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To: "Dr. Baruch Fischhoff - Chair, US National Academy of Sciences Committee on Improving Intelligence" <baruch@cmu.edu>

From: Lloyd Etheredge <lloyd.etheredge@policyscience.net>

Subject: 191. Red Team Analysis: A Weak, Underdeveloped, Offense Strategy in the War on Terror. Testing Strategies from Competitive Election Campaigns. WikiLeaks, Youth Audiences, & Smart Power

Dear Dr. Fischhoff & Colleagues:

A Red Team challenge to the behavioral assumptions of the Administration's Offense strategy in the war against terrorism is likely to identify untested or faulty assumptions, stimulate new thinking, and evolve a more rational strategy.

The *Defense* strategy (military + covert operations abroad and surveillance technologies) has been widely reported and well-funded. The political, economic, and psychological components of an *Offense* strategy are weak and mostly invisible. [Richard Clarke underscored this problem on a recent PBS Newshour interview: He dismissed the idea that a brilliant, creative, state-of-the-art, and well-funded Offense strategy has been disguised by public secrecy.]

Also, the phenomenon is a moving target: The self-enrolling terrorist arrests in the US, UK, and elsewhere suggest that the earlier theories/images of unformed Islamic youth, socialized in fundamentalist religious schools in the Middle East, are only part of the changing picture.

We Don't Really Have Better Ideas?

A Red Team project may find that the people who are responsible for an Offense strategy design - political, psychological, and economic - feel that they have run-out of good ideas and are doing the best that they can. If so, this is an expression of conventional wisdom that a Red

Team project should challenge.

- If better answers are not in the behavioral science literature, there should be a wide range of experiments underway: If every Wal-Mart store manager is expected to have at least a half-dozen new marketing experiments underway with tracking metrics, the Red Team should recommend a similar rapid learning strategy across Embassies and the intelligence community.

In reality, it probably is easy to identify major problems that a Red Team would want vigorously to address and challenge, to the benefit of a better future:

1.) Youth unemployment in high-risk Islamic countries. As the National Academy of Sciences panel recognizes, the DNI system already knows about the risks of high youth unemployment in Islamic UDCs. And the CCC model (e.g., # 40) is an obvious cost-effective approach by USAID (or more politically acceptable allies & corporations). Secretary Clinton, USAID, and other government agencies should have connected the dots already and have bold and effective preventive projects underway in Yemen and other highest risk countries. Prevention is rational and cost-effective: Probably, the Red Team will recommend that USAID should have much more money - quickly - to do the best that we know how to do.

2.) Cognitive Reframing. Cognitive and political psychologists have helped to create a new strategic/competitive framework for domestic political campaigns. The issue is not to change underlying attitudes but to "frame" (define) what an election is about. One US Offense response to still-small jihadist death cults should be to redefine the discussion to the bold and visionary opportunities for the future that is in everyone's interest to build. Projects for a rapid-learning global health system, using electronic health records, and benefitting people in all countries are a good start. Or NIH's visionary idea (# 147 at www.policyscience.net at II. D.) to begin with 250 million people and benefits in two years; which deserves rapid support (also, # 159 et passim)

Good behavioral science research suggests that there are idealistic and altruistic components in the chemistry of young suicide (or non-suicide) bombers and terrorists and the US can begin to shift the balance of these elements that affect recruitment (and social support) to different

causes and alternatives.

3.) WikiLeaks Spins. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, and others, are not doing nearly enough to "spin" the WikiLeaks evidence to the US advantage! After the "this should not have occurred" reaction and the (legitimate) demands to exclude details that could put lives at risk, the primary public message by Secretary Clinton and others should become: "If you want to understand the US and what we're really trying to do in the world, read the 250,000 cables. Look for yourself!"

My impression is that the cables (so far) have been impressive. We should be proud of what they show: They show serious, capable, US diplomats engaged in trying to solve problems. There is little duplicity and subterfuge: Often, they are trying to get other governments to be as far-sighted and constructive as America is trying to be. What you see is what you get. . . . And this is a very important message to many people around the world whose only (cynical) basis to calibrate their image of American foreign policy is assessments of their local politicians and governments.

- The Wikileaks cables could be an enormous political benefit for Secretary Clinton and others to use. There always is a new audience -e.g, the new global youth generation that has grown up thinking of America through the impressions of the last Bush Administration and the televised realities on al-Jazeera.

Re New Analysis Tools: Everybody is handicapped, at the moment, by the absence of the basic, public domain content analysis tools (e.g., # 15) that we need to monitor global trends in a digital age. However, my impression is that there is no "On Message" guidance for US Ambassadors around the world that is coming through. Nor does it appear that US Ambassadors think that we are running for office in a competitive political world.

A Red Team recommendation to build these public domain tools quickly would help the tracking metrics and rapid learning that, rationally, an Offense Strategy should have.

- I know that the latest Wikileaks revelations are evolving after the draft Report was approved. I hope that there will be a supplemental discussion - perhaps in a letter - that can convey further scientific advice to the DNI (e.g., for high priority Red Team analysis) at the time of official publication and transmission.

Best wishes for the New Year,
Lloyd

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