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3

On Being More Rational Than the Rationality Assumption: Dramatic Requirements, Nuclear Deterrence, and the Agenda for Learning

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For almost a quarter century, a principal theory of how to produce intelligent U.S. defense policy (and arms control) has been to design courses at leading universities and professional training to equip policy analysts and decision makers with the tools of rational decision engineering. The core strategic investment has been the Harvard-MIT arms control program, and its graduates have produced a substantial increase in the technical sophistication of discussion on both sides of defense issues and also produced useful learning concerning several major aspects of nuclear policy. However, this theory of learning and investment did not itself produce major arms control agreements. As Schelling notes, the influence of academic guidelines for rational decision making ceased to determine the main outlines of U.S. policy in the early 1970s.[1]

What lessons do we draw from this experiment? My assessment is that government learning did not occur quickly as a result of the direct impact of the Cambridge- (Brookings-) style of analysis because academically created analytic methods have implicitly misspecified the phenomenon of power as it is experienced by many practitioners—and have thus failed to be fully persuasive. Until this sensibility of political leaders is engaged forthrightly, and its alternative logic explored more thoughtfully and systematically, further overall improvement generated from the academic world is unlikely.

FROM RATIONAL CHOICE MODELING TO A DUAL-TRACK FRAMEWORK

What is at issue becomes clearer, I think, if we drop the (too narrow) rational actor assumption and substitute a framework that thinks of decision makers (and their audiences) as dual-track information processors. In this conception, the first track (A) remains the familiar capacity for rational analysis and constructing chains of analytical reasoning already embodied in the rational actor model. The second track (B) is the mind's encoding of knowledge in the imagination—for example, as drama—with behavior being shaped by the emotional impact of direct experience and intuition rather than by analytic reasoning. According to this sensibility, the United States's power in international relations exists and lives (so to speak) as drama.[2]

This conception that political power may be an effect of political drama rather than analytical reasoning and logical deduction may seem obvious—or an obscure reference. Logically, power motivation might be considered exogenous to, and independent of, other elements of foreign policy decision making (e.g., perceptions and theories about how the world works). However, a body of empirical research in social psychology suggests that high power motivation is a syndrome, a package that includes a distinctive and highly dramatized experience of reality. If one asks people with high power motivation to create stories and describe the states of mind that lie behind the actions of others (a standard TAT measure), they typically imagine that other people, as well, have high power motivation and, indeed, the entire world acquires the coloration, in their experience, of a universal power drama. The more highly, and single-mindedly, ambitious and power-motivated the individual, the more vivid and single-minded his or her experience that others have similar ambitions for power—and, to a significant degree, the more universal the international security dilemma.[3]

There also appears to be a second process at work when the imagination is used to create the experience of a power drama— although it has not been as extensively researched by quantitative methods and is primarily discussed by clinicians. The imagination appears to operate by zero-sum modeling rules. Thus, at the extreme of high power motivation, world power politics becomes encoded as a competitive, unitary phenomenon; all are actors embedded within a single, hierarchical global drama (or game of chess), the question of whose "will" dominates the drama is the primary issue, and it is a zero-sum contest ("our" sphere versus "their" sphere, the separate identities of other nations being subsumed within the drama) that is jointly psychological and geographic.[4]

Perhaps as a way of underscoring this suggestion—that distinctive and atypical power drama sensibilities are present in national security decision making—one could cite a common view among political scientists that psychologists without training in international relations (and other sincere and well-intentioned people—such as clergymen—who also lack such training) are often naive about questions of power. This criticism has force—and it illustrates, I think, the fact that the strong power motivations correctly perceived by specialists in international politics are not statistically universal in human psychology.

THE DUAL-TRACK FRAMEWORK: TWO SYSTEMS OF DEFENSE BUDGETING AND STRATEGIZING

Based upon these two modes of information processing are two distinct systems of defense budgeting and thinking about nuclear strategy. These two systems differ in their use of either (1) realistic military encounter scenarios (which assume that other actors use a rational analytical mode) or (2) a strongly dramatized sensibility that employs associational psychology to effect impression management, specifically to create and maintain a personified and dramatized image of the United States in the minds of others, as a primary mechanism to create deterrent effects.

Model A—Rational Analysis and Realistic Military Encounters

On the conventional side, the thrust of rational analysis is to ground defense and deterrence in the detailed analysis of realistic military encounters. One defines national interests; forecasts what wars might be fought and where; and after careful gaming and realistic encounter analyses (e.g., how many Soviet divisions, with what equipment, might move into the Persian Gulf?), "adds up" the totals of the human resources and military equipment needed to prevail.[5] One also makes rational actor assumptions about potential adversaries. With such realistic capability and preparedness, one is ready to fight and win—and thus, by counting on the other side to "read the numbers," one deters.

On the nuclear side, rational actor assumptions have generated several guidelines for policy, of which I focus on two:

1. By introducing (successfully) the concept of *arms race* explicitly into the discussion, one makes a compelling argument, to all rational actors, that a continuing arms buildup merely wastes money and that arms control agreements should have been struck long ago,
2. The MAD doctrine has prescribed a specific stop-point for the stability of deterrence—again, a stop-point that rational actors will

honor if their goal is deterrence and if they make rational actor assumptions about the other side.

Model B—Public Drama and Impression Management

According to the second system, all power relationships (including U.S. ones) are a dramatic art, and one creates and manages power as an exercise in applied psychology, shaping a dramatic presence that, in the minds of others, becomes their experience of reality. Thus, while its practitioners may make an effort to talk in ways that induce people to act rationally, in reality Model B makes only minimal assumptions about the likelihood that they do so habitually. Specifically, this model seeks to create and maintain a vivid and compelling imagery, which can impress itself directly and does not rely upon the capacity of opposing leaders, or their influential publics, to read tables of numbers or to think matters through.[6] This sensibility, I suggest, is the cause of the following logic in decision making:

1. Of primary importance in the maintaining of imagery is its tendency to remain vivid only in the short term and to fade unless it is renewed. Thus, for purposes of deterrence, any existing (prior) base of weaponry must be substantially discounted. Just as a minister who seeks to maintain the experience of God's love among the congregation cannot (and does not) rely upon the stock of past sermons, delivered weekly over many years, and so gives a new sermon, so the requirements for deterrence via imagery are requirements for *this* year's impression based on *this* year's actions. Thus, the percentage of real increase requested in the defense budget, this year, is taken to be a primary determinant of this year's image of commitment to strength and the will to continue as an active and a serious player in the world arena. (Judging from recent requests, the present U.S. calibration for the desired effect appears to be 5 percent plus, even 3 percent being dangerously close to what President Carter settled for.)

2. The image of strength and resolve requires, further, that politicians be extraordinarily sensitive, and quick to respond, to any growing public discussion that this desired image is weakening among the general public. Thus, when numbers of weapons (in categories completely irrelevant for realistic military encounter calculations) begin to shift adversely against the United States *and* public discussion of such a trend which is apprehension of the United States' "weakening will" are observed, a countervailing buildup is enjoined.

3. Being impressive also differs, as a policy logic, from rational (realistic encounter) sensibilities when addressing questions of high technology weaponry. Model B practitioners reach for a psychological effect via associational psychology: Bigger, faster, and technologically awesome weapons—although they may not be maintainable or work reliably in actual combat and can only be acquired in fewer numbers than less expensive weapons—have the compelling merit of making U.S. military power look more formidable.[7]

4. Impression management also differs, in a critical respect, in its logic of preparedness. Rational analysis deterrence emphasizes the *genuine* ability to fight and prevail and enjoins high levels of preparedness. However, if one wishes to deter by a dramatization model—that is, to convey that the United States is tough, strong, confident, and a bit menacing but not *too* menacing—then one appropriately gives only modest attention to preparedness in the allocations of the Defense Department budget. (Indeed, given the recent drama of a rapid U.S. arms buildup, preparing to *use* these new weapons to fight a war, and undertaking such rational steps as solving the C3I problem, would be proscribed as creating too menacing an image—and dangerously stupid.) In this regard, it may be that President Reagan's Star Wars program—"irrational" from the standpoint of rational choice assumptions—may be highly functional *if* it conveys a vivid impression of a technologically impressive United States committed to strengthening its confidence even further (by neutralizing the threat of nuclear weapons) and willing to escalate arms expenditures massively if necessary.

5. Finally, it is worth noting that paying primary attention to the logic of managing international drama may be a route not only to deterrence but also to arms control. Specifically, the MAD stop-point did not work and if one of the reasons is that the Soviet (and/or U.S.) *public* cannot be relied upon to "read the numbers" and must be addressed by drama—be *vividly* impressed by the dangers of nuclear war and *vividly* impressed by the determination of the other side to continue a costly and pointless arms race—then a drama to realize these impressions could be, and perhaps will turn out to be, a political strategy for a major arms control agreement.

DISCUSSION

If the dual-track framework has merit, then to portray the Reagan administration as *prima facie* irrational, motivated by implacable ideological hostility, or irresponsible and reckless because it did not primarily follow prescriptions derived from academic rational actor assumptions misses the deeper point at issue. With all due respect to Jervis, the "illogic" has a logic, and perhaps (if the model of a drama-oriented, impressionistic, and assocational psychology of others should prove valid) there was a tense necessity to the enterprise.[8]

I can illustrate the problem of necessity by Table 3.1, which shows that deterrent outcome varies whether or not one has the realistic capability and will to prevail and also varies whether or not one conveys the impres-

TABLE 3.1. Deterrent Outcome as a Function of Impression Management and Realistic Capability

		Impression of Capability and Will	
		No	Yes
Realistic Capability and Will	No	Failure	Success
	Yes	Failure	Success

sion of the capability and will to prevail. Although impressions obviously require a component of reality if they are to be sustained in the long run, paying primary attention to impression management is the more successful strategy. Deterrence theorists have consistently emphasized the importance of conveying credibility and resolve, but in practice, these requirements have been served by a Model B logic that adopts different policy choices than is derived from a consistent application of Model A thinking.

The distinction between rational assumptions about other actors and drama-based sensibilities can also be seen in crisis decision making. During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, and others agreed with Defense Secretary McNamara's view that "a missile is a missile," and it made little realistic difference to U.S. national security if some of the newly acquired nuclear missiles of the Soviet Union were placed in Cuba. Seeing the rational sensibility, the president and his advisers nevertheless felt *compelled* to act on a different sensibility, the drama of superpower confrontation, which the president himself estimated to carry at least a 30 percent probability of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. *Others* would think in these public drama terms. The fact that the political decision makers, who had high degrees of rational and analytical ability, did not rely fully upon the assumptions about Russian leaders and wider publics illustrates the two separate tracks. The correct inference, I suggest, is, not that these men were "irrational," but that they had a capacity of mind that allowed them to construct an understanding of international power relations as, critically, a public drama—and thereby felt compelled, by the necessity for effective and responsible political management in international politics, to be more rational than to use only a (too limited) Model A sensibility and logic.[9]

DRAMATIC REQUIREMENTS: A SYSTEM-INDUCED BARRIER TO LEARNING

"There is a pervasive sense among both critics of nuclear weapons and strategists inside the security establishment that . . . what passes for a strategic debate is little more than construction of a facade,"[10] but I want

to emphasize that this new framework for thinking about decision making is a *dual*-track model. Both the logic of rationality assumptions about other actors, emphasizing capabilities and coupled to realistic encounter scenarios, and the "logic" of creating and sustaining an effective power drama interweave in nuclear policy. Indeed, Model A sensibilities have been important since the early days when "massive retaliation" was both the declaratory and the operational policy. As I have suggested, for some critical issues—including crisis stability, survivability, and the distinction between first-strike and second-strike weapons—the contribution to learning on the part of people who work in areas related to this model has been impressive.[11] But the dual-track framework clarifies exactly those points where system-level learning (as prescribed by the rationality assumption school) has *not* occurred, that is, those issues I have outlined above that reflect the contours, and primacy, of Model B sensibilities.[12]

However, Model B assumptions affect the democratic process in a way that may also inhibit learning by a wider citizenry. Such assumptions introduce a complex skewness and breakdown in public discussion by making political leaders of the Model B persuasion unavailable for serious discussion and also block candid discussion of the reason for the problem. This backward linkage of a system-level logic, undermining normal forms of domestic political debate and inhibiting collective learning, probably is not fully appreciated by students, and it calls for an unusual political sophistication on the part of citizens (and policy makers) in interpreting so-called policy debate.

Model B deterrence enjoins a unitary international self-presentation of confidence and rational mastery, and, as a result of these dramatic requirements, practitioners must view public discussions involving a domestic audience as, themselves, a part of this international drama.[13] Thus, it is a requirement of effective Model B political leadership that critics be managed, as if in a lower status in a top-down drama, to prevent the introduction of doubts, fear, or weakness in the self-presentation. Out of necessity, political movements that seek to end the arms race will be ignored (if this tactic is effective), viewed as a threat, or treated—publicly—in a patronizing manner that does not respond to the urgency, or rational cogency, of the arguments.[14]

The effect is fascinating, although it may have deadly implications: Role-constrained Model B leaders can sometimes exhibit a complex ambivalence, pursuing their policies publicly while also sending indirect messages to encourage future critics.[15] Take, for example, President Eisenhower, whose declaratory policy was massive nuclear retaliation. In a private letter, he wrote the following: "I have spent my life in the study of military strength as a deterrent to war, and in the character of military armaments necessary to win a war. . . . When we get to the point, as we

one day will, that both sides know that in any outbreak of general hostilities, regardless of the element of surprise, destruction will be both reciprocal and complete, possibly we will have sense enough to meet at the conference table with the understanding that the era of armaments has ended."[16]

Model B clarifies, I think, why Eisenhower would pursue one set of public policies while signaling indirectly, and toward the end of his term, that the people of the world should not be misled into following their Model B leaders. The unusual and complex political agenda needed to shift this international system lock-in—without the normal forms of political leadership being available—is clarified, I think, if we recognize the nature of Model B thinking and self-constrained discussion in national security affairs.

THE DUAL-TRACK FRAMEWORK AND LEARNING

"Man in his elemental state is a peasant with a possessive love of his own turf; a mercantilist who favors exports over imports; a Populist who distrusts banks, especially foreign banks; a monopolist who abhors competition; a xenophobe who feels threatened by strangers and foreigners . . . it is the task of [good theoretical education in] international economics to extirpate these primitive instincts."[17] Kindleberger's apt prescription for economic policy learning applies to the current U.S.-Soviet arms race: The sensible system-level judgment is that both sides should call it off. But to move from diagnosis to prescription calls for a specific answer to a general problem, which has not yet been solved: How does one create a new way to discuss public policy to empower people and call forth greater collective intelligence? And, especially, how does one do so when two logically incommensurable paradigms are involved?[18] One strategy to teach Leviathans is simply to persevere in teaching and prescribing Model A rationality assumptions, but the academic world has been warned: Cambridge-based, patronizing efforts to hold this self-conceived high ground and merely continue to assert Model A may get one ignored or the learning rate may be held below the potential the academic world might engage.

A model of dual-track processing suggests one answer to the problem, the diagnosis that learning rates have stalled because decision makers and their critics seek to be rational (i.e., effective) but differ primarily about an *empirical* question—the extent of dramatization requirements in international power relationships. Thus, at one level, I think the possibilities for applying social science to aid discussion and learning are hopeful. The following four points suggest the avenues by which these two logics can be explored and integrated in discussion:[19]

1. In the long run, the rationality of other actors assumed in Model A would probably be more stable—and less expensive—if it could be demonstrated or created. Thus, current Model A criticisms (e.g., of arms races) seem valuable to create and maintain standards for public discussion. They establish criteria for how people should behave *if* they were rational and are a critical investment, part of a process to *create* rationality in a world that is not yet up to such modeling assumptions. In principle, one probably finds internal divisions, within both the United States and the Soviet Union, between people who think about deterrence rationally and focus on military capabilities to be effective in realistic encounters and those whose highly dramatized sensibilities of power produce drama-oriented policies. In the long term, it is probably wiser to see the issue as how to strengthen the Model A (rational and undramatized) sensibilities in policy formation and reduce the extent of dramatization in the U.S.-USSR relationship, on both sides.

2. One approach to learning would be to grant (for the sake of argument) the Model B assumptions and, within these assumptions, discuss how to improve policy.[20] Thus, for example, one might argue for *consistency* of dramatizations in creating deterrent impressions.[21] It might also be useful for the annual Brookings reviews of the defense budget to include additional analyses of impression management sensibilities and, within overall budget totals, suggest the areas of highest return.[22]

3. Like a *Star Wars* drama of good versus evil and a battle for control of the universe, global power dramas can become engaging preoccupations for the imagination, and side-payments need to be acknowledged as well as costs and dangers: Drama management is obviously an expensive and, in major respects not included in Table 3.1, a potentially risky sensibility. It can be a black hole for expenditure of large sums of cash. Decision makers can capture their own imaginations, overestimating the capacities of their performances to define reality as it is experienced by others and overestimating the deftness by which they can produce deterrent effects without raising counterproductive fears.[23] Theatrical requirements, understood by the sophisticated, can open doors for career advancement of people who fail to appreciate the sophisticated multilevel orchestration[24] and take some of the rhetoric of declaratory policy literally (e.g., the bold talk of nuclear war fighting capability). Budget levels, set to manage emotional reactions via symbolic politics, can become hostage to the sensibilities of the most excitable and alarmist members of the public. A continuing pattern of high defense expenditures creates economic interests and can alter domestic political systems.[25] In the long term, any tendency of attentive publics to think in dramatic terms can be strengthened by the confirmation that national leaders take these sensibilities seriously. Persistent and strong dramatizations may also affect the decision makers them-

selves, increasing subjective entrapment within such dramas, and they may have the unintended consequence of reducing the capacity of rational analysis to direct behavior.

4. Political scientists have not yet assessed the validity of Model B assumptions about the nature of power in the international system, and it would be helpful for the profession to design a research program, and add the second track to the curriculum, to address the problem rigorously. Earlier research by McClelland and Winter concerning variations in the strengths of achievement, power, and affiliation themes in national dramas suggests the sensibility of an intense global power drama is probably a *variable* which differs for different country's leaders in different periods of history.[26] Their evidence also suggests it may be a variable primarily determined as an attribute of the nation-state rather than by motivational patterns of other actors or the international political system.

PUBLIC DRAMA AND THE DOMINO THEORY

Leading U.S. universities and foundations have not sought to bring Third World interventions under the same intellectual control as nuclear weapons. But the issues of international power to be addressed to foster politically relevant, scientific discourse with decision makers present, in a similar fashion, questions of assessing the public drama requirements (if any) for power and deterrence.

The scientific issues exhibit a parallel form to the problem of learning in the case of nuclear deterrence. The Model A version of the domino theory emphasizes changes in physical reality and their effects upon realistic military encounters. Thus, threats to security of the United States or other nations are primarily created because a victor has acquired a new staging area from which to invade territory physically contiguous to this new staging area.

Model B imagines power—and deterrence—as the unitary persona of a hegemonic power that impresses itself—through inhibiting, intimidating, demoralizing, or some other deterrent effect—upon the imagination of would-be challengers.[27] The global political drama is sufficiently unitary and commonly perceived that, for example, a visible public defeat of the United States in Southeast Asia (e.g., in the Korean or Vietnam War) would dangerously weaken U.S. power in Europe or the Middle East.

The Model A theorist would believe that the credibility of U.S. deterrence to prevent a Soviet invasion of the Middle East would depend upon U.S. military capabilities and the rationally understood magnitude of truly vital U.S. interests in the region. Such rational, local credibility would be unaffected by a U.S. withdrawal from any unpromising, minor war in Southeast Asia. Similarly, to the Model A theorist, a victory by Fidel Castro or the Sandinista government in Nicaragua could pose no serious threat to U.S. security so long as the United States retained massive military superiority in the Caribbean, could prevent any physical aggression from coming to fruition, and could overthrow the governments at will.

But the alarm—and even hysteria—in the reaction of a Model B decision maker would follow from the different sensibility of public drama and an audience—worldwide—in whose eyes the imposing persona of the United States (and too, client governments whose power was thought to depend upon U.S. power) would be diminished. By challenging the United States and winning, Castro or the Sandinistas become public heroes and role models, change the space of imaginative possibilities, and (via observational learning) encourage others to challenge the U.S. government (which is now perceived as more paper tigerish than before). Should such U.S. impression management fail—or its requirements not be correctly understood by naive or wishful thinkers—violence, as the Model B theorists who authored the Kissinger Commission report warned, could break-out in many countries around the globe.[28]

Model B international relations theory might be right, and one critical empirical question is whether international politics is sufficiently dramatized to invoke the mechanisms it postulates. The mechanisms themselves—for example, observational learning and attributional errors giving extraordinary weight to dramatized events—are standard phenomena that are possible under the right conditions.[29] The classic Milgram (and other) experiments by social psychologists provide compelling laboratory evidence that even *one* public challenge to an authority, when successful, produces an extraordinarily weakening of the authority-figure's power and promotes similar rebellion among those who witnessed the events.[30] The speed with which anticolonial wars and nationalism spread after World War II gave U.S. decision makers plausible empirical grounds to suspect that a collective world political drama, perhaps strengthened by the new mass media, enjoined—and still enjoins—the political necessities of a Model B, interventionist foreign policy.

NOTES

I am indebted to the Brookings Institution for a congenial setting in which to draft this chapter for private circulation in the summer of 1986 and to faculty colleagues at the Yale Arms Control and Disarmament Program for their discussion. My criticism of (plus respect for, notwithstanding) intellectual evasion at the core of the Harvard/MIT experiment at that time is unchanged and, as I believe subsequent events have shown, was essentially accurate.

1. "Thinking on arms control was on the right track, and was effective, from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, culminating in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, but . . . things have derailed since" (Schelling 1985–1986, 221). As March (1978) notes, little good evidence supports the theory that people trained in rational decision engineering will (or do) make better decisions outside of a narrowly defined set of technical problems.

2. I have elsewhere suggested that a dual-track framework, and a class of strong imagination system models, might clarify barriers to learning in other policy areas (see Etheredge 1985 concerning Third World interventions and Etheredge forthcoming). A parallel argument that variations in perception are more important than variations in technical rationality for the explanation of variations in political behavior is in Simon (1985). A useful review of drama entrapment models, which draws upon psychoanalytic research of small group dynamics and makes application to South Africa and other cases of political conflict, is Hare (1985).

3. The growing attention to power motivation is reflected in Etheredge (1985) and Frank (1987). For the basic research concerning the McClelland-Winter hypothesis, see Winter and Stewart (1978), Winter (1973), and McClelland (1975). Thus, for example, Richard Nixon—who would count, I think, as being highly power motivated—wrote of one Soviet leader that, "Brezhnev wants to rule the world, but he doesn't want war." Rigorous psychological measurements of foreign policy professionals have shown that the more ambitious the U.S. foreign service officer, the more likely he or she is to believe that the Soviet Union's involvement in the Middle East "is part of a long-range strategy to effect a sweeping action across North Africa, turn the Mediterranean into a Soviet lake, and lead to the Finlandization of Europe." By contrast, foreign service officers with lower (i.e., only moderately high, in this sample) power motivation were more inclined to imagine Soviet intentions in the Middle East as essentially opportunistic and to be skeptical that the Soviet leaders designed and pursued their Middle East policy as a subset of larger strategic plans to rule the world (see Etheredge 1978).

4. Etheredge (1978). On the interlocked construction of dramas and the sense of self within the drama, see Etheredge (forthcoming) and Gergen and Gergen (forthcoming).

5. There is still considerable impressionism in the practice of this rational analysis, and the scenarios and calculations may be less realistic than proponents believe (see, for example, Epstein, 1985 and Brewer and Shubik, 1979). A parallel argument to my analysis would suggest the potential benefits, to conventional force planning, of paying attention to the traditional belief that battles are seldom won by firepower that destroys an enemy but by creating the psychological impression of inevitable defeat. The primary mechanism by which such traditional tactics as driving wedges through enemy ranks and flanking actions succeed is via their psychological impact.

6. See, for example, the account in Stockman (1986, 291): "Defense Secretary Weinberger also brought with him to the meeting with the President a blown-up cartoon. It showed three soldiers. One was a pygmy who carried no rifle. He represented the Carter budget. The second was a four-eyed wimp who looked like Woody Allen, carrying a tiny rifle. That was—me?—the OMB defense budget. Finally, there was G.I. Joe himself, 190 pounds of fighting man, all decked out in helmet and flak jacket and pointing an M-60 machine gun menacingly at—me again? This imposing warrior represented, yes, the Department of Defense budget plan. . . . It was so intellectually disreputable. . . . Did he think the White House was on Sesame Street?"

7. See, for example, Fallows, (1981) and the Brookings Institution's annual defense budget reviews.

8. Jervis (1984). For a more systematic analysis that cognitive models can be improved by a dual-track formulation and locating "illogic" in the dramatization associated with high power motivation, see Etheredge (1985, 146–147 and passim). The still-wider set of issues to be addressed by an adequate, empirically grounded deterrence theory was posed by de Sola Pool (1969). The fact that the Reagan administration won reelection by carrying 49 states gave little reason to suppose that it would readily change its primary commitment to a drama management approach to political power.

9. See Etheredge (1985, 199–200). Robert Kennedy's privately conveyed assurances concerning the future removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey illustrate the creative use of both sensibilities in effecting a settlement.

10. Comment by Paul Bracken in Dahl (1985, 43).

11. For a more extensive discussion, see the overview in Nye (1986). See also George (1983, passim).

12. Note, however, that the contest between academically based Model A assumptions and practitioner-based Model B assumptions can be seen as what Zeckhauser, in another context, has called a "turf battle." If rationality can be defined by academic theorists, then academic theorists have the upper hand in making arguments that should govern policy (see Zeckhauser 1987).

13. A *facade* of rationality and rationality-based mastery, explored more fully in Bracken (1983) and logically in J. P. Bennett (1987). See also the broad indictment in Lebow (1987).

As John Steinbruner notes concerning the rational theory of deterrence, it is "plagued with internal paradox and unanswered questions" (see Steinbruner 1976). Geertz, applying Bentham's concept of "deep" play, suggests that bettors can get in over their heads, into dangerous risks that none should be running, when public status dramas are involved. "Shallow" or normal betting can be more or less rational. Bentham, of course, thought such "deep" play should be outlawed by legislation (see Geertz 1973a).

14. An *appearance* of paternalizing guardianship that is not justified on more thoughtful grounds (see Dahl 1985).

15. See, for example, Kull (1985). Political system entrapments, especially when leaders are self-reflective about them (but, as actors, continue to play the role), may be a different phenomenon than entrapment at the individual level (see, for example, Brockner and Rubin 1985 and Staw 1982).

16. Quoted in Dahl (1985, 36).

17. Kindleberger (1986, 7).

18. My emphasis on learning via *shifting discussions* (e.g., the creation of language and the nature of dialogue) reflects an evolution in organizational learn-

ing theory and the contributions of Habermas, among others (see Winograd and Flores 1986; W. Bennett 1985; and Gergen 1982). The broader and common agenda, which psychotherapists, policy scientists, and some philosophers may share, is suggested in Maranhalat (1986).

19. Note, however, that potential contributions of conventional science may lie in a limited realm: Scientific rationality belongs to a distinctive methodological and rhetorical realm; it is a mode of discourse for controlling (by excluding or not arousing) emotion. At least at the moment, there are no scientific methods by which the degree of dramatization of political relationships can be calibrated against an epistemological standard (see the apt observation in Geertz 1973b). But the danger of irreconcilable argument is, I think, overdrawn. There is a *pragmatic* way to engage Model B because, in nuclear cases, the symbolic politics involves not only expression of personal taste or feeling but also a set of propositions about how others think and behave politically (see, for example, Etheredge 1985).

20. See, for example, the discussion of these strategies in the work of Tetlock and Blight (for example, Tetlock 1986 and Blight 1986).

21. The Cuban missile crisis can be seen as a failure by President Kennedy to recognize what steps should have been taken to deter a Soviet missile deployment. Although Kennedy sent private messages to the Soviet leaders and made public speeches warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, his level of dramatization was markedly below the actions he adopted to deter Soviet assertiveness in Laos or Berlin, for example, placing troops on alert (see Etheredge 1985, 84).

22. For example, given the size of the Soviet army and its role in internal politics, it might be more useful for the United States to invest in massive numbers of relatively dramatic but low-cost weapons designed to neutralize tank assaults rather than to spend equivalent sums on new carriers. Discussion that takes Model B as valid may seem imprudent because a dramatic sensibility causes, and justifies, a wide range of policies which are politically controversial and which any thoughtful person would wish not to occur: domino theories and Third World interventions as well as the arms race. The intensity of dramatization, and a large sphere of the symbolic politics associated with it, apparently play a large role in ethnically based wars in the world, terrorism, and the classic cases of messianic empire-building (see, for example, Glad and Taber forthcoming).

As Donald Horowitz observes in his fine study of conflict, "the size and intensity of the symbolic sector, as a fraction of all demands, constitute an excellent indicator of malintegration" (Horowitz 1985, 216–217). For a perceptive discussion of learning agendas in highly dramatized domestic conflicts, see Apter and Sawa (1984).

23. The potential for error is greater than practitioners may imagine because their intuitive calibrations are learned primarily through experience with domestic audiences. This may have been one source of the erroneous prediction of European public reaction in the cruise missile controversy, which appears to have had continuing, long-term consequences for NATO (see, for example, Talbott 1985, esp. 186–187).

24. See, for example, Kull (1985).

25. See Russett (1983) for a brief review of research on the military-industrial complex and a baseline review of arms race theory.

26. For the McClelland-Winter hypothesis, see note 3. Such a program, I have suggested elsewhere, also would bear upon questions of stuck learning rates concerning economic growth policy (see Etheredge forthcoming). Preliminary ideas for such a program are discussed in Etheredge (1985, 196–204). From different traditions, similar views for the training of policy makers are developed in Meltsner (1976) and in a book with an analysis that may parallel national security affairs, Muir (1977). Current thought about these issues of societal and government learning on nuclear issues is included in White (1986, 511–566).

27. Thus, the behavior of the Israeli government to maintain hegemonic control of the West Bank and deter expansion of the *intifada* would afford a relevant current test of this theory of Model B dramatic sensibilities generating elite decison making.

28. See Etheredge (1985) for an extended discussion of the case.

29. See, for example, Bandura (1983) and Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982).

30. See, for example, the review in Moore (1978, chap. 3 and Fireman, Gamson, Rytina, and Taylor (1979).

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