

A final feature of 2B liberal activism is its bi-polar character. That is, liberal activism can

be politically unreliable. The haste and euphoric enthusiasm are susceptible to a switch mechanism, and liberal activists episodically stall-out and shift to an underlying despair and disillusion when idealistic involvements are not being realized.<sup>17</sup> They also put their political leaders through a similar roller-coaster ride: one might recall the brief Draft Ted Kennedy bubble of several years ago, the passing enthusiasm of the John Anderson campaign, the evolution of Jimmy Carter to Jimmy Who? <sup>18</sup>

- I have described the second-track, dramatic nature of liberal activist involvements; in a two-track model, political conduct will also involve the rational pursuit of interests. The traditional liberal coalition of the Democratic Party has united many groups - labor, Blacks, Jews, the poor, college-educated intellectuals, etc.- whose common orientation is that they all look to an affirmative government for the protection of their rights and to further their interests, and often have done so with realism.

#### 1B FREE-MARKET POLITICAL ECONOMY: PRESIDENT REAGAN

President Reagan's approach to economic policy illustrates, in pure form, the type of zero-sum (often, Republican) necessities I have located in cell IB. He was a practicing psychologist and used ideas familiar to psychoanalysts and clinical psychologists to diagnose the problems of the American economy and design a course of treatment.<sup>19</sup>

The President's perceived national drama was simple. He believed our economy's lack of vitality was produced because government had become a powerful, substantial presence above us here in America. Over the past thirty years as, in our national imagination, government became bigger, we grew comparatively smaller to develop a national dependence. There was a zero-sum effect: as it (government) assumed more

responsibility in national life, we (the people) took less. The work ethic disintegrated; productivity increases stopped; the economy stalled.

This is not a conventional academic economic sensibility based on ideas of freestanding individuals and rational choices. It is a psychological model, of national drama and group psychology, which assumes strong imagination encoding and dramatic entrapment throughout the general population.

The President's economic policy followed logically: He must provide national counseling and psychotherapy for a depressed, passive nation that expected its therapists to have a prompt and magical solution.

To effect the change he desires, our President-counselor sought a changed national psychodrama to create open space, to inspire us, and to dissolve our idealized illusions. He was warm and supportive. He tried to cut taxes and domestic expenditures to make government above us smaller. Curing our dependency may not be a process we would like, and there would be painful withdrawal symptoms, but we must again take responsibility for our own lives.

From personal experience, Dr. Reagan knew he was right. The dire predictions of his theory, made thirty years ago, appeared correct to him. In his autobiography, Where s the Rest of Me?, he described how he, too, was once misguided and dependent, in his case on the Hollywood studio system. He was well paid but unhappy, reading scripts written by others, never given the leading dramatic roles he hoped to play. But then he became more assertive, struck out on his own. And as he became his own man, life started to work for him. He made a successful second marriage. Speaking his own ideas, he was elected Governor of California. Then, he achieved the leading role in the country.

Other aspects of the President's life and experience confirmed the same basic truths. He enjoyed exhilaration, and a sense of freedom, when he rode the open range on horseback, the experience of the open range for free entrepreneurship he told us we would regain in our national psychology by cutting back that big government in the sky. When he escaped to California from Washington and cleared brush on his ranch, he felt recharged. He knew we would feel that way too, if we stayed the course to effect the national psychological transformation we needed.

To be sure, this was a closed (and internally consistent) system of beliefs. Evidence was always interpreted in the light of what the President calls his basic principles. If results were slow to appear, it only meant problems of dependency and addiction to big government were deep in our national psyche. So he was under an even greater obligation to persevere until we regained our independence and self-confidence and restarted the economy. Given the reality and internal logic of drama lB. he had no choice.

I underscore my interpretation that free-market conservatives are not speaking in abstract theories or metaphors. President Reagan knew he was talking about reality: solid, strong constituents of individual imaginations so powerful in their effects as to destroy the health of a multi-trillion dollar economy and enervate our national spirit. And his theories - and those of Bush and Quayle - reflect ideas many psychologists have voiced seriously in the past: psychoanalysts for example, have told us that, via transference, many people relate to government authority, in our mass psychology, the way as children they regarded magically powerful parents.<sup>20</sup>

#### **OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS**

I want to make several observations about the idea of two-track processing and then turn

to lessons for intellectual investment and learning.

The two-track image, and this class of drama-entrapment models, use recent advances in the descriptive language of psychoanalytic (self) psychology to create a new theory of ideologies. Liberals or conservatives do not merely show different attitudes toward a common reality or express different values. They disagree with one another, almost wholly, in their experience (directly and personally known) of objective national reality, the psychology bonding American citizens with their government. But they both agree about the overriding importance (and existence) of a national group psychology. Both seek economic and social progress by reparative changes inside hierarchically-encoded dramas they believe all of us to inhabit. Both camps, at core, are psychologists and believe individual energy and spirit are key to economic growth and vitality. Both tell us that the most powerful and activating policies for economic growth would address current problems located in the psychology of national hierarchical relationships. De facto, they both consider secondary the economists solely first-track notions of autonomous individuals with already-fixed motivations (at a maximum for profit-seeking), and the advice of economists is used only selectively. 22

- Political scientists have been asleep amidst this dramatic, long-standing, and consequential public debate concerning the nature of the American political system. The attitude measures of the discipline are not interpretable to measure objects of perception and address issues of strong imagery, dramas of entrapment, and emotional bonding. As one of my colleagues summarized the problem, we really don t know whether there is anything [i.e., solid, emotionally engaging] up there, an unsettling admission, as the question concerns the nature of American political reality; I know of no American government textbook which is sufficiently candid about this current impotence of the political science profession to evaluate critically these key ideological (especially,

conservative) beliefs concerning the nature of reality.<sup>23</sup> There are no relevant numbers that can be given to Congress, which is appalling.<sup>24</sup>

- However, the Council of Economic Advisers has not been awake and alert either. President Reagan's kindly patronizing toward mainstream professional economists had a justification: they have been ignoring his model of society, and he believed - and could offer evidence to support the belief (e.g., two terms as President, coming from a minority wing of a minority party; a 49-state win in the most recent election) - that he understood people, the simple and basic themes of life, and what makes things happen in American society, better than they did. 25 Economists - and with a certain arrogance - have not developed the appropriate numbers, to add to current national income accounts, that would evaluate the Republican Party's competing model, monitor the pathways by which coefficients might be affected, or refine the implementation of what they believe to be an unnecessary agenda for empowerment.<sup>26</sup> The political scientists confession, We really don t know whether there s anything up there would have to be the economists as well. To be sure, if the CEA adapted existing measures in psychology and officially published a National Dependency Index, the fat would be in the fire. But it should be. And if the World Bank addressed the beliefs of free-market conservatives that enjoin privatization of foreign aid by testing dependency models with appropriate psychological measures, this would make for vigorous debate - and, in the long term, for more intelligent and sensible American thinking about international economic relations. <sup>27</sup>

- Two-track models structure an agenda to repair a breakdown in intellectual integrity and restore serious standards of evidence to public discussion, an opportunity for the basic research applied to national needs that foundations and funding agencies seek, and an opportunity to stir things up, constructively, in the academic world.<sup>28</sup> Obviously, there is the overall question of whether the free-market conservative s model of imagination

entrapment has external validity, applies to 2% of the people, or to 98%. But I would expect an inquiry also to refine thinking about a variety of useful issues. For example: 1.) After the evidence is in, the choice probably will not be either/or, whether to scrap the motivationally fixed, autonomous (and rational) individual of economic theory. If people are, indeed, twotrack processors, the evidence will probably show merit to both sensibilities, that there is a national drama component (perhaps, especially, for some people more than others) of macro-economic policy and this might be used to boost performance at the margin - and a 1 % annual boost in the rate of GNP growth would be an extraordinarily useful (\$60 billion/year) result; 2.) Our current knowledge of imagination and motivation suggests a (liberal) role model effect may be stronger than a dependency effect. Thus, for example, it might be useful to prescribe Kennedy-style achievement imagery, whether or not the federal budget is intended to grow. The Gipper, we might recall, did not smile and wave and get on the plane for his California ranch - he asked people to win one for him; <sup>29</sup> 3.) It may be that dependency or susceptibility to imagination effects are especially strong in underdeveloped countries with low levels of literacy and making the transition from traditional authority, or among the young.

- The strong imagination systems I have described are implicitly created and sustained by the nature of the state and inherently insular. The liberal agenda, with its hope for idealistic American leadership in the world, affords a greater attention to international economic policies and foreign aid, but the commitments are weaker than one might wish, and they can be unreliable. The Alliance for Progress commitment came apart, just as the current long-term economic aid program for Central America has failed to achieve strong bipartisan support.

Given the current primacy of the 1B model of macro-economic psychology, the prognosis is not good, and it is unlikely there will be any conceptual learning or major

change in American domestic or international economic policy, especially if it requires sustained White House leadership. The prognosis on the international side may be especially poor, as the preoccupation to cut back big government in the sky is a wholly internal preoccupation. In the political psychology of lB thinkers, the economic realities of relations with the rest of the world, less dramatized than the domestic, are peripheral concerns.

A great deal of what we would like to accomplish domestically, and internationally, is hostage to the current inability to clarify, and reach broader consensus concerning, these two classes of models. Given the lack of agreement and coherent policy for domestic growth issues - an impasse in which neither class of models is adequately implemented - the President is probably too optimistic. Thus, funding for American foreign economic assistance and other international humanitarian concerns is likely to diminish further. As a rule, if one wants more money for affirmative, humanitarian programs, elect 2B liberals. However, even if a liberal activist administration should be elected soon (and it is problematic), faced with the untouchables of national defense, interest on the debt, and the large built-in costs of entitlement programs as American society ages and health inflation continues, it will have little political ability to spend significant additional sums.<sup>31</sup>

To dissolve the impasse, I believe we must test the validity of these second-track, macro-economic psychology, models for thinking about the general population. It may be a bit unsettling to do so. The enterprise is reminiscent of the movie <u>Harvey</u> in which a leading man spends much of the movie talking to - and about - a remarkable 6-foot white rabbit who is invisible to the audience and to everyone else. As we contemplate talking seriously with people about their experience of government - how big it is, where it is, how personally involved they have become with it, whether the energy level with which they wake up in the morning is affected by its size? - we face an enterprise in which we will

appear a bit odd and naive. To those who do not see any 6 white rabbit, we are in the position of seeming to take seriously, and give credence to, an odd species of political hallucination. To those who do see the 6 rabbit, and have known him for years, a researcher - puzzling seriously about whether he is there at all - may seem equally naive and odd. An inquiry is going to be unsettling, especially as it promises to rattle some cages of reality and to conclude who is right and who is wrong concerning matters about which many politically active and concerned people feel deeply. 33

I suggest, however, that the inquiry will be constructively unsettling. Beyond its empirical benefits for straightening-out economic thinking generally, I see special value for improving international economic policy. My reasoning is the following:

Psychologists have a great deal of experience with the primary agenda that, perhaps more deeply than we now recognize, both liberals and free-market conservatives share, the conditions to foster healthy, strong and independent individuals (i.e., that economists assume Americans already are).<sup>34</sup> The wisdom of doing this humanistic work via arguing about national economic policy aside, I suggest both sides have missed a larger perspective.

In Figure 1, I drew a rectangle around a picture of strong imagination systems and labeled the rectangle, itself, Self. The reason is that one current psychological view of personal growth focuses on the conception of ego integration. <sup>35</sup> That is, each of the intense dramas portrayed in Table 1 reflects a single capacity of human imagination and experience, a single set of emotional preoccupations, each of which is intensified and expanded to become a limited sense of self and of reality to the exclusion of other capacities. Each strong imagination system, generated inherently by the nature of the state, is self-limited and has something missing as a basis for intelligent and effective policy -for example, a blocking of compassion and solicitude to victims in the conservative market (1B)

system, a lack of tough-mindedness and critical skepticism about the capacities of large government institutions in the liberal activist system (2B). Likewise, the capacity for rationality, itself, is purely technocratic and lacks both humane purpose and moral imagination. The instinct of the psychologist is to suggest that the desired answer, apart from overdramatizations, is the capacity for all of the above. A thoughtful understanding of the nature and (partial) validity of these dramatic models for public policy will itself expand and strengthen people s humanity. <sup>36</sup>

That result also follows from a simple clarification that the individual is not inside these boxes (and never has been) but is the clearing (as it has been called) within which these (only apparently) larger-than-life dramas show-up. The inquiry itself is an invitation that implicitly enhances the inquirer and can, in the best liberal arts tradition, call forth and empower men and women of greater stature.<sup>37</sup>

Over 50 years ago Oscar Jaszi introduced his classic study, The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy, with an observation by Goethe, that there comes a point where, so to speak, a man comes to stand above the nations and to feel the good fortune or distress of his neighbor people as if it had happened to his own. <sup>38</sup> Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, discussing the Marshall Plan and the unusually fertile period of American foreign policy after World War II, entitled his memoirs, Present at the Creation; <sup>39</sup> I suggest a phenomenon occurred in those years similar to that noted by Goethe, that the political realities of post-war Europe, and their own successful leadership during the war, empowered a generation of post-war leaders with an unconventional, and distinctive experience of their own stature, a location for relating to the world, and questions of policy, that freed imagination and motivation from the insular subjective lock-ins of conventional national dramatic forms. If a reader glimpses, around the fringes of this analysis of insularity and self-blockage in American policy learning, a larger enterprise concerned with

the subjectivity of political statesmanship, he or she will be right: even the liberal activist commitments we typically see, and have become accustomed to accept in the American political system, have been too weak to play the strong, constructive role that I would like to see and that would be in America s own, rational, self-interest.

Thus, by addressing the issues of two-track models, I suggest we are placing bets in a bigger game, and with larger stakes than money. My bet is that the most potent investment in the future of learning in domestic and international economic policy is an inquiry into the public drama of who we are, and who - as a result of the curriculum in social sciences and our examination of these issues - our students recognize themselves to be. By this diagnosis, when our economics and political science texts expand to integrate a rigorous empathy concerning these second-track, national drama models of economic growth, we will -whatever the empirical results reported - be inviting a growth of a generation of citizens and leaders who are able to integrate tough-mindedness (SIS-1), compassion and idealism (SIS-2), a capacity for secular ends-means analysis (SIS-3), and are freer to use these capacities for more-integrated policy analysis, for economic growth, and to look outward with the motives and attention required for constructive and sustained international policy.<sup>40</sup>

In sum, we are running a multi-trillion dollar economy, with insular preoccupations, without testing the models used to set policy. Obviously this is stupid, although the reasons are deep and the motives behind them deserve to be honored.<sup>41</sup>

It is not clear how many centuries elapsed between the time men first argued seriously the shape of the earth - in societies technically capable of sailing to its alleged ends - and those consequential years when, finally, somebody tested reality. Perhaps 18 centuries of back-and-forth arguments between flat-earth theorists and round-earth theorists? Once

and economic performance may prove as consequential in their resolution as the Michelson-Morley experiment in physics to test for the existence of ether, or these earlier arguments concerning the shape of the physical world. One hopes reality-testing by social scientists can be occur more rapidly than waiting for an additional 18 centuries of argument.

### Notes

- 1. Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (NY: Basic Books, 1973).
- 2. See Heinz Kohut, <u>The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders</u>. (NY: International Universities Press, 1971) and his <u>The Restoration of the Self</u> (NY: International Universities Press, 1977).
- 3. E. g., Jane Loevinger with A. Blasi. <u>Ego Development</u> (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1976); David Winter. David McClelland, and Abigail Stewart, <u>A New Case for the Liberal Arts: Assessing Institutional Goals and Student Development</u>. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass, 1981).
- 4. E. g., D. Cartwright, Jan L. Jenkins, R. Chavez, and H. Peckar, Studies in Imagery and Identity, <u>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</u>, 44:2 (1983), pp. 376-384.
- 5. See also the argument of Steven Lukes, On the Social Determination of Truth, in Michael T. Gibbons (Ed.), <u>Interpreting Politics</u> (NY: New York University Press, 1987), pp. 64-81. Also in R. Horton and R. Finnegan (Eds.), <u>Modes of Thought: Essays on</u>

<u>Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies</u> (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 230 - 248.

- 6. The use of self psychology will also clarify an inherent insularity and difficulty in the creation and sustaining of international economic policies in the national self-interest.
- 7. See Lloyd Etheredge and James Short, Thinking About Government Learning, Management Studies, 20:1 (1983), pp.41-58 and Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn: American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions. (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1985), esp. pp. x xi and 87 for basic references in the government learning field. This book-length study of Third World military intervention develops a two-track model (a top-down power drama) to aid understanding of policy repetition, despite earlier failure of the policy.
- 8. Evidence of the physiological basis of the two modes is discussed in Richard Restak, <u>The Brain</u>. (NY: Bantam, 1984), esp. pp. 237- 269. The practical importance of the distinction for therapy and learning is developed in R. Bandler and J. Grinder, <u>The Structure of Magic.</u> 2 volumes. Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books, 1975. See also Donald L King, <u>Conditioning: An Image Approach</u> (NY: Halsted Press, 1979), A. Paivio, <u>Imagery and Verbal Processes</u>. (NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), Mardi Horowitz, <u>Image Formation and Psychotherapy</u> (NY: Jason Aronson, 1983). Imagination is an individual-difference variable. Some people lack it thus, the validity of applying ideological models to other people is, appropriately, an empirical question.
- 9. The postulate that the government image, like an authority, is reified and located above the self is the direct linkage between this account and clinical analyses.

- 10. See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, <u>The Social Construction of Reality</u>. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966).
- 11. I.e., voice I have added this term from Hirschman, and his two other terms exit, and loyalty, in the left column. Note that each of these responses has three possible bases. Albert 0. Hirschman Exit. Voice. and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms. Organizations. and States. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). The schema is informed by various traditions in the behavioral sciences and reflects a language for integrating similar concerns addressed in several fields. With the shift of language, and addition of two horizontal levels, the schema is similar to that used by the British object relations school of psychoanalytic theory (especially Bion and Klein). See for example, W. R. Bion, Experiences in Groups and Other Papers (NY: Ballentine, 1975), H. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. rev. ed. (NY: Basic Books, 1973). This dramatic interpretation of deprivation motivation portrayed in columns 1 and 2 can be seen to correspond to deficiencies in security and respect addressed by A. Maslow, e.g., Power Relationships and Patterns of Personality Development in A. Kornhauser (Ed.), <u>Problems</u> of Power in American Democracy (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1957). Relationships of this framework with other traditions in behavioral science are discussed in Lloyd Etheredge, Larger-Than-Life Problem s: the Citizen, the State, and Policy (Unpublished, 1983).
- 12. For discussions see, for example, J. P. Kirscht and R. C. Dillehay, <u>Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory</u>. (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1967) and Robert W. Altemeyer, <u>Right Wing Authoritarianism</u> (Winnipeg, Canada: University of Manitoba Press, 1981.
- 13. For a recent review, see Melvin Seeman, Alienation Studies in Alex Inkeles et al.

- (Eds.), Annual Review of Sociology. (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, 1975), pp. 91-123.
- 14. This section presents the main themes outlined in Lloyd Etheredge, Strong Imagination Systems: The Liberal Activist Case. Unpublished xerox, 1983. See that exploratory study for a discussion of 57 characteristics and a comparison with previous theories.
- 15. See, for example, S. DeGrazia, <u>The Political Community: A Study of Anomie</u>. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1948).
- 16. An overly-simple, but relevant, interpretation is that liberals split-off hostility and locate it in the imagery of business.
- 17. Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology The Issue-Attention Cycle, The Public Interest, 28 (summer, 1972), pp. 38 50. For a discussion of switch mechanisms in emotional life, see Leiv R. Gjessing, The Switch Mechanism in Periodic Catatonia and Manic Depressive Disorder, Chronobiologia 2,307 (1975), pp. 307 315. Among liberal activists, my impression is that the shift is backwardly-triggered by shifts in imagery resulting from actions (or inactions) of government.
- 18. In some respects, as Costantini and Craik have shown, a significant number of conservative Republicans who become active in politics are more dutiful about obligations. They are stalwart, respectable members of the community, hard-headed about the long-term investments of time and energy needed to effect political change, and more given to sustained organization. Their political conventions can be more boring, but their support for leaders can be more reliable. See E. Costantini and K. Craik, Personality and Politicians: California Party Leaders, 1960 1976, <u>Journal of Personality and Social</u>

- 19. This section draws upon Lloyd Etheredge, President Reagan's Counseling, <u>Political Psychology</u> 5:4 (1984), pp. 737 740. For a more recent discussion, see M. Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie. Unpublished xerox, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1985.
- 20. Economists specializing in economic development often seem to agree that culture (including relations to authority), and the change of cultural variables, are critical to the rate of economic growth in <u>underdeveloped</u> countries. A useful discussion of the classic ideas in this literature, and of Latin American culture as it may affect economic performance, is Lawrence E.. Harrison, <u>Underdevelopment is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case</u>. (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Harvard University and Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985).
- 21. For another effort to think-through the holding power of ideologies, and their resistance to rational decision engineering methods for policy analysis, see Aaron Wildavsky s recent work, e.g., A World of Difference: The Public Philosophies of Rival American Cultures and From Political Economy to Political Culture or Rational People Defend Their Way of Life, both unpublished working papers, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, Fall, 1985. My approach agrees with Wildavsky s in using the language of the self and pointing to separate worlds. The syndromes I discuss are, I think, grounded more universally in human psychology and reflect political content for imagination systems that, with changed nouns to designate different higher presences, could apply to any authority figure and, as abnormally intense entrapments, to clinical syndromes.

- 22. See, for example, Herbert Stein, <u>Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy From Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond</u>. Revised and Updated. (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1985). For recent examples, see David Stockman, <u>The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed</u> (NY: Harper and Row, 1986).
- 23. The presence of strong idealized imagery above the self is critical for a diagnosis of psychological dependency. President Reagan accurately describes the presenting symptoms of the syndrome - idealizing imagery, enervation of energy, complaining, etc., which supports the present argument that he has a serious model in mind. Similarly, the arguments discussed in Stein op. cit. concerning the liberal way of life associated with this shift in national drama and modal personality (e.g., drugs and anomie, divorce, teenage pregnancy, reduction in work and academic motivation) are part of a recognizable clinical syndrome. Its logic may not be fully apparent to economic analysts attempting a fairminded evaluation for public discussion who lack training in psychological models: thus, for example, Sawhill and Stone refer to effects on climate and suggest that messages from the Rose Garden may well yet have an impact on the way managers and workers behave and, perhaps on the economy s efficiency and productivity. The inability of economists to adequately explain the long-term rise and fall of national economics could rest on just such intangibles. The enterprise is deeper and involves far more than messages from the Rose Garden - for example, alteration of the allegedly claustrophobic and enervating experience of vivid hierarchy. The quotation is from Isabel V. Sawhill and Charles F. Stone, The Economy: The Key to Success in John L Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill (Eds.), The Reagan Record: An Assessment of America's Changing Domestic Priorities. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 69- 105, p. 105.
- 24. Simple aggregate comparisons across nations cannot reliably settle issues for the American case. For example, a Value-Added-Tax (relatively invisible ) might allow

government to acquire a higher percentage of GNP without spiritually inhibiting effects. As Lucian Pye shows, dependency must be understood within the context of a culture - thus the fact that Japanese workers are thought to be dependent in relations to authority, yet still highly motivated and productive, does not show President Reagan to be incorrect about the dynamics (e.g., dependency yields enervation and a reduced rate of growth) in the United States with a culture created around individualism, which eschews the identity merger and group-level enthusiasm found in Japan, uses different management styles, etc.. See Lucian W. Pye with Mary Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

- 25. A range of system-affect measures also suggest considerable skill in altering images and feelings. See Jack Citrin and Donald P. Green, Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley. Unpublished working paper, 1985.
- 26. Consumer confidence is a traditional concept in economic psychology. Today, an extraordinary range of differentiated personality, imagery, political-system affect (see footnote 18, above) and social psychological scales are available. For a review of consumer confidence research, see Richard Curtin, Curtin on Katona, in Henry W. Spiegel and Warren J. Samuels (Eds.), Contemporary Economists in Perspective. (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1984), pp. 495-522. See also Bums W. Roper, The Predictive Value of Consumer Confidence Measures, Public Opinion Quarterly, 46 (1982), pp. 361 367.
- 27. The appropriate measure of dependency in a psychological model differs from measures of dependency appropriate to a rationalist model (i.e. the claim of psychological dependency on the part of  $\underline{y}$  is not the claim that the behavior of  $\underline{y}$  is a dependent variable).

- 28. Measures concerning the presence of a strong imagination system, and the location, size, substantiality, etc. of the imagery-encoding involved can be readily developed. Relevant work on horizontal encoding (left-right), which usefully distinguishes people who only use the words from people who genuinely experience left-right forces, is Hans D. Klingemann, What Left and Right Means to Mass Publics. Variations in the Understanding of Political Symbols. Unpublished paper presented to the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1982. Jean Laponce has contributed extensively to research; a useful entry to the growing citation chain is his S patial Archetypes and Political Perceptions, American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 11 69. The methodology developed in research to apply Bion s work to the study of politics has also afforded a useful basis for testing macro-economic applications of similar imagination-encoding theories see, for example, S. R. Brown and J. Ellithorp, Emotional Experiences in Political Groups: the Case of the McCarthy Phenomenon. American Political Science Review, 1970, 64:2, pp. 349 366.
- 29. A useful baseline of American achievement motivation, from which to assess national changes is Joseph Veroff, Charles Depner, Richard Kulka, and Elizabeth Douvan,
  Comparison of American Motives: 1957 Versus 1976, Journal of Personality and Social
  Psychology, 39:6 (1980). pp. 1249 1262. The most recent review of the McClelland achievement motivation hypothesis is Stephen E. G. Lea, Roger M. Tarpy, and Paul
  Webley, The Individual in the Economy: A Survey of Economic Psychology (NY:
  Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 436 441. See also R. Scott Frey, Ne ed for
  Achievement, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth: A Critique of the McClelland
  Thesis. Social Science Journal, 21:2 (April, 1984), pp. 125 134. Liberals may be right
  about major backward linkages and that one can engage or change motivations by changing imagery. Thus Lasswell s famous dictum that personal motives were displaced outward
  onto public issues should now be complemented by a recognition that the reverse process

also occurs - Harold D. Lasswell, <u>Psychopathology and Politics</u> (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1930). For relevant research concerning changes in personality induced by imagery training, see David McClelland and David Winter, <u>Motivating Economic Achievement</u>. (NY: Free Press, 1969).

- 30. Thus the current Administration s policies reflect a variation from a baseline, but the baseline is set (and maintained) at the system level. For a brief overview of the historical record see, for example, Perry D. Quick, Business: Reagan s Industrial Policy in John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill (Eds.), The Reagan Record: An Assessment of America s

  Changing Domestic Priorities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 287 316, esp. pp. 312-314.
- 31. See Lynn Etheredge, An Aging Society and the Federal Deficit, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 62:4, 1984, pp. 521 p. 521 543, p. 543.
- 32. Strong, socially-involved imagery is apparently a phenomenon with major variation in the population and probably occurs more readily among field-dependent people. See, for example, the extensive range of work in W. A. Witkin et al., Field-Dependent and Field-Independent Cognitive Styles and Their Educational Implications. Review of Educational Research. 47:1 (Winter, 1977), pp. 1 64.
- 33. For a general discussion of the sense of self, and social contexts, see Kenneth J. Gergen and K. E. Davis (eds.), <u>The Social Construction of the Person</u>. (NY: Springer Verlag, 1985).
- 34. Psychologists have high standards concerning these issues: the best rigorous research, using national probability samples, rates only a small percentage of American adults as the

strong and independent individuals, with exogenous preferences and self-starting motivation, portrayed as <a href="https://www.nobert.nc.">https://www.nobert.nc.</a> Measure of Ego Development: Reliability and National Norms for Male and Female Short Forms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 39:5 (1980), pp. 909 - 920. To a psychologist, self-blaming is not a valid measure of independence; the evidence that Americans are individually self-blaming when faced with individual hardship is not directly interpretable on these issues, especially when self-blaming is socially-sanctioned. For evidence concerning the ethic of self-reliance and self-blame in America, see Paul M. Sniderman and Richard A. Brody, Coping: The Ethics of Self-Reliance," <a href="American Journal of Political Science">American Journal of Political Science</a>, 21:3 (August, 1977), pp. 501 - 521. Note, however, that both political parties compete by using the claim that they will foster economic growth and the evidence that economic performance affects American voting is substantial. Thus, there are several issues and levels of interaction to be sorted-out.

- 35. The concept of growth via integration and individuation begins with Jung: see E. F. Edinger, Ego and Archetype: Individuation and the Religious Function of the Psyche (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1973). A good review of recent, and more rigorous, stage-development models is Jane Loevinger, <u>Paradigms of Personality</u> (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1989).
- 36. And probably contribute to refined thinking about psychology and growth, now viewed almost exclusively as a problem of heroic individualist entrepreneurs. The motive patterns which support growth and a well-functioning economy are more varied see, for example, the review of Weber's thesis and the empirical interactions identified in the research of David L. Rothberg, Insecurity and Success in Organizational Life: Sources of Personal Motivation Among Leaders and Managers (NY: Praeger, 1981). An outstanding current review of behavioral economics is Stephen G. Lea, Roger M. Tarpy, and Paul Webley, The

Individual in the Economy: A Survey of Economic Psychology, op. cit., which considers individuals in their roles as entrepreneurs, workers, consumers, investors and savers, and givers of charity for each of which, pubic drama effects need to be assayed. I am indebted to Peter Lange for suggesting a Margaret Thatcher stable-environment and stable-expectations theory be added for hypothesis testing. Also, to Bob Bates for suggesting that hierarchical relationships within market organizations be included. As well, different messages may need to be sent to different groups - young people considering whether to start a business, many Wall Street investors may want stability, large mutual fund trading may be sufficiently computerized that only track 1 models need to be used, etc.

- 37. For discussion and empirical evidence, along the lines developed here of the enhanced psycho-social maturity of the self in liberal arts education, and its long term effects increasing civic participation, see David Winter, David McClelland, and Abigail Stewart, A New Case for the Liberal Arts: Assessing Institutional Goals and Student Development, op. cit.
- 38. Os car Jaszi, <u>The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy</u> (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1929).
- 39. Dean Acheson, <u>Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department</u> (NY: Norton, 1969).
- 40. For a similar discussion of Weber's concept of professionalization in political life, and personal integration as a requirement for constructive political work, see William K. Muir, Police: Streetcomer Politicians. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
- 41. This paper was originally presented at a conference to honor my former teacher, Robert

W. Tufts of Oberlin College. I have a cherished memory of Bob Tufts from a seminar devoted to the Marshall Plan. One of the papers touched upon the tough-minded arguments of the planning group, of which Bob was a member; as George Kennan described in his memoirs, at times it was an emotionally exhausting experience. Bob told us that, to have arguments taken apart with such rigor, piece- by- piece, was one of the best things that can happen to you. Taking these ideas apart, piece by piece, and subjecting them to rigorous empirical test is, as an investment in our future, one of the best things that could happen.